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ABSTRACT 
 
THE MONEY-MOVING SYNDROME  
AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FOREIGN AID 
 
BY 
 
NARA FRANÇOISE KAMO MONKAM 
 
May 10, 2008 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez 
 
Major Department: Economics 
 
This dissertation examines in depth one of the potential causes of the low 
performance of foreign aid; in particular, the role incentive structures within international 
donor agencies could play in leading to “a push” to disburse money. This pressure to 
disburse money is termed as the “Money-Moving Syndrome”. In this dissertation, the 
“Money Moving Syndrome” exists when the quantity of foreign aid committed or 
disbursed becomes, in itself, an important objective side by side or above the 
effectiveness of aid.  
The theoretical analysis relies on the principal-agent theory to explore how donor 
agencies’ institutional incentive systems may affect the characteristics of an optimal and 
efficient incentive contract and thus give rise to the “Money-Moving Syndrome”. We 
adapted the basic framework developed in Baker (1992) to fit the organizational settings 
of international development agencies. The model concludes that the extent to which a 
performance measure based the amount of aid allocated within a specific period of time 
would lead to the “Money-Moving Syndrome” and affect aid effectiveness depends on 
xi 
 
the level of institutional imperatives for survival and growth, the degree of aid agency’s 
accountability for effectiveness, the level of corruption in recipient countries and the 
degree of difficulty to evaluate development activities.  
Due to data unavailability regarding other bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, 
the empirical framework tests several predictions of the theoretical model by examining 
whether money moving incentives affect World Bank’s decisions regarding project loan 
size in developing countries. Overall, the empirical results suggest that there seems to be 
some degree of “Money-Moving Syndrome” in effect within the World Bank. 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
    If you spend your own money on yourself, you are very concerned about how 
much is spent and how it is spent. If you spend your own money on someone else, 
you are still very much concerned about how much is spent, but somewhat less 
concerned about how it is spent. If you spend someone else's money on yourself, you 
are not too concerned about how much is spent, but you are very concerned about 
how it is spent. However, if you spend someone else's money on someone else, you 
are not very concerned about how much is spent or how it is spent. 
Friedman, White House ceremony in his honor May 9, 2002 
 
Aid ineffectiveness, defined as the low performance of aid in promoting economic 
growth and reducing global poverty, is a problem utterly complex, prevalent and 
unfortunately still unresolved. For decades now, it has generated a huge literature 
reaching conflicting conclusions as to the justifications of aid, the impact of aid on 
growth and institutional reforms, and the role of economic and political institutions in aid 
effectiveness. Western countries, international donor agencies, recipient countries, and 
other agents in the aid delivery chain have been pondering why, after $2.2 trillion of 
official development assistance transferred to developing countries since 1960 and in 
spite of countless reform approaches (such as Financial Gap Approach, Sectoral and 
Structural Adjustments, Poverty Reduction Strategies, the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries Initiative, and so on), many aspects of the performance of international 
development assistance yet appear dismal.1  
In the discourse of foreign aid, the potential causes of the shortcomings of 
development assistance to promote economic growth and self-sustainability in poor 
                                                 
1 See review of literature on aid effectiveness in chapter two of this dissertation. 
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countries appear to be manifold, ranging from weak policies and institutions in recipient 
countries to problems within the donor agencies themselves.  
The goal of this dissertation is to examine in depth one of the potential causes of 
the low performance of foreign aid; in particular, the role incentive structures within 
international donor agencies could play in leading to “a push” to disburse money. This 
pressure to disburse money is termed as the “Money-Moving Syndrome.” In this 
dissertation, the “Money-Moving Syndrome” exists when the quantity of foreign aid 
committed or disbursed becomes, in itself, an important objective side by side or above 
the effectiveness of aid.  
 A fundamental reason to limit the scope of this dissertation to institutional 
framework within donor agencies is that without this transfer of funds to developing 
countries, there would be not much “foreign aid.” If the objective is to maximize the 
effectiveness of aid, it would appear essential to enhance the design and objectives of aid 
resources at the source, i.e., at the stage where the funds originate with donors, before 
considering the causes tainting aid in recipient countries.2 
The overall motivation for this dissertation is to uncover to what extent the 
“Money-Moving Syndrome” (thereafter MMS) may be one major handicap of foreign aid 
effectiveness and to what extent this syndrome may shape other incentives at the macro 
and micro levels of the aid delivery chain. In short, donors’ incentives to “move the 
money” may potentially hinder their genuine intentions to help poor countries, rendering 
                                                 
2 Of course, the misuse of aid funds by recipient countries is an equally deserving aspect of aid 
effectiveness. However, this dissertation does not address this aspect. See Boone (1996), Klitgaard (1991), 
World Bank (1998), Lancaster (1999), Svensson (2000), Alesina and Weder (2002), and Transparency 
International (2007) for a discussion of these issues.  
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these efforts ineffective and possibly in some cases, making an already deplorable 
situation in developing countries worse.  
The theoretical analysis relies on the principal-agent theory to explore how donor 
agencies’ institutional incentive systems may affect the characteristics of an optimal 
incentive contract and thus give rise to the Money-Moving Syndrome. Additionally, the 
model derives conditions required to reach an efficient outcome in terms of the impact of 
aid on poverty reduction and sustainable economic growth. We adapted the basic 
framework developed in Baker (1992) to fit the organizational settings of international 
development agencies. In the theoretical model, we assume that, given the difficulty to 
quantify the overall impact of aid, an aid agency that values its true mission to alleviate 
poverty and is concerned about organizational imperatives may choose to evaluate staff 
performance based the amount of aid allocated within a specific period of time. However, 
the extent to which this performance measure would lead to the “Money-Moving 
Syndrome” and affect aid effectiveness would depend on the level of institutional 
imperatives for survival and growth, the degree of aid agency’s accountability for 
effectiveness, the level of corruption in recipient countries and the degree of difficulty to 
evaluate development activities.  
Due to data unavailability regarding other bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, 
the empirical framework tests several predictions of the theoretical model by examining 
whether money moving incentives affect the World Bank’s decisions regarding project 
loan size and how these incentives may directly or indirectly affect the effectiveness of 
aid resources. In this dissertation, we posit that evidence in support of the “Money-
Moving Syndrome” can perhaps be used to provide some evidence as to why foreign aid 
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has not been more effective at reducing global poverty in developing countries despite 
the large amount of resources involved in achieving this mission over the years. Overall, 
the empirical results suggest that the quantity of foreign aid committed or disbursed 
appears as important a mission as the effectiveness of aid, suggesting that there seems to 
be some degree of “Money-Moving Syndrome” in effect within the World Bank. 
However, since the empirical analysis especially focuses on the World Bank’s 
development activities, the scope of the findings and conclusion would be somewhat 
limited because although the World Bank is one of the world’s largest sources of funding 
to the developing world, there are yet a multitude of other donors in the development 
scene.  
At this stage, it is important to mention that the intent of this study is not to 
identify who to blame for the ineffectiveness of foreign aid; the objective is rather to help 
demystify an undermining problem. No doubt, behind the ineffectiveness of international 
aid lie the many problems of recipient countries. However, examining the poor 
performance of the bureaucracies of developing countries is beyond the scope of this 
study. Thus, the contribution of this dissertation will not necessarily solve the problem of 
aid ineffectiveness. The scope of this dissertation is also limited to official aid as opposed 
to private contributions;3 i.e., we focus on money specifically coming from donor 
countries’ governments and channeled through bilateral and multilateral development 
                                                 
3 For instance, according to the USAID (United States Agency for International Development), the U.S. 
government provides today only 20 percent of U.S. foreign aid whereas American citizens and corporations 
provide 80 percent. In 2003, the official development assistance amounted to $16.3 billion while estimates 
of private contributions amounted to 62.1 billion (Kerlin 2006).  
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agencies, as well as money mobilized by multilateral organizations on international 
capital market.   
 
Background 
 There are two types of aid from developed countries to developing countries: the 
Official Development Finance (ODF) and the Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
also called “foreign aid,” which is a subset of ODF. The ODA, essentially destined to the 
poorest countries, is constituted of grants and concessional loans containing at least a 25 
percent grant component. The ODF encompasses all the inflows of finance to the 
developing world coming from donor countries and multilateral agencies. This financing 
is often done at interest rates close to those available on the market (World Bank 1998). 
Foreign aid is administered by either bilateral aid agencies, such as the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Kingdom’s Department for 
International Development (DFID), or multilateral aid agencies, such as the World Bank, 
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the Regional Development Banks (the African Development Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank), the European 
Commission (EC), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and so on. 
 Today, foreign aid appears as necessary as ever, although not a panacea. In a 
context of a thriving global economy, over a billion of people around the world are still 
afflicted by extreme poverty, living with less than a dollar a day (UNDP 2005). The 2005 
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World Bank annual report recounts that over 115 million children in developing countries 
are not educated, maternal mortality amounts to 10,000 women every week, 10.4 million 
children die every year before their fifth birthday, and more than 8,000 people die every 
day of AIDS. Even today, malaria has still not been brought under control and continues 
to kill over 1.1 million people every year. In addition, basic services are lacking; 1.4 
billion people in poor countries do not have access to potable water, and 3 billion of them 
live without electricity (World Bank 1998, 2006).  
 In the face of such a gloomy reality, many international development agencies 
have made their overall mission to promote economic growth and eradicate global 
poverty, generally attempting to do so through the stimulation of democracy, economic 
and political independence, environment protection, institutional environments, political 
stability, and so on. These goals have been incorporated into the “raison d'être” of many 
of these organizations. For instance, the World Bank states that its mission is “to fight 
poverty with passion and professionalism for lasting results”;4 the first Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG) adopted by 189 countries in the United Nations Millennium 
Declaration in September 2000 is to “eradicate extreme poverty and hunger by 2015”;5 
the Asian Development Bank’s vision is “a region free of poverty” and is similar to the 
African Development Bank’s mission to “combat poverty and improve the lives of people 
on the continent”;6 however, eliminating poverty is not the only objective in the agenda 
                                                 
4 The World Bank’s mission statement, available at http://www.worldbank.org/, accessed 10 September 
2007. 
 
5 http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/, accessed 10 September 2007. 
 
6 http://www.afdb.org/portal/page?_pageid=473,968615&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL, accessed 10 
September 2007. 
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of international development agencies and developing countries. Other aims include 
promoting sustained development through the achievement of primary education, the 
reduction of infant mortality and the curtailment of endemic diseases such as AIDS, 
malaria, and tuberculosis.   
 In order to achieve these goals, international development institutions have 
transferred over the last five decades in excess of $2.3 trillion of foreign aid to 
developing countries (World Bank 1998; Easterly 2006b).7 Since the 1960s, the volume 
of aid has increased in real terms, at the exception of a period of decline in the 1990s; and 
the plans are to double development assistance in the near future (World Bank 1998; 
Bourguignon and Leipziger 2006; Gupta et al. 2006).8 In 2006, the World Bank spent 
$950 million of its resources to combat poverty in the poorest countries (World Bank, 
News and Broadcast). During the 2005 G8 summit,9 world leaders decided to increase 
foreign aid by over $50 billion as of 2010 (UN 2005 World Summit, Sept. 2005). In 
2002, the White House pledged to increase U.S. foreign aid by $5 billion per year before 
2006 through the Millennium Challenge Corporation.10 Jeffrey Sachs, professor at 
Columbia University and chief advisor of the United Nations Millennium Development 
Project, and others such as the singer Bono and Microsoft’s founder Bill Gates, have 
                                                 
7 See also “Global aid shortfall” in globalissues.org, 
(http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/Development/aid/shortfall/), accessed 10 September 2007.  
 
8 Three factors explain the decline of aid flows in the 1990s: fiscal problems in donor countries, the end of 
the Cold War and the surge in private capital flows to developing countries (World Bank 1998). 
 
9 The G8 countries are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom., and the U.S. 
 
10 President Bush, Press Release, March 14, 2002, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D.C. 
   
8 
 
made their mission to lobby for more and more foreign aid to the poorest countries. This 
constant demand for further massive disbursements of aid is referred to in the literature as 
the “Big Push” (Moss and Subramanian 2006). In his book, The End of Poverty, Sachs 
urged the Rich Nations to undertake a Big Push of twice the current amount of aid (i.e., 
$135 billion) by 2006 and a new doubling of aid by 2015 in order to meet the MDGs 
(Sachs 2005).11 Overall, international aid is registering an unprecedented expansion; but 
what will be the results of this boom in terms of promoting economic growth and 
eradicating world poverty? 
 Evidently, there have been some success stories. In 1980, the WHO announced 
the eradication of smallpox around the world.12 From 1974 to 2002 and $556 million later 
from donor agencies, the Onchocerciasis Control Program (OCP) launched in West 
Africa has reduced the transmission of the parasite and prevented more than 200,000 
cases of blindness. Overall, 18 million people were prevented from contracting the 
disease.13 Thanks to a child nutrition project financed by the World Bank and the United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in Tanzania in 1983, severe and moderate 
malnutrition were reduced by 70 percent and 32 percent respectively; this program has 
been successfully implemented subsequently in other regions. With the Food for 
Education program in the early 1990s, the World Bank assisted in doubling female 
                                                 
11 See also Facts on International Aid in http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/endofpoverty/oda.html, 
accessed 10 September 2007. 
 
12 http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/su48a6.htm, accessed 10 September 2007. 
 
13 Onchocerciasis (or river blindness) is a disease mostly encountered in Africa and Yemen. It is 
transmitted by a black fly found near rivers. It causes itching, muscle pains and weakness and often leads to 
permanent blindness. http://www.ajtmh.org/cgi/content/full/72/1/1, accessed 10 September 2007. 
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enrollment in Bangladesh. In 1991, the World Bank helped finance the DOTS (directly 
observed treatment, short course) program for tuberculosis in China. In 10 years, the cure 
rate for tuberculosis went from 52 percent to 95 percent. Foreign aid also facilitated the 
expansion of high-yield variety seeds in Southeast Asia and India during the 1960s and 
1970s, which considerably improved agricultural outputs and reduced extreme poverty 
(World Bank 1998; Sachs 2005; Bourguignon and Leipziger 2006; Easterly 2006b).14 
Collaboration between aid donors, national governments and NGOs led to the near 
eradication of Guinea worm in many countries in Africa.15 In general, development 
assistance has likely played a great role over the years in progress made over life 
expectancy, child mortality, primary and secondary enrollment; and water and sanitation 
in the poorest countries. In addition, some countries have often been cited in the literature 
as successful cases of development fostered by substantial aid flows; these countries are 
Korea, Taiwan, Ghana, Uganda, Botswana, Mozambique, and Vietnam (World Bank 
1998; Devarajan et al. 2001; Bourguignon and Leipziger 2006).16 Finally, in the literature 
on the effects of aid on recipient countries, some studies have found evidence that aid 
spurs growth, albeit under specific conditions (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Hansen and 
Tarp 2000, 2001; Collier and Dollar 2002; Clemens et. al. 2004; Moreira 2005).17  
 
                                                 
14 http://www.yaleeconomicreview.com/issues/summer2006/sachs.php, accessed 10 September 2007. 
 
15 http://www.cartercenter.org/healthprograms/program1.htm, accessed 10 September 2007. 
 
16 However, controversy remains in the literature over the role played by foreign aid in these success stories 
(Easterly 2007).  
 
17 See review of literature on aid effectiveness in chapter two of this dissertation. 
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Motivation 
 In spite of the successes listed above and $2.3 trillion of official development 
assistance transferred to developing countries since 1960, millions of people are still 
dying of hunger, malaria and tuberculosis; millions of children are still out of school and 
made orphans by AIDS; and million of people do not yet have access to clean water and 
live in unsanitary slums. Why is it that despite all the successes listed above, still 
international assistance could be considered to be a failure or at least a partial failure?18 
Africa may be interpreted as a striking manifestation of the failure of overseas 
development assistance to rise million of poor people out of poverty and its devastating 
consequences. For over five decades, $1 trillion has been spent on Africa alone since 
independence, but from many angles, there is too little to show for it (Herbert 2004; 
Erixon 2005; Govender et al. 2005). Actually, many African countries are even poorer 
today than they were 50 years ago.19 Contrary to other poor regions around the world, the 
number of people living with less than a dollar per day has continued to increase in 
Africa; so is the number of malnourished children and the number of deaths among 
children under five years old (United Nations 2005).  
 One big part of the problem appears to be that the largest part of aid transferred to 
the poor does not actually reach them. For instance, Cudjoe (2006) reported that based on 
Jeffrey Sachs’ own calculations, “Out of every dollar of aid given to Africa, an estimated 
16% went to consultants from donor countries, 26% went into emergency aid and relief 
operations, and 14% went into debt servicing.” By the same token, President Paul 
                                                 
18 See review of literature on aid effectiveness in chapter two of this dissertation for an answer to this 
question.  
 
19 See figure 1 in chapter two of this dissertation.    
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Kagame of Rwanda declared: “There are projects here worth only $5m and when I 
looked at their expenses, I found that $1m was going into buying these cars, each one of 
them at $70,000. Another $1m goes to buy office furniture, $1m more for meetings and 
entertainment, and yet another $1m as salaries for technical experts, leaving only $1m for 
the actual expenditure on a poverty reducing activity. Is this the way to fight poverty?” 
(Cudjoe 2006) According to Hancock (1989), the simple fact that aid bureaucracies, after 
more than 50 years of existence, are still growing more than ever is irrefutable proof of 
the lack of success of earlier efforts.  
 Some empirical studies have actually shown that there is no evidence that aid has 
any positive effect on growth, nor that it affects economic institutions in developing 
countries (Boone 1996; Easterly 2003; Easterly et al. 2003; Rajan and Subramanian 
2005a; Coviello and Islam 2006; Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007).20  
 In general, it would appear that international aid has failed to eradicate poverty 
and, in many cases, to promote sustained development in the main aid recipient countries 
around the world. This begs the question of where has all the money gone? Perhaps the 
answers to this puzzle of the ineffectiveness of international aid are to be found 
simultaneously within both recipient countries and development agencies themselves. 
For decades now, a common rationale has been repeatedly used in the literature 
and in the international scene to explain the ineffectiveness of foreign aid in developing 
countries: poor economic policies, weak institutions, bad governance, chronic corruption, 
limited human and physical capital accumulations; lack of democracy and transparency, 
                                                 
20 By “economic institutions” the authors refer to corruption, bureaucracy quality, property rights, and 
regulations; rule of law, repudiation, and expatriation risk (Coviello and Islam 2006). For a more 
comprehensive and systematic review of the aid effectiveness empirical literature, see chapter 2 of this 
dissertation.  
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political instability, civil wars, geography, and many more. In order words, poor 
countries themselves are obviously one source of the low performance of aid (World 
Bank 1998; Alesina and Dollar 2000). For example, despite 12 adjustment loans to 
Zambia between 1980 and 1994, it had experienced inflation above 40 percent every year 
except two from 1985 to 1996;21 Pakistan had a budget deficit of 7 percent of GDP 
between 1970 and 1997 in spite of 22 adjustment loans throughout this period. In the 
1980s and early 1990s, after 9 adjustment loans to Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko’s loot was 
measured in billions of dollars (Easterly 2002). A number of empirical studies have 
provided support to the credence that developing countries’ circumstances are the root 
cause of aid ineffectiveness. Specifically, the literature on aid and economic growth took 
a new turn when Boone (1996) showed that, regardless of political regimes, aid was used 
for wasteful public consumption instead of financing investment and growth. However, 
his study ran counter to the usual belief that aid promotes growth. Subsequently, 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) improved on Boone’s paper and found that aid has a positive 
impact on growth in a good policy environment i.e., with good fiscal, monetary and trade 
policies; and thus launching the beginning of numerous contradictions in the empirical 
literature on aid performance. Collier and Dollar (2002), using a broader measure of 
policy environment (World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) and a 
larger number of countries, confirmed Burnside and Dollar’s results. Svensson (1999) 
showed that foreign aid positively affects long-run growth in democratic countries. 
Furthermore, the issue of absorptive capacity has been frequently raised in the aid 
                                                 
21 Adjustment lending carried conditions on economic policies to developing countries in crisis, in an 
attempt to induce the recipients to make necessary reforms to promote growth: reduction in inflation, 
budget deficits, and black market premium, restructuring of state enterprises in difficulty, and tackle 
corruption (Easterly 2002). 
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development literature, illustrating that there might be diminishing returns to aid in 
developing countries. In order words, because of poor countries’ characteristics 
mentioned above, there might be a certain level of aid inflows after which poor countries 
would have some difficulty to effectively absorb additional amounts of aid (Burnside and 
Dollar 2000; Collier and Dollar 2002; Clemens and Radelet 2003). It is an undeniable 
truth that over the years, a chunk of official development assistance has been drained 
down the pipes of an ill-managed poor world. If not for the above-cited literature, the 
daily reality of some African countries and other poor countries around the world clearly 
illustrate it. It would be naïve and unrealistic to assert otherwise.  
Nonetheless, recipient countries are only one of numerous actors in the vast aid 
delivery network with multifaceted interactions and relationships among them; going 
from donor countries, donors’ development agencies, multilateral aid agencies, NGOs, 
consultants, contractors, to interest groups and civil society organizations.22 Within this 
complex network, the contribution of each actor is fundamental to achieve a joint 
outcome: poverty alleviation. What is harder is to hold each and every intervenient 
responsible and accountable for the results (Ostrom et al. 2001).  
For instance, the richest countries of the world (such as the U.S., France, 
Germany, United Kingdom and Japan) with the largest decision-making power in 
international organizations, and those behind bilateral aid agencies are the ones mostly 
formulating aid policies.23 They have a significant influence over the selection of 
                                                 
22 The aid delivery network is a hierarchy of principal-agent interactions.  
 
23 For instance, the five largest shareholders in the World Bank and the countries with the higher number of 
votes in the IMF are the ones listed above. Votes in those two institutions are linked to the extent of 
financial contributions. Among the 184 member countries of the World Bank, only one selects its president: 
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potential aid recipients and over the use of funds within those recipients’ countries 
(Clements 2005).  They are involved in the design and implementation of development 
projects; and sometimes (if not most of the time) in “determining” the needs of the poor 
(Tendler 1975; Dichter 2003). For instance, Lancaster (1999) argued that because of the 
incapacity of weak institutions in Africa to promote aid, development assistance has 
become increasingly “donor-driven.”24 A declaration by the president of Nigeria, 
Olusegun Obasanjo well illustrates this “donor-driven” phenomenon: “In education and 
in industrialization, we have used borrowed ideas, utilized borrowed experiences and 
funds and engaged borrowed hands. In our development programmes and strategies, not 
much, if anything, is ours.” (Lancaster 1999, 3) In that context, international aid 
institutions might be implicated in the failure to provide quality aid to the developing 
world.25 They might therefore be interpreted as being as responsible as developing 
countries for the ineffectiveness of foreign aid.  
 
Focus of the Study 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine why foreign aid has been largely 
ineffective at eradicating global poverty and promoting sustained economic growth by 
focusing in one particular explanation: the extent of the role played by incentive 
                                                                                                                                                 
the United States (Choike.org). See also http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/Debt/USAid.asp, 
accessed 10 September 2007. 
 
24 This term illustrates the fact that projects are “identified, planned, and implemented with minimal input” 
from recipient countries (Lancaster 1999, 224). 
 
25 Quality of foreign aid refers to its output whereas quantity of aid refers to its input.  See 
http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/Debt/USAid.asp. A complete definition of aid quality is 
provided in appendix A.  
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structures, especially incentives to “move the money” (or the “Money-Moving 
Syndrome”26) within international donor agencies since the inception of foreign aid. In 
this dissertation, the “Money-Moving Syndrome” exists when the quantity of foreign aid 
committed or disbursed becomes, in itself, an important objective side by side or above 
the effectiveness of aid.  
But why is this topic important? Over the years, there have been successive calls 
for a “big push” of foreign aid to assist developing countries in their quest for poverty 
alleviation and growth. Despite some major achievements, the failures of foreign aid 
would seem to have continuously outweighed the successes. And with the amount of 
development assistance likely to considerably increase in the upcoming years, the need 
for greater caution and awareness, and greater aid effectiveness seem pressing and 
imperative. Clearly, reducing poverty and promoting sustainable economic growth in 
developing countries entail much more than just giving money. Nevertheless, wealthy 
nations continue to provide poor countries with increasing levels of funding and have 
even pledged to do more in the upcoming decade. Confronted by the apparent inability of 
aid to deliver the expected results, are aid organizations deliberately pushing ahead and 
ready to repeat past mistakes? Perhaps it is not feasible to cease aid altogether. But is 
really disbursing more and more money the ultimate solution in those circumstances? 
Could it be that while being honestly philanthropic, they are simply hampered in their 
actions by their institutional framework (Tendler 1975)? This dissertation aims to shed 
some light into this debate. In particular, the objective of this study is to investigate the 
prevalence of the “Money-Moving Syndrome” within donor agencies and deduce its 
                                                 
26 This term had been borrowed from Tendler (1975). 
 
16 
 
impact on the performance of aid. Indeed, if a sizable portion of aid resources allocated to 
recipient countries is motivated by money moving incentives, there will be a problem in 
term of aid effectiveness. In other words, we posit that evidence in support of the 
“Money-Moving Syndrome” can perhaps be used to provide some evidence as to why 
foreign aid has not been more effective at reducing global poverty in developing 
countries.   
Furthermore, this dissertation is in an attempt to add one piece to the foreign aid 
puzzle in order to better understand why the effectiveness of aid has not been greater 
despite all the resources involved in the business of aid over the years.  
 
Overview of the Dissertation 
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows: chapter two reviews the 
aid effectiveness literature and the groundbreaking studies that attempted to address the 
incentive mechanisms within international development agencies as a potential, if not 
primary, source of the ineffectiveness of foreign aid. In Chapter three, we identify some 
factors that might provide a motive for money moving behaviors within international 
development agencies and we develop a principal-agent model to explore how donor 
agencies’ institutional incentive systems may affect the characteristics of an optimal 
incentive contract and thus give rise to the Money-Moving Syndrome. Chapter four 
describes the empirical methodology used as well as the empirical data and their sources. 
Chapter five discusses the empirical results obtained and chapter six contains concluding 
remarks and potential policy implications of the analysis conducted. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter is divided in two sections. The first section examines to what extent 
international aid, since the 1950s, has been ineffective in reducing global poverty and 
promoting sustained economic development in aid-receiving countries.27 In addition, the 
first section attempts to determine whether there have been possible variations in the 
level of aid effectiveness across donor organizations and over time. It finally explores 
previous efforts to explain aid ineffectiveness and their contributions to help clarify the 
foreign aid puzzle. The second section reviews some of the main studies that have 
endeavored to shift the focus away from developing country’s shortcomings to 
international donor institutions, in analyzing the partial failure of foreign aid. 
Specifically, the second section highlights the few studies that attempted to address 
institutional incentives and incentives to “move the money” as potential sources of the 
low performance of aid in reaching its objectives.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 Foreign aid, as we know it today (economic aid to poor countries throughout the world) began when 
President Truman announced the Point Four Program in his inaugural address on January 20, 1949. The 
Point Four Program was later formalized in the 1950 Act for International Development. It was the result of 
the Marshall Plan announced by the U.S. government in 1947 and aimed at the reconstruction of Europe 
after World War II (Dichter 2003, 55; Roodman 2004, 3). However, the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the IMF were initially created in 1945 by the international 
community to respond to Europe's calls for help.  
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Aid Effectiveness Literature 
 
The Extent of Aid Effectiveness Today 
To this day, no consensus exists on the magnitude of the effect of aid on growth. 
Besides many success stories evidenced by micro-level studies,28 the overall impact of 
aid on macroeconomic variables (such as savings, investment, and growth) evidenced in 
the aid effectiveness literature, has been weak and often ambiguous (Gibson et al. 2005; 
Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007). This ambiguous or undetectable impact of aid on 
macroeconomic outcomes coexisting with successful donor-sponsored aid projects and 
programs is called the “micro-macro paradox” (Mosley 1986).    
The empirical literature on aid effectiveness encompasses three different 
macroeconomic studies:29 first, the accumulation models studying the impact of aid on 
savings and investment; these macro-studies were influenced by the Harrod-Domar 
growth model which assumes that investment (i.e., the accumulation of physical capital) 
is the key determinant of economic growth and, by consequent, the lack of savings 
financing investment is the main factor impeding growth in developing countries.30 Based 
on these studies, a positive effect of aid on either savings or investment would mean that 
                                                 
28 These studies evaluate the impact of individual aid projects and programs using cost-benefit analyses. 
Certainly, there are micro-level cases of failures; however, most micro-level studies reported in the 
literature have validated the effectiveness of aid. See Hansen and Tarp (2001), Moreira (2005), and 
Bourguignon and Leipziger (2006) for more details.  
 
29 Hansen and Tarp (2000), Moreira (2005), and Doucouliagos and Paldam (2005) surveyed the literature 
on aid effectiveness more extensively.  
 
30 The Harrod-Domar growth model was later expanded into the “two-gap model” which assumes that 
investment, crucial to economic growth, could be constrained either by a lack of domestic saving (saving 
gap) or by a lack of exports revenues (trade gap). The latter gap assumes that developing countries need to 
import goods and services necessary for investment and production, but their import costs often exceed 
their exports revenues (Hansen and Tarp 2000; Moreira 2005).  
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aid stimulates growth. Second, the growth models examining the direct effect of aid on 
growth; these studies were influenced by both the Harrod-Domar and the Solow growth 
models. Most of these models, as well as the accumulation models, were cross-countries 
regressions studies due to limited aid data availability. Finally, the conditional growth 
models which marked a new turn in the aid effectiveness literature in that they are 
inspired by the “new growth theory”: economic policy, political and institutional 
variables are included in the regressions of growth on aid; and the insertion of quadratic 
and interaction terms (e.g., aid square and aid-policy index) captures the possible non-
linearity of the effect of aid on growth. In addition, these macro studies often rely on 
panel data econometrics tools to account for country-specific effects and the endogeneity 
of aid and other explanatory variables (Hansen and Tarp 2000; Roodman 2004; 
Doucouliagos and Paldam 2005; Moreira 2005).  
An overall analysis of the three types of macro-studies led to the conclusion that 
aid may have a significantly positive, significantly negative, or a non-significant effect on 
development outcomes, in statistical terms.31 This lack of robust evidence on the 
macroeconomic effects of aid has often been attributed to underlying theories and/or 
econometric methodologies applied (Moreira 2005; Bourguignon and Leipziger 2006 ).  
Doucouliagos and Paldam (2005) uncovered that until January 1, 2005, the aid 
effectiveness literature consisted of 97 studies, each falling in one or more of the three 
                                                 
31 Here is a succinct list of authors who analyzed the impact of aid on selected macroeconomic variables 
(savings, investment, and growth) and their estimated results: (a) significant positive impact of aid 
(Burnside and Dollar 2000; Hansen and Tarp 2000, 2001; Clemens et. al. 2004; Moreira 2005); (b) 
significant negative impact of aid (Mosley et al. 1987); and (c) zero  impact of aid (Boone 1996; Easterly 
2003; Easterly et al. 2003; Roodman 2004; Rajan and Subramanian 2005a). For the most part, studies in (c) 
showed that there is no robust evidence of the impact of aid on growth even in the presence of sound policy 
environment, contrary to claims by Burnside and Dollar (2000).   
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aforementioned approaches. In an attempt to synthesize the conflicting macroeconomic 
effects of aid, they analyzed all three categories of models using the meta-analysis 
technique and found that despite a great variation in the findings, aggregate results 
showed that the average effect of aid is at best positive, but small and non statistically 
significant.32   
In many instances throughout the years, aid has been negatively associated with 
growth in developing countries. This negative association does not prove that aid caused 
the decrease in growth, but it does show that aid has not always been able to halt the 
deterioration of growth (Easterly 2003) or that success could occur without foreign 
assistance in aid-receiving countries (see table 1).  
 
 
 
Table 1. Ten Best and Worst per Capita Growth Rates, 1980-2002 
 
Country Name 
 
Per Capita 
Growth, 
1980-2002 (%) 
Aid/GDP (%) 
1980-2002 
Percent of time under 
IMF programs, 1980- 
2002 (%) 
Ten Best Per Capita Growth Rates, 1980-2002
South Korea 5.9 0.03 36 
China 5.6 0.38 8 
Taiwan 4.5 0.00 0 
Singapore 4.5 0.07 0 
Thailand 3.9 0.81 30 
India 3.7 0.66 19 
Japan 3.6 0.00 0 
Hong Kong 3.5 0.02 0 
Mauritius 3.2 2.17 23 
Malaysia 3.1 0.40 0 
Median 3.8 0.23 4
Ten Worst Per Capita Growth Rates, 1980-2002
                                                 
32 The Meta-Analysis covers the aid effectiveness literature in its totality and examines if this literature has 
established that aid has a positive effect on growth or accumulation (Doucouliagos and Paldam 2005).  
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Nigeria -1.6 0.59 20 
Niger -1.7 13.15 63 
Togo -1.8 11.18 72 
Zambia -1.8 19.98 53 
Madagascar -1.9 10.78 71 
Cote d'Ivoire -1.9 5.60 74 
Haiti -2.6 9.41 55 
Liberia -3.9 11.94 22 
Congo, Dem. Rep. -5.0 4.69 39 
Sierra Leone -5.8 15.37 50 
Median -1.9 10.98 54
Source: Easterly (2005).  
Figure 1 shows that a steady increase in aid flows in Sub-Saharan Africa since the 
1970s has not been successfully in preventing the decline in economic performance in 
that region.  
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Figure 1. Aid and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1965-2004 (5-year averages)  
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Source: World Bank Development Indicators 2006. 
 
Changes in the Level of Aid Effectiveness  
 Examining the full extent of changes in the level of aid effectiveness across aid 
agencies and over time would be a formidable task due to many factors such as the lack 
of a consistent measure of the overall impact of aid, the difficulty to disentangle the 
marginal effects of a dollar of aid from other factors (attribution problem), and the 
fungibility of foreign aid (Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007).33  
                                                 
33 Supposed infant mortality is used as a key measure of the impact of aid in developing countries; it is 
practically impossible to say whether an additional child being saved is due to an aid-financed program or 
many other factors that affect infant mortality such as water quality, mother education, access to clinics, 
lack of food, and so on (Clemens and Radelet 2003). Aid is fungible when a recipient country reduces its 
own resources in the sector receiving aid and transfers them to non-targeted sectors.  
 
23 
 
 Despite the absence of a consistent measure required to efficiently assess changes 
in the level of aid effectiveness, there are nonetheless a few factors that could cause 
variations in the impact of aid in developing countries; variations across donor agencies 
and over time:  
1. Changes in the development discourse and in donor agencies’ practices 
Throughout the history of foreign aid, a multitude of development approaches 
have been implemented which may have had the consequence of changing the level of 
aid effectiveness. In the 1950s, capital accumulation was thought to be the motor of 
economic growth. Development assistance during that period took the form of large aid-
financed projects to build roads, dams, factories, ports, irrigations canals, and so on. In 
the 1960s, knowledge transfer and skills began to be recognized for their capacity to 
create growth. As such, while the emphasis remained on capital formation, physical 
infrastructure, and large projects, development policies and projects started targeting 
social infrastructures, such as schools and universities. It was the beginning of technical 
assistance. During the 1970s, while the international development assistance experienced 
extensive growth, it became evident that the gap between rich and poor was widening. 
Development assistance strategies began targeting the poor to alleviate poverty by 
attempting to provide for their basic needs (food, water, health). By the mid-1970s, 
poverty reduction was as much an important goal as economic growth in the development 
arena. Basic human needs and quality of life joined the rank of GDP as yardsticks of 
success. In the early 1980s, developing countries, facing severe debt crises, turned to the 
World Bank and the IMF for an increase in foreign aid and a debt relief. Inspired by the 
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Asian Tigers’ success,34 the World Bank and the IMF instituted the stabilization and 
structural adjustment programs to ensure debt repayment and economic restructuring. 
These programs aimed at reducing inflation, correcting government deficits, removing 
price distortions, and reducing trade barriers. Unfortunately, the stabilization and 
structural adjustment programs did not yield the expected results (see table 2). By the end 
of the 1980s and early 1990s, the development assistance field had started to recognize 
the need for sound institutions like good governance, property rights, and democratic 
accountability. This change gradually led to a new aid architecture characterized by: a 
greater emphasis on selectivity in allocating aid; a growing recognition of the importance 
of governance, institutions, and local ownership of reforms; enhancement of aid 
coordination and donor alignment with country strategies; greater considerations for 
absorptive capacity constraints; measuring and monitoring of results (Easterly 2007; 
Bourguignon and Leipziger 2006; Pitman et al. 2005; Ellerman 2005; Dichter 2003).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 Between the 1960s and 1990s, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan (the four Asian Tigers) 
achieved rapid economic growth mainly due to high levels of human and physical capital accumulation, an 
export-driven model of economic development, macroeconomic stability (World Bank 1993).  
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Table 2. Structural Adjustment Loans, Growth, and Inflation in Poor countries with Most 
Structural Adjustment Loans Received 
 
 Number of IMF and 
World Bank Adjustment 
loans 1980- 99 
Annual per capita growth 
rate from the date of first 
Structural adjustment loan 
(%) 
Annual Inflation rate 
from first adjustment 
loan to 1999 (%) 
African countries that were in the world’s top 20 of structural adjustment loans received 1980-99 
Niger 14 -2.30 2 
Zambia 18 -2.10 58 
Madagascar 17 -1.80 17 
Togo 15 -1.60 5 
Cote d'Ivoire 26 -1.40 6 
Malawi 18 -0.20 23 
Mali 15 -0.10 4 
Mauritania 16 0.10 7 
Senegal 21 0.10 5 
Kenya 19 0.10 14 
Ghana 26 1.20 32 
Uganda 20 2.30 50 
Top ten recipients of structural adjustment Loans over 1990-1999 among Ex-Communist countries 
(growth and inflation measured from first adjustment loan to 1999 
Ukraine 10 -8.4 215 
Russian Federation 13 -5.7 141 
Kyrgyz Republic 10 -4.4 25 
Kazakhstan 9 -3.1 117 
Bulgaria 13 -2.2 124 
Romania 11 -1.2 114 
Hungary 14 1.0 16 
Poland 9 3.4 52 
Albania 8 4.4 40 
Georgia 7 6.4 37 
Source: Easterly (2006b, 67). 
 
 
 
In addition to changes in the development discourse, donor agencies’ institutional 
reforms may also affect the level of aid effectiveness. For instance, subsequent to major 
environmental disasters in Brazil and Indonesian caused by a series of World Bank 
lending blunders in the early 1980s, the Bank adopted dramatic institutional reforms such 
as increased reporting requirements and police-patrol oversight. The World Bank also 
significantly altered its lending portfolio by increasing environmental lending and 
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reducing “traditional” loans in energy and transportation causing environmental damages 
(Nielson and Tierney 2003). 
2. Changes in recipient countries’ circumstances 
The development assistance world is gradually realizing that development is a 
very complex phenomenon that occurs as a result of an accumulation of and a 
complicated interaction between multitudes of resources: (a) “public capital” such as 
political, legal, and economic institutions of society; (b) infrastructure, physical and 
human capital; and (c) “cultural and social capital” such as mentalities, beliefs, values, 
and social institutions (Dichter 2003). Therefore, different combinations and levels of 
these resources within and across aid recipient countries will result in different levels of 
aid effectiveness across countries and over time. 
 
Previous Explanations of Aid Ineffectiveness  
One explanation of aid ineffectiveness commonly used in the literature focuses on 
the shortcomings of aid-receiving countries. On the one hand, problems like corrupt 
leadership, misguided government policies, weak policies and institutions, and political 
instability have been frequently raised to explain the disappointing performance of aid in 
developing countries (World Bank 1998; Lancaster 1999; Easterly 2006b); On the other 
hand, some authors like Sachs (2005) argued that bad governments constitute only a 
small part of the explanation of the low performance of aid in poor countries and stressed 
other problems like diseases, vulnerability to climate shocks, and geographical distress.  
Another widespread explanation of the aid ineffectiveness used in the literature 
emphasizes that donor country strategic interests have frequently dominated recipient 
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countries’ needs and merits as aid allocation criteria within aid agencies.35 Donor 
strategic interests generally include diplomatic interests (e.g., establishing military bases, 
securing UN votes, supporting a preferred regime); commercial interests (e.g., “tied” aid, 
providing exports subsidies to donor countries firms, focusing on projects with high 
foreign exchange components; and cultural interests usually provided to promote a 
donor’s religion, language, or values (Lancaster 1999).  
The preponderance of donor interests over recipients’ needs and merits, as aid 
allocation criteria, appears to be present within both bilateral and multilateral aid 
agencies, though with less intensity in the latter.  
Many empirical studies investigating the determinants of aid, especially which 
donor country gives to which recipient country and why, concluded that bilateral aid 
most of the time favored former colonies and political allies over recipient countries’ 
needs or policy and institutional environments. For instance, empirical evidence showed 
that the U.S. allocation of aid is mostly influenced by its interests in the Middle East; 
France mainly employs foreign aid as a tool to maintain and foster its cultural, economic 
and political ties with former colonies; and Japan tends to give more aid to investment 
and trade partners. Only smaller donors such as Netherlands and the Scandinavian 
countries provide aid to poor countries according to economic necessity and sound 
management (Maizels and Nissanke 1984; World Bank 1998; Alesina and Dollar 2000; 
Fleck and Kilby 2005b; Allen 2006).  
                                                 
35 This is the part of the aid literature that studies the determinants of foreign aid, in particular the reasons 
why certain donors give to certain recipient countries..  
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If bilateral aid giving appears to be tied to donor interests and less sensitive to 
recipients’ need, multilateral development agencies, however, tend to be more need-
based oriented in their aid allocations (Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Roodman 2006; 
Burnside and Dollar 2000; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Milner 2006; Allen 2006). 
Unfortunately, multilateral aid agencies, albeit “independent” and “apolitical,”36 have 
nonetheless been known to further the interests of their most prominent member 
countries. For instance, Frey and Schneider (1986) analyzed the lending behavior of the 
World Bank between 1972 and 1981. They found that the “politico-economic model,” 
which assumes among other things that the Bank extends more credits to poor countries 
to which top member countries export a large share of goods, explains best the World 
Bank behavior. In a more recent paper, Fleck and Kilby (2005a) showed that not only 
U.S. interests (e.g., recipient countries’ importance to the U.S. as trade partners, U.S. 
commercial financial flows into and out of poor countries) influence the World Bank 
lending patterns; but that influence varies across presidential administrations. More 
recently, Kilby (2006), using a panel data for less developed Asian countries from 1968 
to 2002, revealed that the Asian Development Bank (ADB) aid giving is tied to Japan and 
the United States’ interests. Consequently, the autonomy of multilateral aid agencies may 
be somewhat circumscribed as the autonomy of bilateral aid agencies, but certainly to a 
lesser extent.37    
                                                 
36 See Fleck and Kilby (2005a) for more details.  
 
37 The autonomy of the World Bank for instance might be limited through the vehicle of triennial IDA 
(International Development Association) replenishment negotiations (Frey and Schneider 1986; Lancaster 
1999; Fleck and Kilby 2005a).  
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Finally, the third set of explanations of the ineffectiveness of aid encountered in 
the literature has been more aid agency-centered. They posit that because international 
aid organizations are involved in the identification, design, and implementation of 
development assistance activities, they ought to be partially responsible of the low 
performance of aid in promoting economic growth and reducing poverty in developing 
countries. The next section analyses in depth this third set of explanations.  
 
Donor Agencies’ Incentive Structures and the “Money-Moving Syndrome” 
Literature 
While there has been a proliferation of studies on the impact of aid based on 
recipient countries performance, very few studies have attempted to address the incentive 
mechanisms within international development agencies as a potential, if not primary, 
source of the low performance of foreign aid.  
This restricted but growing literature may possibly be divided in two ways: (a) 
studies on how incentives and constraints faced by aid organizations affect the 
performance of aid (macro-institutional approach);38 (b) studies on how incentives and 
constraints faced by staff in those organizations affect the performance of aid (micro-
institutional approach).39  
This section highlights the major studies that broached the subject of incentive 
structures and, in particular, incentives to “move the money” in analyzing aid agencies’ 
                                                 
38 These organizations in the aid business encompass “taxpayers, donor organizations, politicians, lobby 
groups, donor agencies and consultants in donor countries and recipient organizations in beneficiary 
countries” (Martens et al. 2002, 1). 
 
39 In the macro-institutional approach, a donor institution is considered as a single homogenous agent, 
whereas in the in the micro-institutional approach, the donor institution is made of different individuals 
with different interests. Those concepts are well developed by Frey et al. (1985). 
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shortcomings in delivering aid. Although frequently acknowledged as a problem in donor 
agencies, the incentive to “move the money” has nevertheless been very often treated in 
an incidental manner in the aid literature. 
In this dissertation, incentives are defined as the set of “rewards and punishments 
that are perceived by individuals to be related to their actions and those of others” 
(Ostrom et al. 2001).  
 
Macro-Institutional Approach and the Incentives to “Move the Money” 
Back in the 1970s, Tendler (1975) was already alerting the international scene to 
how multilateral agencies and bilateral agencies’ organizational environments, in 
particular USAID, could impinge upon foreign aid outcomes. Among USAID 
shortcomings hindering the effectiveness of aid, Tendler (1975) mentioned the pressures 
to move out the money. Aid agents were considered bright and dynamic based on how 
they excelled in moving the money; their accomplishments and career advancements in 
the institution were determined by their ability to “move” a certain amount of funds 
within a limited time. Tendler also added that the “Money-Moving Syndrome” was not 
unique to development agencies funded by annual government appropriations like the 
USAID; indeed the pressures to spend were just as great in the World Bank as in the 
USAID. In Tendler’s view, the existence of money moving behavior may have the 
consequence of switching a donor organization’s sense of mission away from economic 
development to the commitment of resources. She argued that a potential explanation of 
the “Money-Moving Syndrome” lies on the standards by which development agencies 
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judge their performance (i.e., the quantitative estimates of development assistance needs) 
and how the agencies are judged by the outside world.  
Tendler’s views were corroborated in a more recent book by Lancaster (1999). 
Lancaster argued that there are two sides of the aid effectiveness equation: (a) on the one 
hand, there are recipient countries with limited natural resources, political instability, 
corrupt and incompetent governments; and weak policies and institutions; and (b) on the 
other hand, there are donor agencies often constrained in their autonomy and/or 
capacity.40 Lancaster identified pressures to spend available funds as one factor limiting 
the capacity of both the USAID and the World Bank to “identify and design policies, 
projects, and programs and implement them” in such a way as to take into account the 
circumstances of recipient countries. For instance, in Lancaster’s view, “the Bank’s 
pervasive preoccupation with new lending” had been incorporated in the criteria used to 
evaluate the World Bank’s staff. In general, staff’s performance is assessed according to 
whether they achieved the targeted number of lending operations agreed in their annual 
performance contracts. Furthermore, pressures to spend contributed to an “excessive 
optimism” on the part of the staff about conditions in recipient countries and about the 
likely impact of the Bank’s development projects and programs.    
Three major reports also acknowledged this problem. The World Bank’s 
Wapenhans Report, analyzing the factors that affect the development impact of the World 
Bank operations, found that a “pervasive culture of approval” for loans and “pressure to 
lend” resulted in a decline in project quality (World Bank 1992). Another report, issued 
                                                 
40 Lancaster (1999) defined autonomy as the “ability (or freedom) of an organization to make policy and 
allocative decisions to achieve its missions and purposes” and capacity refers to the “the capacity to 
identify and design policies, projects, and programs and implement them to achieve overall purposes.” 
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by the World Bank in 1998, revealed that aid agencies’ ability to work in distorted 
economies has been hampered by their disbursement culture. Indeed, because aid 
agencies’ primary objective was to “dish out money,” much went to countries with poor 
institutional and policy environments (World Bank 1998). The Meltzer Commission 
Report (2000) found that incentives to “move money” are built in the structure of the 
Development Banks, and “internal budget resources are awarded where loan volumes are 
high, not where the number of worthwhile projects is highest or where technical 
assistance and knowledge transfer are favored over funding.”41 This report concludes that 
“rewards for lending and no penalties for project failure dilute concern about project 
performance.”  
In a book recently published, Easterly (2006b) argued that one reason why foreign 
aid has continuously failed to reach the poor is the planning approach adopted by aid 
bureaucracies throughout the history of development assistance. Planners, with their top-
down mind-set, lack two essential elements: feedback and accountability. Easterly 
brought up other explanations of the nonperformance of aid such as internal bureaucratic 
incentives to serve the “West” rather than serving the “Rest,” and the absence of truly 
independent evaluations of aid agencies’ development projects and programs. He also 
showed how development agencies apply the volume of foreign aid as a measure of 
success, and as such consciously confuse aid disbursements as an output to development 
rather than an input. Easterly did not propose a panacea to reform the foreign aid system 
                                                 
41 The Meltzer Report (2000) was commissioned by the U.S. Congress as part of the legislation authorizing 
$18 billion of additional U.S. funding for the IMF. Development Banks are the World Bank Group, the 
African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. 
Note that the World Bank Group includes five institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD); the International Development Association (IDA); the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC); the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA); and the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). See http://www.house.gov/jec/imf/ifiac.htm. 
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but claimed that, would donor agencies acquire a searcher-like mentality, foreign aid will 
certainly be successful in finding solutions to piecemeal projects and programs  
 
Micro-Institutional Approach and the Incentives to “Move the Money” 
In 2001, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) published a 
report examining the link between aid, incentives, and sustainability in an attempt to 
improve the performance and sustainability of its development assistance (Ostrom et al. 
2001). The report provides an extensive account of the importance of incentives as they 
underpin aid performance and recommends strategies to mitigate perverse incentives. The 
SIDA study constitutes the first attempt to collect data on the behavior of staff members 
and other agents involved in the delivery of aid. The authors interviewed over 175 SIDA 
staff and other people involved in the aid process, and found that there is no evidence 
supporting the argument that incentives within SIDA are oriented towards individual 
learning about sustainability, nor there is evidence of incentives to use evaluations for 
organizational learning about sustainability. The interviews also revealed that SIDA is 
not immune to the incentives to “move the money”; in fact, SIDA officers feel a strong 
pressure to disburse money, especially at the end of the budget year. The report offers 
some explanations of the SIDA’s resource-driven environment: the Swedish’s 
commitment to increase aid allocations to reach 1 percent of GNP and the fear that 
uncommitted resources will be considered unnecessary and not re-budgeted in subsequent 
years. Given these results, SIDA reports that the agency is constantly making great 
efforts to give a new direction to its development assistance.  
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Martens et al. (2002), using the principal-agent model and its variants, explained 
that for decades foreign aid failed to achieve its goals because of incentive structures 
affecting agents’ behavior in the aid delivery processes.42 They argued that most of the 
problems encountered in the aid business stem from two elements: one element is the fact 
that the beneficiaries of aid are not the same as the taxpayers in rich countries providing 
aid. This “broken feedback loop” deprives aid recipients of the power to reward or punish 
public official and/or aid organization. The second element is the multiplicity of 
principals and objectives, which restrains the efficiency of aid. In the view of these 
authors, a broken information feedback loop combined with difficulties to measure 
performance have pushed aid officials towards an excessive focus on “input” activities, 
such as budget and personnel, rather than the quality of output. They also noted that 
careers within aid agencies are often determined by the staff’s performance in easily 
monitorable tasks such as “committing and spending budgets.” In this context, they 
argued that straightforward independent evaluations of foreign aid projects and programs 
appear crucial to reestablish information feedback between donors and recipients and to 
improve aid performance.  
 In a more recent paper, Wane (2004), an economist at the World Bank, recently 
wrote a paper where he argues that donor agencies’ internal incentive system in the 
design of aid projects affects the quality of aid and thus its effectiveness. Wane showed 
theoretically and empirically that the quality of aid depends on the capacity and 
accountability of aid recipients. It also depends on the impact the incentive system has on 
the effort the staff put in designing development projects. If the incentive system within 
                                                 
42 Incentives are determined by institutions which are defined as “the formal and informal rules of behavior 
that constitute incentives for all agents involved in the aid delivery process” (Martens et al. 2002, 1).  
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the aid agency is such that staff promotion depends on project approval rather than 
project performance (“spend the budget incentive system”); and if the aid recipient 
government has a weak screening capacity (i.e., the ability to screen projects), then the 
recipient government will receive poorly designed aid projects. However, if the recipient 
government has a high screening capacity, it will only accept bad projects if it has a low 
accountability. 
 The above discussion does not necessarily constitute a complete review of studies 
in the aid effectiveness literature that have raised the issue of the “Money-Moving 
Syndrome” in development agencies. 
 
Conclusion 
 The empirical literature mentioned in this chapter has been critical in 
assessing the performance of official development assistance in developing countries. In 
particular, previous aid effectiveness studies focusing on international development 
agencies have corroborated the idea that, not only aid allocations respond to donor 
country preferences but also, aid agencies institutional frameworks may hinder their 
genuine intentions to help the poor. These studies helped our understanding of the fact 
that aid organizations are bureaucracies making their own set of formal and informal 
rules. These organizational rules structure incentives for all agents involved in the chain 
of aid delivery, may make aid agencies powerful, or lead them to inefficient behaviors 
(Barnett and Finnemore 1999). The purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to this 
literature by analyzing in depth one particular set of incentives common to many 
international aid organizations: the incentives to “move the money.” Although frequently 
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acknowledged as a problem in donor agencies, these incentives have nevertheless been 
very often treated in an incidental manner in the aid literature. To the extent of our 
knowledge, this dissertation represents the first attempt to explicitly focus, theoretically 
and empirically, on the “Money-Moving Syndrome” in analyzing aid agencies’ 
shortcomings in delivering aid.   
The primary reason to focus on these incentives is that without the “money,” there 
would not be “foreign aid”; and if the objective is to maximize the effectiveness of aid, it 
would appear essential to enhance the effectiveness of aid resources at the source, for 
instance by creating the right incentives in providing development assistance to poor 
countries. This research proposes a simple theoretical framework examining some 
adjustment mechanisms that could reduce both institutional incentives to “move the 
money,” and windows of opportunities for money moving behaviors. 
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CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends upon his 
not understanding it.      
Upton Beall Sinclair I, Candidate for Governor: And How I Got Licked (1935) 
 
The theoretical analysis in this chapter identifies aid agencies’ institutional 
incentives that may lead individuals to engage in money moving behaviors and it 
provides examples of such behaviors (section 1). In the theoretical model (section 2), we 
develop the hypothesis that the money-moving syndrome may be one major handicap of 
foreign aid. The basic rationale for the model is that if the pressures to move out the 
money are strong enough, they might lead to an inefficient allocation of aid resources 
whether or not international aid agencies and staff are well-intentioned and have the 
interest of aid recipients at heart.  
    
Analytical Framework 
 As mentioned in Chapter two, since its inception in the 1950s, foreign aid has 
been used for two not always reconcilable purposes:43 (a) serve the interests of donor 
countries and their domestic constituencies;44 and (b) increase the well-being of the poor 
in developing countries. This dichotomy in the objectives of aid could be illustrated by 
President Ronald Reagan’s words: “Our foreign aid is not only a symbol of America’s 
                                                 
43 This aid can be in the form of tied-aid, grants, loans, and soft loans or concessional loans.  
 
44 Taxpayers, political leaders of the donor countries, donor agencies, commercial businesses (contractors, 
consultants, and suppliers), experts, private contributors, lobby groups, and non-governmental 
organizations.   
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tradition of generosity and good will, but also a servant of our national interest”; or by the 
USAID’s declaration: “Foreign aid doesn’t cost Americans, it pays!” (Hancock 1989, 
161). According to the empirical literature on the determinants of foreign aid, it would 
seem that the former has more than often outweighed the latter (especially in bilateral 
aid), thus undermining the ability of aid to successfully promote growth and reduce 
poverty.45 Although the main objective of this dissertation is to analyze the extent to 
which aid agencies’ self-created incentives to “move the money” may affect foreign aid 
performance, and thus focuses on aid once it reaches the “hands” of development 
agencies, this research nonetheless indirectly examines options for the elimination of 
donor countries’ strategic interests behind aid giving. 
 
Incentives to “Move the Money” in Donor Agencies 
Three factors might be identified as providing a motive to money moving 
behaviors within international development agencies: (1) the organizational imperatives 
to survive and grow and its corollary the remunerative incentive to move the money; (2) 
the “warm glow” effect; and (3) the lack of checks and balances and the constraints in the 
delivery of aid which potentially allow the money-moving syndrome to set in and thrive.   
1. Organizational Imperatives to Survive and Grow 
According to Ditcher (2003) and Ellerman (2005), “organizing” international 
development assistance, while being necessary and inevitable, appears to be one factor 
preventing the achievement of its ultimate goals: poverty alleviation and economic 
growth. First, “organizing” development assistance has led to unavoidable organizational 
                                                 
45 See chapter two of this dissertation, section one.  
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imperatives, such as employees’ determination to maintain their jobs and succeed within 
the organization, and organizational imperatives for “survival,” perpetuation, recognition, 
and growth.46 Second, because organizations in the same line of work tend to 
conglomerate, development assistance has become an “industry.” As such, it has 
furthered its imperatives to protect the interests of its members and ensure its own 
survival, sometimes, over its fundamental mission.  
Dichter’s characterization of development organizations might provide a strong 
motive for “money moving” at the agent and organizational levels, and might plausibly 
explain why aid organizations would be as equally concerned with moving the money as 
with the effectiveness of the development assistance they provide.47A probable important 
corollary of the organizational imperative to survive and grow would be the remunerative 
incentive to move the money: as evidenced by the literature review in chapter two, aid 
providers are evaluated and rewarded according to the level of aid resources they 
disbursed rather than the ability of these resources to promote economic growth and 
reduce poverty.48  
 
                                                 
46 Hancock (1989, 72) called these “bureaucratic survivalism.” These self-perpetuation imperatives run 
counter to donor agencies’ objective to bring development to poor countries. In fact, Dichter (2003) argued 
that if development were successful in developing countries, donor agencies would no longer have a raison 
d'être, and thus questioned the fact that aid agencies will voluntarily go out of business by bringing 
development to the Third World. 
 
47 Dichter (2003) acknowledged that survival imperatives can also incite donor agencies to be more 
effective and undertake activities such as self-examination retreats, strategic planning workshops, and 
internal reviews to help them achieve effectiveness; but according to Dichter more of these internal reviews 
are about prospects of survival than they are about concern for effectiveness. 
 
48 See also Transparency International (2007)  and OECD/DAC (1999).  
 
40 
 
2. The “Warm Glow” Effect 
According to Andreoni (1990), pure altruism is not the only factor explaining 
observed patterns of giving; when people make donations, they can also be motivated by 
“warm glow.” The “warm glow” effect is the utility or psychological benefits (e.g., 
feeling of gratification) people derived from the “act of giving” itself. Considering this 
utility essentially arises from the act of giving and not from its impact, Andreoni (1990) 
argued that it is “egoistic” or “impurely altruistic.”  
Ostrom et al. (2001) and Gibson et al. (2005) applied Andreoni’s theory to 
partially explain why foreign aid does not seem to generate the expected results. To the 
extent that aid agents get a “warm glow” from giving, all that matters is the amount of aid 
spent or “moved.” In this situation, considerable amounts of aid resources may be given 
to aid-receiving countries with little concern about the actual impact of aid.  
3. Lack of Checks and Balances and Constraints in the Delivery of Aid   
They are (a) limited feedback and accountability, and (b) difficulty to evaluate 
and quantify the performance of aid. Those elements could possibly allow in aid agents’ 
perverse behaviors we generally observe in the aid delivery chain. 
One essential characteristic of foreign aid appears to be a “broken information feedback 
loop” existing between taxpayers in western industrialized nations generating aid 
resources and intended beneficiaries in poor countries. Associated with this broken 
feedback may be a limited final accountability both at the aid bureaucracy level and at the 
staff level (Martens et al. 2002). In this chapter, aid agency accountability or staff 
accountability is defined as an aid agency’s or aid agent’s “obligation to demonstrate that 
work has been conducted in compliance with agreed rules and standards or to report 
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fairly and accurately on performance results vis a vis mandated roles and/or plans” 
(OECD/DAC 2002).   
According to Martens et al. (2002), the geographic and political separation between 
taxpayers and beneficiaries result in the fact that aid recipients have no means to 
communicate their own needs, or to communicate whether those needs have been met, to 
“reward” or “punish” donors’ actions, or to question the adequacy of what donor agencies 
provide them. This is seemingly unlike the political process in modern democracies 
where the taxpayers (voters) are the same as the beneficiaries and could therefore, to 
some extent, exercise political pressure on public bureaucracies to improve performance 
and satisfy their needs.  
Evidently, feedback without accountability would lead to inefficient outcomes. 
And there seems to be limited accountability both at the aid institution level and at the aid 
agency’s staff level. An illustration of why there may be a limited final accountability at a 
donor institution level is as follows: in a particular country where numerous aid agencies 
operate simultaneously and jointly to promote its economic development, the outcomes 
of their individual efforts would be difficult to evaluate, and thus no specific agency 
could be held accountable. Unfortunately, many developing countries seem to have at one 
point or another experienced this situation. For instance, after twenty years and 2 billion 
dollars spent in Tanzania to building roads, the road system appears to have been little 
improved and none of the numerous aid agencies operating in Tanzania has been held 
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accountable; for it is simply difficult to observe or even evaluate the effects of their 
individual efforts (Easterly 2006b; Birdsall 2004; Radelet 2003; World Bank 1998).49 
If there is staff accountability in a donor agency, a top executive or country manager for 
example, is liable to being called to account for: first, the disappointed performance of a 
specific aid project or program he/she directs (in case of short time-bound projects); and 
second, the deficiencies in a specific project phase involving the said staff (in case of 
development projects requiring long periods of time).50 However, for such a system to be 
effective, two elements ought to be present. First, the executive or manager should be 
held accountable for not only projects at hand, but also for past projects he/she supervised 
(retroactive individual accountability with positive or unlimited prescription). Long 
project cycles make it difficult to assess the accountability of the staff. Aid agents in 
charge of those projects would have moved on before a systematic evaluation is 
conducted. In addition, short-term assignments to field positions and high employee 
rotation across departments at headquarters are usually frequent in most aid agencies. 
While they expose the staff to a variety of experiences, short-term assignments prevent 
them to see all phases of a particular project, from design to evaluation stage (Gibson et 
al. 2005). Second, if found somewhat responsible for the bad results of a development 
                                                 
49 Aid institutions have financed more than 1,300 projects in Tanzania between 2000 and 2002 alone, with 
an estimated 1,000 missions of donor officials per year and over 2,400 reports to donors per quarter 
(Easterly 2006b; Birdsall 2004; Radelet 2003). 
 
50 The World Bank identifies the following phases in a project cycle: Country Assistance Strategies, the 
Identification Phase, the Preparation Phase, the Appraisal Phase, the Negotiation and Approval Phase, the 
Implementation and Supervision Phase, the Implementation and Completion Phase, and the Evaluation 
Phase (http://go.worldbank.org/GI967K75D0).  
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project, the top executive or country manager should liable to be “punished.”51 In this 
regard, we might unfortunately observe that if there has often been a system of checks 
and balances ex-ante in the aid delivery process, an ex-post mechanism of checks and 
balances would not seem to be always in place (Ostrom et al. 2001).  A corollary of such 
a system would be that once the top executive or country manager is accountable, he/she 
would hold accountable all staff members under his/her chain of command and carry out 
punishment.  
Another characteristic of foreign aid would be the difficulty to evaluate and 
quantify the overall impact of aid, but also the costs and time a rigorous evaluation would 
entail. Very often, the lack of comparable baseline database and controlled experiments 
would make it impossible to  tease out the influence of a particular aid project or program 
from the influence of environmental factors or random shocks. Furthermore, establishing 
such control and treatment groups might not only prove to be costly and time consuming, 
but also unfeasible for the project at hand, due to methodological or ethical constraints. 
For instance, it would be inappropriate to establish randomization methods with 
development projects such as universal primary education and anti-retroviral HIV/AIDS 
drugs interventions (Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007; Birdsall 2004; Radelet 2003). 
Under these murky conditions, it might be very difficult to attribute the failure of 
development projects or programs to donor agencies involved in them, thus providing 
them with a fair amount of latitude in their design of development policies in the Third 
World.  
                                                 
51 Punishment could involve removal from a project or program, elimination of certain perquisites, or even 
dismissal. 
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 In conclusion, organizational imperatives to survive and grow and its corollary the 
remunerative incentive to move the money, the “warm glow” effect, and the lack of 
checks and balances are incentives at the aid agency level that might allow the “Money- 
Moving Syndrome” to set in and thrive. Beyond recipient countries’ shortcomings and 
donor countries’ strategic interests plaguing aid, these aid agency incentives, and the act 
of “moving the money” itself, may constitute another important factor explaining why aid 
does not seem to generate the desired results. 
 
Emergence of the Money-Moving Syndrome 
The probable consequences of the above-mentioned factors in terms of pressure to 
spend the available funds appear manifold and in themselves would seem to establish a 
vicious circle where excessive attention is placed on the quantity of aid rather than the 
quality of aid outcomes or its effect in beneficiary countries. Alimented by one or more 
of the aforementioned factors, the following money moving behaviors could be 
frequently observed in the development field in general and in international donor 
agencies in particular.   
Taxpayers in developed countries may be truly concerned about the poor in the 
Third World, but the broken information feedback loop is such that they could not 
directly observe the impacts of aid and would therefore be inclined to rely on aid volumes 
disbursed to evaluate the performance of aid agencies (Ostrom et al. 2001, 124). Aid 
institutions would also tend to judge their performance on the basis of the volume of aid 
disbursed.52 In this context, the case of the World Bank and other multilateral regional 
                                                 
52 This tendency towards processes rather than results seems to manifest itself in the fact that success is 
often defined in terms of the volume of aid disbursed on visible short-run inputs such as: conferences, 
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banks are often cited; first and foremost, these institutions are banks, and as such, they 
are in the business of lending money to developing countries. To continue justifying their 
existence and their primordial role in the international scene, they might be under the 
pressure to make big loans, and as quickly and frequently as possible (Hancock 1989; 
Wane 2004).   
In the search of plausible explanations to the ineffectiveness of aid, there would 
seem to be a tendency to emphasize the insufficiency of funds rather than questioning the 
organizational structures of aid bureaucracies (Tendler 1975); leading rich industrialized 
nations to often make pledges of more and more aid resources. Concerns for development 
effectiveness have also led some donor countries and donor agencies to demonstrate their 
effectiveness through tangible outcomes. For instance, in 2003, the World Bank 
developed a conceptual framework and action plan on “managing for development 
results” (World Bank 2004, 84). In addition, the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness53 stressed the importance of “results” and “mutual accountability” to 
reform the ways donors deliver and manage aid.  However, this recent shift towards 
“management-by-result” may or may not help close the gap between donor agencies and 
their clients. For one, it may exacerbate pressures to spend the money on large-scale 
development interventions that would guarantee the delivery of “fast, concrete and visible 
results” to the detriment of local initiatives requiring little external funding and which 
                                                                                                                                                 
commissions, committees, publications, missions, foreign experts, advisers, consultants, purchase of goods, 
issuing of contracts, etc. (Hancock 1989; Birdsall 2004).   
 
53 http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html,  accessed 1 
September 2007.  
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could bring sustainable development but in a long and less visible manner (Crespin 
2006). 
The broken feedback loop and the limited accountability would seem to facilitate 
the transformation of domestic suppliers of aid into the direct beneficiaries of aid since 
they possess both political power over donors’ politicians and information on the needs 
of the poor and the outcomes of development assistance in developing countries (Martens 
et al. 2002).54 Therefore, they would seem to be free to pursue their self-interest, move 
the money or compel governments and aid agencies to appropriate more funds to aid, 
thus cultivating a resource-focused rather than a quality-driven international development 
assistance. 
Seeking possibilities of career advancements and positions of power, aid officials 
might also be willing to respond to pressure to spend the monies to the detriment of the 
quality of development projects they manage. They may tend to select large and quick-
disbursing infrastructure projects, which on the other hand, may in general involve donor 
countries’ contractors and may not necessarily reflect the poor’s needs. Perhaps, subject 
to the same behaviors are aid officials working in the field.  
Other money moving behaviors could be found in the fact that donor agencies 
seem to feel the imperative to always “do” something (Dichter 2003).55 This imperative 
                                                 
54 Domestic suppliers of aid are consultant firms, experts, lobbyists, contractors, NGOS, private firms, and 
academic institutions. They form a vast chain of principal-agent relationships. In general, they make profit 
out of providing goods and services used in the delivery of aid, gain access to foreign markets, and are able 
to function thanks to official aid funds channeled through them (Martens et al. 2002). 
 
55 Dichter (2003, 7) argued that the key to development lies “in the realm of the policies, laws, and 
institutions of a society, and to change these requires indirect kinds of approaches (stimulating, fostering, 
convincing) rather than doing things directly.” A similar idea was raised by Jerve (2002).  
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to “act” could be explained by the “warm-glow” altruism or by aid agencies’ need for 
survival and growth. It can also be explained by the fact that they partially or totally 
depend on “other people’s money,” and as such, they are forced to satisfy the constraints 
attached to this type of money (Dichter 2003). In addition, the amount of aid resources 
spent by the international development industry into producing annual reports, 
publications, brochures, reports, and organizing frameworks, conferences, and summits, 
has often been considered as wasteful because they appear more to further the self-
interests of development agencies (perpetuation, recognition, and growth) rather than the 
interests of the poor (Hancock 1989; Dichter 2003; Easterly 2006b). 
Finally, motivated by the above mentioned incentives, aid agencies might also be 
willing to respond to recipient country pressures to “move the money.” Aid dependency 
and the volatility of aid flows explain why most developing countries would be eager to 
do whatever is necessary to receive as much aid as possible (Azam et al. 1999; Jerve 
2002).  
Certainly, the money moving behaviors cited above do not constitute a 
generalization. One might expect the “Money-Moving Syndrome” to vary across 
development agencies and over time. Different aid organizations have different incentive 
structures, at least on the margin, and they are also likely to differ in terms of their 
approach to feedback, accountability, and evaluations problems encountered in the 
delivery of aid. By the same token, incentives for money moving behaviors might change 
over time within any aid agency as it incorporates lessons learned into future planning or 
adopts institutional reforms.   
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In conclusion, when the world decided in September 2000 in New York to launch 
an attack on global poverty, donors committed to a substantial aid increase, under the UN 
Millennium Declaration, with many promising to raise aid to 0.7 percent of their GNI.56 
These commitments were later reaffirmed at subsequent UN summits: the UN summits in 
Monterrey, Mexico (March 2002) and in Johannesburg (September 2002); the 
International Forum on Aid Harmonization in Rome (February 2003); the Marrakech 
Round Table on Financing for Development (2004); the High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness in Paris (2005) and the 2005 World Summit. As donor countries begin to 
answer those calls for more aid, the need for greater aid effectiveness appears crucial as 
ever. The previous section explored one important incentive problem in aid relationships, 
namely the pressure to spend the money; and it provided some examples of this 
phenomenon. The next section formally examines whether and how this incentive 
problem, by sacrificing quality for quantity, might hinder foreign aid’s development 
impact in poor countries.  
 
The Theoretical Model 
This section proposes a simple theoretical model that explores how incentive 
structures within international donor agencies may lead to “a push” to disburse money; it 
also examines the extent to which these incentives may inhibit the ability of foreign aid to 
promote economic growth and reduce poverty.  
                                                 
56 This promise by donor governments to spend 0.7% of GNI on official development assistance was 
initially made at the UN General Assembly in 1970, available from globalissues.org.  
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The general approach we use to model the problem at hand is the principal-agent 
model (Baker 1992; Gibbons 1998; Prendergast 1999; Courty and Marschke 2003). Other 
approaches are possible (such as surveys of development agencies incentive systems, or 
case studies), but we believe the principal-agent framework best fits the main dimension 
of the problem and can provide a wealth of insights and implications.  
Let us assume there is an international aid organization (the principal) whose 
mission is to allocate aid so as to maximize poverty reduction and economic growth in 
poor countries. To achieve this objective, the aid agency relies on its staff members or the 
bureaucrats (the agents) to allocate aid funds to aid-receiving countries. The aid agency 
also establishes its internal incentive structure within which its personnel operate.57 This 
is a fundamental aspect since the aid institution incentive system determines the 
performance evaluation criteria that would be used to design incentive contracts of staff 
members.  
An ideal performance measure in an incentive contract reflects an employee's 
contribution to the organization’s total value.58 However, in many organizations (non-
profit organizations and government agencies), employees’ contribution to the 
organization’s total value function is not objectively measurable; it is either too complex 
or too subtle to be objectively evaluated and thus cannot be used in an enforceable 
contract with employees. In other words, the principal’s value function cannot be 
                                                 
57 This is borrowed from Wane (2004) who showed that both the incentive system prevailing within an aid 
agency and a recipient country’s characteristics affect the quality of aid. The importance of incentives was 
emphasized by the Sida Studies in Evaluation: “A successful approach to the problem of development must 
focus on how to generate appropriate incentives so that the time, skill, knowledge, and genuine effort of 
multiple individuals are channeled in ways that produce jointly valued outcomes” (Ostrom et al. 2001 p. 
xiii).  
 
58 The organization’s total value refers to its fundamental objective or mission.  
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objectively measured (Baker 1992; Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1993; Gibbons 1998; 
Prendergast 1999; van Praag and Cools 2001; Courty and Marschke 2003). 
The inability to use the organization’s objective (total value) as a basis for 
incentive contracts leads to the use of various alternative methods of performance 
evaluation which have the ability to be objectively measured.59 The relevant issue when 
using (imperfect) performance measurements is whether the measure used in the 
incentive scheme may lead to dysfunctional behavioral responses that will deteriorate or 
not further the true goal of the organization due to the prospect that agents tend to focus 
only on those aspects of the performance measure that are rewarded (Lindsay 1976; 
Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1993; Prendergast 1999; Courty and Marschke 2003).  
As Baker (1992) has argued, in these circumstances, to avoid distorted incentives 
and obtain a contract that yields first-best outcomes, the performance measure should 
accurately reflect the organization’s objective; in other words, the marginal product of 
effort (or agent’s actions) on the performance measure should be perfectly correlated with 
the marginal product of effort (or agent’s actions) on the organization’s objective.  
 Here, we will follow the framework developed in Baker (1992). We first develop 
the basic approach and later, we adapt the model to our specific goals. In the Baker’s 
model (1992), ),( εeV  denotes the organization’s objective (or the organization’s total 
value or the agent’s total contribution to the organization value) as a function of the 
agent’s effort e  (unobservable) and a vector of random variablesε . ),( εeV  is not 
contractible, i.e., it cannot be directly implemented in a contract. Let ),( εeP denote the 
                                                 
59 The principal can also rely on discretionary subjective performance measures, such as worker's 
cooperation, innovation, and dependability, which may complement or improve on the available objective 
performance measurements (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1993).  
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(alternative) contractible performance measure as a function of the same variables. 
),( εeP is scaled such that the expected marginal product of effort on performance 
measure equals the expected marginal product of effort on value: 
)],([)],([ εε eVEePE ee = .60 The principal uses this performance measure to determine a 
linear incentive contract as follows: 
),,( εebPsw +=  
where w  is the agent’s compensation, s  is a fixed payment or the agent’s base salary,61 
and b is the “piece rate” the agent receives for each unit of P . An important assumption 
is that the agent is asymmetrically informed about the state of the world )(ε and his 
informational advantage affects the choice of his effort.  
Neither the principal nor the agent knows ε  before signing the binding contract, 
but the realization of ε  is known to the agent before he chooses his effort. Furthermore, 
it is assumed that at least some components of ε  affect the marginal product of the 
agent's effort level on both the performance measure )( eP and the value function )( eV . 
Hence, from the perspective of the principal, these marginal products are random 
variables. The degrees to which the two marginal products ( eV  and eP ) vary with the state 
of the world )(ε are denoted by 
eV
σ and
eP
σ , the standard deviation of eV  and eP  with 
respect toε .  
In the Baker’s model, the agent is assumed to be risk neutral, so that his utility 
function takes the form:  
                                                 
60 The expectation operator is taken overε , the vector of random variables.  
 
61 The agent’s salary is chosen to ensure that worker earns his reservation utility; it has no important role 
otherwise (Prendergast 1999; Courty and Marschke 2003).  
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),(),( eCebPsU −+= ε  
where )(eC is the disutility of effort, C’>0, C’’>0.  
The model is solved in a standard way, with the principal maximizing his total 
value net of compensation payments subject to the participation and the incentive 
compatibility constraints given respectively by: 
_
)](),([ UeCebPsE ≥−+ ε                (3.1) 
)(),( *'* eCebPe =ε                             (3.2) 
In equation (3.1), 
_
U is the agent’s utility given by his outside option or his 
reservation utility andε  is unknown. In equation (3.2), ε  is revealed to the agent and he 
chooses *e  given b  so that his marginal benefit of effort equals his marginal cost of 
effort. The principal’s maximization problem is then: 
)],,(),([max **
,
εε ebPseVE
sb
−−  
subject to equations (3.1) and (3.2).  
The solution to this problem yields the following expression for the optimal piece 
rate:62  
][
][
*
*
*
be
be
ePE
eVEb =                          (3.3) 
Equation (3.3) simply states that the optimal piece rate is equal to the ratio of the 
expected value of the marginal product ( eV ) times the responsiveness of the agent’s effort 
to incentives ( *be ), to the expected product (
** be eP ). Baker (1992) points out that if
*
be , 
the marginal effect of incentives on the agent’s effort, is not a function of ε , it would 
                                                 
62 Baker (1992) did not show how he derived this solution, but we provide the full development in appendix 
C.  
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drop out of the formula and 1][][* == ee PEVEb ; which is the standard case in agency 
theory with a risk-neutral agent. However, *be depends onε  in this situation; and 
differentiating equation (3.2) with respect to b gives:  
.''
*
ee
e
b bPC
P
e −=                                                                                                    (3.4) 
Substituting (3.4) into (3.3) using the second-Taylor approximation for C and P ,63 and 
assuming without loss of generality that 1][][ == ee PEVE , equation (3.3) can be rewritten 
as:  
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                                    (3.5) 
where ρ  is the correlation between eP  and eV .  
An important implication of Baker’s model is that, even under risk-neutrality, 
achieving the first-best outcomes (i.e., an optimal incentive intensity or piece rate 
*b equals to one) requires that eP  and eV  have the same variance and have perfect 
correlation. Otherwise, the performance measure leads to distorted incentives and the 
contract does not induce first-best outcomes. 
Now taking the 1992 Baker model as a basis, our goal is to extend the analysis to 
the case of development assistance by examining how incentive structures within 
international donor agencies may lead to “a push” to disburse money and the extent to 
which these incentives may inhibit the ability of foreign aid to promote economic growth 
and reduce poverty. Specifically, the model explores how donor agencies’ institutional 
                                                 
63 The second-Taylor approximation assumes that the second derivatives of C and P with respect to e and ε  are constant (Baker 1992).  
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incentive systems affect the characteristics of an optimal incentive contract and thus give 
rise to the “Money-Moving Syndrome.” Additionally, the model derives conditions 
required to reach an efficient outcome in terms of the impact of aid on poverty reduction 
and sustainable economic growth.   
It follows from Baker (1992) that an aid organization’s mission to maximize 
poverty reduction and economic growth is part of its total value function. In effect, aid 
agencies are part of a chain of principal-agent relationships which starts with taxpayers 
and their legislative representatives as principals who are willing to transfer appropriated 
funds to developing countries. They delegate the implementation of development 
programmes to an aid agency. The aid agency, in turn, becomes the principal to other 
agents in the aid delivery chain (Martens et al. 2001). Hence, the objective or the mission 
of an aid organization (i.e., global poverty alleviation and sustainable economic growth) 
is mostly defined by those ultimate principals who provide aid resources (e.g., citizens, 
taxpayers).64 However, aid agencies, as agents, also have “organizational imperatives” 
(survival, growth, achieve and/or maintain higher status or leadership position, have 
greater “market share,” promote interests of stakeholders, and so on).65 In the corporate 
world, these imperatives are completely integrated into the total value function. In 
development assistance, it cannot be the case; being effective for an aid agency, or 
accomplish its mission as stated above, would mean to “shorten the organization’s 
lifespan, not lengthen it,” which runs counter to its imperative to survive or grow. 
                                                 
64 Note that in some cases, for example, the World Bank, part of its resources comes from loans mobilized 
on international capital markets.  
 
65 Dichter (2003) argued that these organizational imperatives evolve naturally.  See chapter 3 of this 
dissertation for more details. 
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Although these organizational imperatives are experienced at different levels across aid 
agencies,66 they may be translated into similar actions across organizations. Donors, 
whose explicit goal is to alleviate poverty and promote growth, are committed by the 
very nature of their mission to deliberately put themselves out of work (Dichter 2003; 
Ellerman 2005). Thus, when they are faced with the prospect of survival and/or growth, 
aid organizations, though caring about development, may naturally take actions that run 
counter or preclude this mission and may institute an incentive system and performance 
evaluation criteria somewhat fostering these organizational imperatives. Hence, an aid 
organization will value two elements: its true mission (aid effectiveness) and its 
organizational imperatives.  
 We proceed to extend Baker’s model (1992) as follows: let ),( εeV  denote the aid 
agency’s true mission, i.e., to promote aid effectiveness in terms of maximizing poverty 
reduction and economic growth. As before, ),( εeV  is a function of the agent’s effort e  
(unobservable) and a vector of random variablesε . Let ),( εeO denote the 
aforementioned organizational imperatives, as a function of the same variables. Note that 
),( εeV  is not contractible because the agent’s (staff in the aid agency) contribution to 
development is difficult to observe and evaluate. ),( εeO is also not contractile for similar 
reasons. 
 The aid agency is thus required to choose an alternative performance measure 
easy enough to monitor or evaluate that it can be used in an incentive contract with the 
                                                 
66 It may be argued that some development agencies, such as the World Bank, would not be concerned 
about, for example, survival in the short-run given the number of poor in the world. Nonetheless, in the 
long-run, as development takes place and is both successful and sustainable, those agencies may become 
less necessary.   
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staff. Let us assume the aid agency decides on a performance measure ),( εeP defined as 
the volume of aid allocated within a specific period of time; e then becomes the agent’s 
effort exerted for project identification, design, and preparation.67 The rationale for such a 
choice of performance measurement is as follows: considering a development institution 
is in the business of “transferring” money from taxpayers in the developed world to the 
poor in the developing world and in a context where aid workers’ contribution to 
development is difficult to observe and evaluate, a tendency will arise to measure 
performance according to the size of budgets allocated to implement and finance 
development projects and programs for the reason that this performance measure appears 
convenient and is easily monitorable. A corollary of this rationale would be to determine 
under which conditions the volume of aid allocated would be more likely directed 
towards poverty alleviation or/and organization imperatives purposes.  
 Let us therefore consider the following assumptions:  
)],,([)1()],([)],([ εγεγε eOEeVEePE eee −+=                                                    (3.6) 
where   
mc +=
θγ   and 10 ≤≤ γ       
with ,10 ≤≤ θ   ,10 ≤≤ c  .10 ≤< m                         
Equation (3.6) states that the extent to which the expected marginal product of 
effort on the performance measure is related to the expected marginal product of effort on 
both organizational imperatives and the goal to reduce poverty depends on parameters θ , 
,c and .m  The parameterθ  is a measure of the degree of accountability in the 
development agency, specifically accountability for effectiveness with 1=θ denoting 
                                                 
67 This is similar to Wane (2004).    
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perfect accountability.68 Parameter c represents the level of corruption in recipient 
countries, with 1=c characterizing highly corrupt countries. The degree of difficulty to 
measure or evaluate the performance of development projects or program aid is denoted 
by m , where 1=m  embodies development activities whose effectiveness is very difficult 
to evaluate.  
Accountability is defined as “the means by which individuals and organizations 
report to a recognized authority, or authorities, and are held responsible for their actions”; 
and accountability for effectiveness is “the extent to which the combined impact of an aid 
agency’s portfolio of projects is in fact positively contributing to sustainable 
development” (Crawford 2004). The concept of accountability also implies the possibility 
of negative evaluation accompanied by sanction, or the possibility of positive evaluation 
and reward (Wenar 2006).  
Today, there is a general consensus that corruption, defined as the “abuse of 
public office for private gain,” deters economic growth and poverty reduction and should 
be eradicated (Transparency International 2007).69 In recipient countries, especially those 
countries where development resources constitute a large source of finance, corruption 
would prevent aid to reach the targeted beneficiaries and would lessen the magnitude of 
the impact of aid. Additionally, considering decision-making processes over aid 
allocations remain for the most part outside public scrutiny, the level of corruption in 
some aid-receiving countries may provide donor agencies with windows of opportunities 
                                                 
68 The international aid institutions should be accountable either to taxpayers in rich countries from whom 
resources are obtained, or to the intended beneficiaries in developing countries, or to both (Wenar 2006).   
 
69 See Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2004).  
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and incentives to yield ground to organizational imperatives and external constraints 
when implementing development efforts.  
Evaluation of development activities is an important aspect of the accountability 
of donor agencies. The evaluation of a particular development effort depends on the 
choice of development goals, the choice of indicators  used to measure goal achievement, 
the choice between absolute goal achievement or the overall “value-added” of the 
development effort, the time period over which the evaluation is conducted, and on 
decisions about who should do the assessment. Once there is a consensus on the above 
evaluation criteria, evaluation becomes more complex the more extensive the 
development effort. For instance, the evaluation of a single project would be quite 
straightforward while the evaluation of a budget support to a recipient government would 
be much more complex (Pitman et al. 2005).  We therefore assume that the more 
complex it is to evaluate development efforts of a donor agency in a recipient country, the 
greater the opportunities and incentives for that agency to emphasize organizational 
imperatives over poverty alleviation or economic growth. 
Various interactions between accountability, corruption and development 
evaluation in equation (3.6) would influence the extent to which the expected marginal 
product of effort on the performance measure is related to the expected marginal product 
of effort on both poverty reduction and organizational imperatives to survive and grow.  
First, if 1→γ , then the expected marginal product of effort on the performance 
measure should be close or equal to the expected marginal product of effort on the 
organization’s objective to alleviate poverty or promote economic growth. This criterion 
would be met under the following conditions:  
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• If an aid agency with a strong accountability system provides highly corrupt 
recipient countries with development assistance strictly in the form of easily 
measurable development activities ( 0,1,1 →→→ mcθ ); such a form of 
development assistance would provide the agency accountable with a margin of 
maneuver to police and sanction aid recipients. Conversely, such an aid agency 
would only implement budget supports, development policy lending, or 
comprehensive development frameworks whose economic, political, institutional 
and social ramifications render evaluations complex, in highly clean recipient 
countries ( 1,0,1 →→→ mcθ ).70 
• If an aid agency with a strong accountability system chooses to limit aid strictly to 
developing countries with good governance and very low levels of corruption and  
in the form of development projects and programs whose performance evaluations 
are easily carried out ( 0,0,1 →→→ mcθ ).71  
• Finally, if an aid agency with a limited accountability chooses to restrict its 
development aid to the least corrupt countries and focuses on financial and 
technical assistance where  outputs, outcomes, and impacts are easy to identify 
and measure ( 0,0,0 →→→ mcθ ). In this context, low aid agency 
                                                 
70 Note that equation (3.6) mathematically imposes that ,mc +≤θ even though accountability, 
corruption, and development evaluation are independent from one another. However, the expected marginal 
product of effort on the performance measure remains close or equal to the expected marginal product of 
effort on the organization’s objective to alleviate poverty or promote economic growth if 
( 0,1,1 →→→ mcθ ) or ( 1,0,1 →→→ mcθ ) and .mc +>θ  
 
71The  expected marginal product of effort on the performance measure remains close or equal to the 
expected marginal product of effort on the organization’s objective to alleviate poverty or promote 
economic growth if ( 0,0,1 →→→ mcθ ) and .mc +>θ  Note that when 1=θ , the aid agency is 
totally held accountable for producing positive results in reducing poverty and promoting economic 
growth. For efficiency reasons, it is important to increase accountability to the extent that this results in 
greater poverty reduction; because a higher degree of accountability also involves costs (Wenar 2006). 
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accountability would be counteracted by low levels of corruption in recipient 
countries and project performance assessed against easily monitorable targets and 
efficiency criteria. 
Second, if 0→γ , then the expected marginal product of effort on the 
performance measure should be close or equal to the expected marginal product of effort 
on aid agency’s organizational imperatives to survive and grow. This criterion would be 
met when the following condition is satisfied:  
• If an aid agency with a limited accountability ( 0→θ ) does not discriminate 
against corrupt countries and provides development assistance in the form of 
budget supports, development policy lending, or comprehensive development 
frameworks whose economic, political, institutional and social ramifications 
render evaluations complex ( 1,1 →→ mc ). The same is true when an aid agency 
with a limited accountability chooses to implement easily measurable 
development activities in highly corrupt countries ( 0,1 →→ mc ) or conversely, 
to provide development policy lending in support of policy and institutional 
reforms to the least corrupt countries ( 1,0 →→ mc ). In these three cases, aid 
officials are given windows of opportunities to satisfy the aid agency’s 
organizational imperatives to survive or grow.  
Finally, for any other level of accountability and corruption and any other level of 
difficulty to evaluate development activities, the expected marginal product of effort on 
the performance measure would be equal to a linear combination of the expected 
marginal product of effort on poverty reduction and the expected marginal product of 
effort on organizational imperatives to survive and grow. In other words, at any other 
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level of accountability and corruption and any other level of difficulty to evaluate 
development activities, an aid official would work for and allocate his/her effort 
simultaneously to both the aid agency’s mission to reduce global poverty and its 
imperatives to survive.  
A second important set of assumptions relates to the relationship between ),( εeV , 
),( εeO and ),( εeP . The aid agency’s total value function is defined by: 
),()1(),(),( εαεαε eVeOeW −+=                                                                     (3.7) 
In other words, the development agency cares about both aid effectiveness and its 
organizational imperatives. The parameterα  is the preference weight on organizational 
imperatives, where 10 << α . All other assumptions of the Baker’s model remain.  
 The principal’s maximization problem becomes: 
)],,(),([max **
,
εε ebPseWE
sb
−−  
subject to equations (3.1) and (3.2).  
 The solution to this problem yields the following optimal incentive intensity for a 
risk-neutral agent:72 
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As before, if the marginal effect of incentives on the agent’s effort is not a function ofε , 
i.e., *be  does not depend onε ,  *be  would drop out from equation (3.8) and the optimal 
piece rate becomes ,
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72 See appendix C for a complete derivation of the optimal piece rate.  
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given the assumption in equation (3.6). In this case, *1b  would be equal to one 
when 1=+ γα ; in other words, the closerγ  is to one, the smaller the preference weight 
attached to organizational imperatives. This result implies the following proposition:  
Proposition: In a bilateral or multilateral aid agency, the preference weight attached to 
organizational imperatives to survive and grow is small when:  
• The accountability for effectiveness is very high and attached to readily 
measurable development activities implemented in the least corrupt countries 
• The accountability for effectiveness is very high and attached to readily 
measurable development activities implemented in corrupt countries, and vice 
versa (negative relation between c and m ). 
• The accountability for effectiveness is limited but attached to readily measurable 
development activities implemented in the least corrupt countries. 
Substituting (3.4) into (3.8), using the second-Taylor approximation for C and P , 
the optimal incentive intensity becomes: 
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Equation (3.9) can easily be rewritten as follows:73 
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73 See appendix C for a complete derivation of the optimal piece rate.  
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where 1ρ  is the coefficient of correlation between eO  and eP , and 2ρ  is the coefficient of 
correlation between eP  and eV , and ][)1(][][ eee OEVEPE γγ −+= .  
As mentioned in the beginning of this section, an incentive contract is efficient 
i.e., induces first-best outcomes, when the optimal incentive intensity or piece rate 
*b equals to one. Per this definition, an incentive contract would be efficient whether it 
achieves first-best outcomes in terms of aid effectiveness or first-best outcomes in terms 
of promoting organizational imperatives to survive and grow. However, we are interested 
in an incentive contract where an aid organization’s incentive structure would influence 
the chosen performance measure in such a way that would elicit an “effective” effort 
from aid officials, i.e., a level of effort that not only would affect their reward but also 
contribute as much as possible to the aid agency’s true mission to reduce poverty and 
promote economic growth (Praag and Cools 2001).  Consequently, “efficiency” hereafter 
would refer to efficiency in terms of poverty alleviation and sustainable growth. 
Under the assumption that development aid agencies also face organizational 
imperatives that may justify the choice of a performance measure based on the amount of 
aid allocated within a specific period of time,74 the characteristics of an optimal incentive 
contract based on such performance evaluation and the conditions for efficient outcomes 
depend on the imperatives of aid organizations and their degree of accountability, the 
level of corruption in recipient countries and how difficult it is to assess development 
activities.75 
                                                 
74 As aforementioned, other reasons to evaluate performance based on the amount of money spent are 
explored in section 1 of chapter 3. However, here we focus on organizational imperatives. 
 
75 The pertinent equations for the discussion are equations (3.6) and (3.11).     
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First, if concerns about poverty alleviation and economic growth are predominant 
in a development agency and if there is a high level of accountability attached to readily 
measurable development activities implemented in the least corrupt countries, such 
that 0→α  and 1→γ , then a first-best linear incentive contract for a risk-neutral agent is 
obtained when the marginal product of the agent's effort level on both the performance 
measure )( eP and the aid agency’s true mission )( eV have the same variance and have 
perfect correlation. The first-best linear incentive contract could also be obtained under 
the aforementioned conditions in the cases where the accountability for effectiveness is 
very high and attached to readily measurable development activities implemented in 
corrupt countries, and vice versa, or where the accountability for effectiveness is limited 
but attached to readily measurable development activities implemented in the least 
corrupt countries. In such an aid agency, the performance measure creates an incentive to 
direct each unit of effort/money towards its poverty alleviation mission; the staff is 
encouraged to choose projects and adopt policies more likely to promote development. 
Furthermore, if the recipient country is highly corrupt, perfect accountability would 
require that the agency implement development projects and program aid whose 
performance evaluation is easily carried out, and vice versa (negative relation between 
c and m ). Lower levels of aid agency accountability would be offset by low levels of 
corruption in recipient countries and project performance assessed against easily 
monitorable targets. In this case, the quantity of aid disbursed factors in aid “quality.”76 
This is the Quality-Aid Incentive Scheme (figure 2).   
                                                 
76 According to the Commitment to Development Index 2006 developed by the Centre for Global 
Development (CGD), “quality” aid, among other things, excludes tied aid, subtracts debt payments by 
developing countries on aid loans, and favors poor and uncorrupt countries.  
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Second, it could also happen that concerns about poverty alleviation and 
economic growth are predominant within an aid agency with limited accountability 
where, on the one hand, development assistance programs do not discriminate against 
corrupt countries and are provided in the form of development policy lending inherently 
difficult to evaluate. On the other hand, low aid agency accountability could also be 
attached to easily measurable development activities in highly corrupt countries or to 
development activities difficult to evaluate and implemented in least corrupt countries 
such that 0→α  and 0→γ . In these circumstances, the expected marginal product of 
effort on effectiveness should be equal to the expected marginal product of effort on 
organizational imperatives in order to maintain the efficiency of the contract.  Otherwise 
stated, despite strong concerns for development effectiveness, the above combination of 
limited accountability and levels of corruption and project performance measurability 
would leave room to organizational imperatives however weak they may be, and thus to 
the possibility to “move the money.” One solution to dampen this possibility of money-
moving syndrome might be to restrict development assistance to countries with low 
levels of corruption and in the form of development projects and programs with higher 
levels of performance measurability (Quality-Aid Incentive Scheme with Limited 
Accountability). 
Third, if the internal imperatives of an aid organization largely outweigh the goal 
of effectiveness )1( →α  and the levels of accountability, corruption and project 
performance measurability are such that the expected marginal product of effort on the 
performance measure equals the expected marginal product of effort level on 
organizational imperatives, meaning ,0→γ  then the chosen performance measure would 
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elicit a level of effort that would contribute as much as possible to the aid agency’s 
organizational drive to grow if and only if the marginal product of the agent's effort level 
on both the performance measure )( eP and organizational imperatives )( eO have the same 
variance and have perfect correlation. However, the incentive contract would not be 
efficient in terms of poverty reduction and sustainable economic growth. Each unit of 
effort/money would be directed towards the organization’s imperative to survive, to 
grow, or maintain its global status. Therefore, the focus is predominantly on volume of 
aid disbursed rather than on the impact of aid disbursement on development. This 
situation is encountered when aid agencies with limited accountability and high 
preference for survival adopt development assistance programs that do not discriminate 
against corrupt countries and are provided in the form of budget support or program aid 
more difficult to evaluate; or when these agencies implement easily measurable 
development activities in highly corrupt countries and vice versa. This is the Money-
Moving Syndrome Incentive Scheme, a state where the quantity of foreign aid committed 
or disbursed becomes, in itself, an important objective side by side or above the 
effectiveness of aid (figure 2). 
Finally, let us modify the previous case in such a way that the internal imperatives 
to survive are still largely predominant in the aid organization )1( →α , but this time 
,1→γ i.e., the levels of accountability, corruption and project performance measurability 
are such that the expected marginal product of effort on the performance measure equals 
the expected marginal product of effort level on aid effectiveness. In this case, the 
performance measure would still align, as closely as possible, aid officials’ levels of 
effort and aid agency’s imperatives to survive and grow if an additional condition is taken 
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into account: the expected marginal product of effort on organizational imperatives 
equals the expected marginal product of effort on effectiveness. In other words, despite a 
high preference for survival, a combination of high level of accountability attached to 
readily measurable development activities implemented in the least corrupt countries 
would compel aid workers to somewhat choose projects and adopt policies that are more 
likely to promote development. Further pressures to emphasize organizational 
imperatives over aid effectiveness would be discouraged where the accountability for 
effectiveness is very high and attached to readily measurable development activities 
implemented in corrupt countries, and vice versa, or to some extent where the 
accountability for effectiveness is limited but attached to readily measurable development 
activities implemented in the least corrupt countries (Money-Moving Syndrome Incentive 
Scheme with High Accountability). 
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Figure 2: Analytical Illustration of the Effects of “Money Moving” Incentives on Aid  
Effectiveness 
 
Conclusion 
In general, international development agencies’ principal mission is to reduce 
global poverty and promote sustainable economic growth. Concurrent to this mission, 
external constraints, institutional structures and the incentives they generate may help or 
hinder development efforts. Among these institutional incentives and external constrains, 
are organizational imperatives to survive and grow, the “warm glow” effect, the lack of 
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checks and balances, and the difficulty to evaluate and quantify the overall impact of aid; 
factors that have been identified in this study as providing a motive for money moving 
behaviors within international development agencies. In the theoretical model, we 
assumed that, given the difficulty to quantify the overall impact of aid, an aid agency that 
values its mission and is concerned about organizational imperatives (or warm glow) may 
choose to evaluate staff performance according to the size of budgets allocated to 
implement and finance development projects and programs. The extent to which this 
performance measure affects aid effectiveness would depend on the level of institutional 
imperatives, the degree of accountability within the aid agency, the level of corruption in 
recipient countries and the degree of difficulty to evaluate development activities. 
The theoretical model suggests, among other things,  that as long as concerns 
about poverty alleviation and economic growth are predominant and a high level of 
accountability is attached to readily measurable development activities implemented in 
the least corrupt countries, the quantity of aid disbursed would factor in aid “quality.” 
This is explained by the fact that the staff is given the incentive to direct each unit of 
effort and money towards projects and policies more likely to promote development. On 
the other hand, where, for example, organizational imperatives outweigh the goal of aid 
effectiveness and limited accountability is attached to development assistance programs 
that do not discriminate against corrupt countries and are provided in the form of budget 
support or program aid more difficult to evaluate, each unit of effort and money would be 
mainly directed towards promoting organizational imperatives, because the staff face the 
incentive to focus on the amount of money disbursed rather that the impact of that 
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amount of aid on development. This occurrence is called the “Money-Moving 
Syndrome.” 
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CHAPTER IV 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
The objective of this chapter is to test several predictions of the theoretical model. 
We develop an empirical framework to examine the extent to which organizational 
imperatives for “survival,” perpetuation, recognition, and growth affect international aid 
agencies’ incentive structures and thus their mission to reduce global poverty and 
promote sustainable economic growth. In particular, the empirical framework analyzes 
the extent to which incentives to move the money stemming from these imperatives are 
present within donor agencies and coexist with genuine concerns about aid effectiveness 
to shape aid agencies’ decisions regarding project loan size to developing countries.   
 This chapter is organized in five sections. It begins with an overview of the 
empirical approach used to test the existence of the “Money-Moving Syndrome.” In the 
second section, we offer a description of variables and data sources used in the empirical 
analysis. The empirical methodology is described in the third section. In section four, we 
present our main set of hypotheses testing the existence of the “Money-Moving 
Syndrome” within the World Bank practices. In the last section, we develop the empirical 
model and specify the estimation equations used to test our set of hypotheses.  
 
 
 
 
 
72 
 
Overview 
At this stage, it is important to recognize that the nature and the limitation of the 
data available do not allow us to derive the testable empirical hypotheses entirely from 
the theoretical model presented in the previous chapter; therefore attenuating the 
connection between theory and empirics in this dissertation. However, we could draw 
from the theoretical model several predictions readily testable empirically and complete 
them with testable hypotheses derived from the money moving literature reviewed in the 
second chapter.   
As discussed in previous chapters, the purpose of this dissertation is to examine 
the prevalence of the “Money-Moving Syndrome” within international donor agencies 
and its role as a potential factor in the low performance of foreign aid in terms of poverty 
alleviation and growth enhancement in developing countries.  
One approach in attempting to gauge the prevalence of the “Money-Moving 
Syndrome” within donor agencies would be to identify the determinants of project size or 
net commitment amounts to aid recipient countries.  
However, an analysis of the impact of the “Money-Moving Syndrome” on the 
effectiveness of foreign aid is less straightforward. An ideal model specification would be 
one in which there is a relationship between a measure of aid effectiveness as a 
dependent variable and a measure of the “Money-Moving Syndrome” as an explanatory 
variable plus a set of other control variables. For example, at the aid institution level, we 
would analyze the extent to which the “Money-Moving Syndrome” is present in each 
project commitment and disbursement levels and then analyze how it affects the 
performance of that project. 
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However, while there are many variables readily available that could be used to 
measure the overall impact of aid,77 this is not so for the “Money-Moving Syndrome.” To 
the extent of our knowledge, variables or proxies explicitly capturing independent 
institutional biases toward money moving at the expense of the development impact are 
not currently available. This issue was already raised by Fleck and Kilby (2005a). 
Moreover, there are not yet any variables specifically capturing money moving incentives 
faced by aid officials in aid agencies and other organizations involved in development 
assistance.78  
Consequently, it appears that estimating a direct relationship between aid 
effectiveness and “Money-Moving Syndrome” is not yet feasible. Nevertheless, as 
emphasized by the review of literature in chapter two, there is good reason to believe that 
a high degree of “Money-Moving Syndrome” will somewhat lead or contribute to aid 
ineffectiveness for the simple reason that, in this context, what matters the most is the 
volume of aid disbursed rather than its actual impact on poverty reduction or economic 
growth.  
In our context, we posit that evidence in support of the “Money-Moving 
Syndrome” can perhaps be used to provide evidence as to why foreign aid has not been 
more effective in reducing global poverty and promoting economic growth among 
                                                 
77 For instance, variables such as GDP per capita growth, life expectancy at birth, adult literacy rate, 
primary, secondary or tertiary enrolment ratio, and so on.  
 
78 As far as we know, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) is the only aid agency 
which attempted to determine if its employees felt pressures to disburse the budget within the appropriation 
period. Amongst the 46 randomly selected Sida Desk Officers interviewed, around 31officers indicated that 
they had been under the pressure to “move the money,” especially at the end of the end of the budget year 
(Ostrom et al. 2001).  
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developing countries, despite the large amount of resources involved in achieving this 
goal over the years.  
 
Variables Description and Data Sources 
Foreign assistance is delivered through a collection of projects and programs 
offered by different multilateral aid agencies or bilateral donors to developing countries 
(Wane 2004). These development projects and programs are in general “donor-driven.” 
This means that international development agencies are highly involved in the 
identification, design, implementation, and evaluation of those projects and programs in 
poor countries.  In this context, bilateral and multilateral aid agencies might be 
interpreted as being as responsible as developing countries for the effectiveness of 
foreign aid through the quality of aid they provide.79  It is therefore sound to examine 
whether the “Money-Moving Syndrome” is present in aid agencies’ decisions over loan 
amounts for projects in aid-receiving countries. Of course, our underlying hypothesis is 
that whether incentives to move the money are present or not would influence aid quality 
and thus aid effectiveness.  
However, obtaining comprehensive project databases from International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) and bilateral organizations is not an easy task and is often impossible.80 
                                                 
79 Some authors have shown that donor agencies could improve the quality of the aid they provide. For 
example, Deininger, Squire, and Basu (1998) showed that the economic and sector work (ESW) provided 
by the World Bank improves the quality of World Bank lending portfolio. Kilby (2000) showed that early 
supervision and the amount of supervision improve the performance of World Bank-funded projects.  
 
80 Regarding some bilateral agencies, the USAID’s “Greenbook” for instance shows a complete record of 
the U.S. foreign aid (loans and grants) to the rest of the world for each fiscal year since 1949. However, this 
database does not contain any information on the performance of those projects. Also, the Office of 
Inspector General in charge of the efficiency and effectiveness in the operations of the USAID does not 
release data on the performance of USAID’s projects overseas.  
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In 2005, the Bank Information Center (BIC) and freedominfo.org developed the IFI 
Transparency Resource, an extensive information tool which compares the transparency 
standards of ten IFIs, including the World Bank and the regional development banks.81 
The Transparency Resource was developed to encourage greater openness by the IFIs and 
promote higher global governance standards within the IFIs. The data in the Resource 
examines the ten IFIs’ operations and projects and compare them across around 250 
indicators of transparency (IFI Transparency Resource 2005).82  
One indicator is the “Final staff assessment of project” which provides critical 
information about institution, borrower, and implementing agencies’ performance; and an 
evaluation of implementation of various aspects of the project. Another indicator is the 
“Evaluation unit assessment or audit of project” conducted by the Operations Evaluation 
Department of the institution and which assesses if the original objectives of the project 
have been satisfied and determines the project overall performance. The IFI Transparency 
Resource comparison of the ten IFIs across these two indicators revealed that, with the 
exception of the World Bank, the IFIs in general do not disclose information related to 
their evaluations and assessments related to a given project or operation (IFI 
Transparency Resource 2005).  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
81 The ten IFIs examined in the Transparency Resource are the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the 
African Development Bank (AfDB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the 
European Investment Bank (EIB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), the Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC), the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the World Bank (IFI Transparency 
Resource 2005).  
 
82 The IFI Transparency Resource was launched in 2005 but it has been regularly updated. 
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We thus requested the World Bank projects database, and after a careful review of 
the request and dissertation outline by the Bank, we were finally able to obtain the data. 
However, contrary to the IFI Transparency Resource, some important variables we 
specifically requested (such as sub-ratings data, discussed in the section below) were 
omitted from the dataset. The reason given was that these data are “not currently 
disclosed.”  
For all the obvious reasons, the empirical analysis in this chapter focuses 
exclusively on the World Bank-funded project database. Due to the unavailability of the 
data on projects and programs funded by other bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, 
the World Bank will be used as a proxy for the performance of all other donors in the 
development field.  
 The econometric analysis draws on 1,977 World Bank projects approved in 134 
developing countries between 1984 and 2006 and completed between 1993 and 2007. 
The central variables in this analysis are project loan size or net commitment (dependent 
variable), various measures of project success and the World Bank’s and borrower’s 
performance in various stages of the project life cycle. We consider a variety of other 
project characteristics such as administrative regions, economic sector or network, and 
lending instrument types. These project-level variables are reported by the Independent 
Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank. Additionally, the aid literature has long 
emphasized that GDP per capita, growth rate of GDP per capita, population size 
(indicators of need) and macroeconomic policy indicators such as inflation and trade 
openness (indicators of country merit) are important factors influencing aid allocation 
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and therefore project size in developing countries.83 It is then important to control for 
these variables. All macroeconomic and policies variables included in the empirical 
analysis are drawn from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2006) and the 
Penn World Tables (Heston et al. 2006). They cover a period from 1984 to 2004. 
Governance indicators such as corruption and bureaucracy quality over the same period 
are also retained in our analysis.  
From an original population of 7,260 projects transmitted to us, only 2,078 were 
found to have complete measures of project success and bank and borrower performance.  
Of these, 101 other projects displayed a size of zero and have been excluded. This leaves 
us with 1,977 projects in our sample. The resulting dataset is a project-level 
independently pooled cross-section dataset. The summary statistics and the definition of 
all variables are presented in table D1 through table D3 of appendix D.  
The choice of the dependent and explanatory variables presented in detail below 
stems from the propositions and implications of theoretical model we developed in 
chapter three. In the model, we assumed that because aid officials’ contribution to 
development is difficult to observe and evaluate, a tendency will arise to measure 
performance according to the size of budgets allocated to implement and finance 
development activities for the reason that this particular performance measure appears 
convenient and is easily monitorable. However, the extent to which the chosen 
performance measure would elicit an “effective” effort from aid officials, i.e., a level of 
effort that would contribute as much as possible to an aid agency’s true mission to reduce 
poverty and promote economic growth,  would depend on factors such as: aid agency’s 
                                                 
83 See Burnside and Dollar (2000), Alesina and Dollar (2000), and Kilby (2000) for more details.  
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preferences for organizational imperatives to survive and grow, degree of aid agency’s 
accountability for effectiveness, level of corruption in recipient countries and level of 
performance measurability. The main propositions of the model are as follows: 
 (a) As long as concerns about poverty alleviation and economic growth are 
predominant, and a high level of accountability is attached to readily measurable 
development activities implemented in the least corrupt countries, the staff is given the 
incentive to direct each unit of effort and money towards projects and policies more 
likely to promote development. Therefore, the quantity of aid disbursed would factor in 
aid “quality.”  
(b) On the other hand, if organizational imperatives outweigh the goal of aid 
effectiveness and limited accountability is attached to development activities that do not 
discriminate against corrupt countries and are provided in the form of budget support or 
program aid more difficult to evaluate, the staff is given the incentive to direct each unit 
of effort and money towards promoting organizational imperatives. Therefore, the focus 
would be on the amount of money disbursed (aid “quantity”) rather that the impact of that 
amount of aid on development.84   
These two propositions and other propositions derived from the model justify the 
choice of project loan size as the dependent variable. Indeed, this variable offers the 
possibility to separate the component “quality” from the component “quantity” in the 
volumes of aid resources allocated to developing countries. From the set of explanatory 
variables included  in the model that would influence the quantitative and qualitative 
aspects of official aid (such as aid agency’s preferences for organizational imperatives to 
                                                 
84 Quality of foreign aid refers to its output whereas quantity of aid refers to its input. A complete definition 
of aid quality is provided in appendix A. 
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survive and grow, degree of aid agency’s accountability for effectiveness, level of 
corruption in recipient countries and level of performance measurability), only data on 
corruption and performance measurability are readily available and therefore used in the 
testable empirical hypotheses. As aforementioned, other explanatory variables that have 
been known to significantly influence the quantitative and qualitative aspects of aid (such 
as GDP per capita, growth rate of GDP per capita, population size, inflation,  trade 
openness, and bureaucracy quality) have been drawn from the literature (discussion of the 
relevance of these variables is in section four).  
 
Dependent Variable 
 Our dependent variable is a measure of project’s size and reflects the degree of 
World Bank involvement.85 It is called the Net Commitment Amount (in millions of 
current dollars) and is calculated as total commitments net of cancellations for all projects 
in the Work Bank portfolio (Annual Report on Portfolio Performance 2006).  
 An important part of a development project is the mode and amount of financing 
required for the project. The proposal for financing the project may involve a loan 
component from the World Bank. The World Bank may then approve the loan amount 
for the project based upon mutually agreed upon terms and conditions.86 The amount of 
loan approved is called the committed loan amount. Once the loan is approved, the 
borrower should meet certain conditions (in terms of the project), before the loan 
becomes effective. Upon the loan becoming effective, the World Bank may disburse the 
                                                 
85 Hereafter, project size, loan amount, and net commitment will be used interchangeably in the chapter.  
86 Loan Approval by the Board of Directors occurs at stage 5 of the World Bank Project Cycle (see 
appendix E). 
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loan. For closed (completed) projects, net commitments equals to all disbursements 
made.87 
 
Independent Variables 
Our main independent variables of interest are three project performance rating 
criteria developed by the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG): (1) overall 
project outcome, (2) project’s sustainability, and (3) project’s contribution to institutional 
development in the borrowing country. These indicators are available from ex-post 
evaluations conducted by the IEG and provide an assessment of the overall performance 
of a completed project.  
 The overall project outcome is the extent to which the project’s major relevant 
objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. Project outcome is 
rated on a six-point scale: highly satisfactory, satisfactory, moderately satisfactory, 
moderately unsatisfactory, unsatisfactory, and highly unsatisfactory.  
Sustainability reflects the resiliency to risks of a project as measured by the 
likelihood that its estimated net benefits will be maintained or exceeded over the project's 
intended useful life. Sustainability is rated using the following five-point scale: highly 
likely, likely, uncertain, unlikely, and highly unlikely.  
Finally, the institutional development impact measure assesses the extent to which 
a project improves the ability of a country to use its human, financial, and natural 
resources efficiently, equitably, and in a sustainable manner. This last measure is rated 
using a four-point scale: high, substantial, modest, and negligible (Independent 
                                                 
87 This information was provided by the Loan Services Group at the World Bank.  
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Evaluation Group 2006). These performance ratings are transformed into dichotomous 
variables for the econometric analysis.   
Other independent variables of interest include the IEG's evaluations of bank and 
borrower performance. The goal of these evaluations is to determine how good a job each 
partner has done during the different stages of the project cycle, i.e., project 
identification, preparation, appraisal and implementation. However, only the overall bank 
and borrower performance are available in our dataset. In the case of the bank, the quality 
at entry and quality of supervision ratings are combined into a rating of overall bank 
performance. This rating is based on a six-point scale from highly satisfactory to highly 
unsatisfactory, where “highly satisfactory” means that the bank performance was rated 
highly satisfactory on both dimensions.88 In the case of the borrower, ratings for 
government performance and implementing agency (ies)’s performance are combined 
into a rating of borrower performance. This rating is also based on a six-point scale, 
where “highly satisfactory” means that the borrower performance was rated highly 
satisfactory on both dimensions.89 
Another potentially useful variable is the Implementation Completion Report or 
ICR quality. This is a project performance evaluation conducted by the operational staff 
                                                 
88 It should be noted that when the rating for one dimension is in the satisfactory range while the rating for 
the other dimension is in the unsatisfactory range, the rating for overall bank performance normally 
depends on the outcome rating. Thus, overall bank performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory if 
Outcome is rated in the satisfactory range or Moderately Unsatisfactory if outcome is rated in the 
unsatisfactory range, except when Bank performance did not significantly affect the particular outcome 
(Independent Evaluation Group 2006).  
 
89 A similar guidance rule as in the previous footnote applies for the borrower performance rating.  
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of the Bank itself but not by the IEG; in that regard, it is a self-evaluation.90 ICR quality 
is rated as exemplary, satisfactory, or unsatisfactory.  
All the above-mentioned performance ratings are also transformed into 
dichotomous variables for the econometric analysis. 
In the following paragraphs, we discuss other variables of interest that can be 
potentially used as control independent variables (discussion of the relevance of these 
variables is in section four).  
First, other project characteristics that could be used in this study consist of: 
i) Administrative regions (Africa; Asia; Europe, Middle East and North Africa; and 
Latin America and Caribbean) which correspond to the major operational 
divisions of the World Bank 
ii) Economic sectors (Agriculture, Health, Education, Transport, and so on), which 
reflect the type of project.91 
iii) Projects are also categorized by type of lending instruments. There are two types 
of lending instruments: investment lending and adjustment lending.92 Investment 
lending provides long-term financing for a variety of activities in various sectors 
aimed at building the physical and social infrastructure necessary for 
                                                 
90 The IEG nevertheless reviews every ICR and validate the self-rating (see 
http://www.worldbank.org/oed/oed_tools.html).   
 
91 In total, 17 sectors are represented in the IEG dataset.   
 
92 In 2004, adjustment lending was replaced by development policy lending (see 
http://go.worldbank.org/56JYOB4OV0), accessed 10 February 2008. 
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development. Adjustment lending provides quick-disbursing financing to support 
policy and institutional reforms in developing countries.93  
iv) In the IEG dataset, each project has also an approval fiscal year, an approval date, 
an exit fiscal year, a deactivation date (or closing date) and an evaluation date. 
We also control for macroeconomic conditions in the borrower country which 
may influence Bank managers’ decisions over project size or loan amount. The variables 
taken into account are some measures of poverty or need in the recipient country, such as 
GDP per capita, growth rate of GDP per capita, and some policy indicators such as 
inflation and trade openness. These data are compiled from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2006) and the Penn World Tables (Heston et al. 
2006). Other variables likely to affect decisions over project size or loan amount are 
corruption and bureaucracy quality, governance indicators compiled from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).  
 A brief overview of the World Bank’s lending portfolio size, composition, and 
performance is presented in Table D4 through Table D7 of appendix D. Table D8 reports 
the frequency distribution of projects per aid recipient country. 
Tables D4 and Table D5 report the size of the loan by region, sector, and overall 
project outcome respectively. Cleary, from 1984 to 2006, East and South Asia received 
on average the largest amount of net commitments (around $1.1 billion) for a total of 510 
operations. With near 78 percent successful outcomes weighted by number of projects, 
                                                 
93 For more information on Investment and Development Policy Lending, refer to 
http://go.worldbank.org/Y5DDIIBTY0 and http://go.worldbank.org/NIOSPCWSA0, accessed 10 February 
2008. 
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this region is well above the Bank’s average of 74 percent. This is the case for most 
regions except Sub-Saharan Africa. Over the same period, Sub-Saharan Africa’s total net 
commitment averaged $36 million with the largest number of operations (544) financed 
by the World Bank during that period. However, the breakdown of successful 
development outcomes by region revealed that Sub-Sahara Africa’s low successful 
outcomes rating at 61 percent, weighted by number of operations, is well below the 
Bank-wide average of 74 percent.   
A detailed analysis of development outcomes by Sector Boards (Table D5) shows 
that during the same period, the Finance sector outperformed other sectors in successful 
development outcomes in terms of number of operations; furthermore the Finance 
portfolio was the largest, with an average net commitment of $1.44 billion. Two sectors 
(Environment & Social Development and Private Sector Development) had successful 
development outcomes below the World Bank’s average of 74 percent; each sector 
receiving around $50 million in net commitments.  
Table D6 shows development outcomes by loan size and approval month. 
Compared to other operations, projects approved at the end of the fiscal year (March, 
April and May) had successful outcomes weighted by number of projects below the 
Bank’s average; moreover, their average portfolio from 1984 to 2006 is close to the 
average portfolio of operations approved during the remainder of the fiscal year.  
Operations considered difficult to evaluate are the largest in the Bank’s portfolio, 
with an average loan size of about $1.75 billion concentrated on 264 operations and with 
development outcomes at 80 percent successful by number of projects. On the other 
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hand, operations considered easy to evaluate received on average $80 million with 
successful development outcomes slightly above the Bank’s average (Table D7).   
 
Empirical Methodology  
To examine the extent to which “Money-Moving Syndrome” and concerns for 
poverty alleviation coexist within the World Bank, we use the independently pooled 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation. Indeed, projects subject to a Project 
Performance Assessment Report (PPAs) conducted by the World Bank’s Independent 
Evaluation Group (IEG) are randomly selected each year from a population of completed 
projects. One in four completed projects (around 70 projects a year) is subject to a Project 
Performance Assessment Report. Unfortunately, data on projects not approved, and 
projects approved and completed but not subject to Project Performance Assessment are 
not reported.  
In addition, we use specific estimation procedures in an attempt to address 
potential econometric issues. Due to of the possible nonlinear effects of population and 
GDP per capita, these two variables are entered in the regression in logarithm and 
quadratic terms respectively. To control for potential heteroskedasticity in the error term, 
we use the White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.  To account for any historical 
factors that could potentially affect the current decisions regarding project loan size, or to 
control for unobserved factors (projects and country unobservables) that affect current 
project loan size and are likely to be correlated with one or more of the independent 
variables (endogeneity bias), we use a lagged dependent variable. Using this technique as 
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a way to control for unobservables is not perfect but it allows us to obtain better estimates 
of our main variables of interest.  
 
Testable Hypotheses 
Our empirical work attempts to explain the “net commitments” dependent 
variable as fully as possible by controlling for all independent variables that may 
positively affect the size of the net commitments; but at the same time to include other 
explanatory variables that may reduce if not eliminate the size of net commitments.  
Evidence supporting the existence of a “Money-Moving Syndrome” will be 
provided if: a) we find those variables that are expected to take a negative sign to actually 
take a positive and significant coefficient (for example, the higher the level of corruption 
in  the country as measured independently by Transparency International, the higher the 
level of net commitments); and b) we find those variables that are expected to have a 
positive sign actually being insignificant or taking a negative and significant coefficient. 
Specifically, after controlling for country- and project-specific factors, we are 
interested in determining the extent to which the World Bank’s managers take into 
consideration past project performance, bank and borrower performance when making 
decisions regarding the loan amount of a new development project. In effect, we would 
expect that, before choosing the loan amount of an additional development assistance 
project in a country, a country manager concerned about project performance would take 
into account the relevance and efficiency of past projects in the country, their 
sustainability, their impact on institutions, and the quality of the work done by both the 
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Bank and the borrower in various stages of past projects (hypothesis 1).94 Reckoning with 
this information as well as with country specific characteristics may have a positive 
impact on the effectiveness of a new development assistance project approved in a 
recipient country. In effect, it provides an estimate of the likelihood of success of the 
Bank’s future development projects and programs in a country and may reduce the 
“excessive optimism” about conditions in recipient countries that often plagues 
development organizations preoccupied with volume of lending rather than effectiveness 
of loans. Another advantage of such an analysis is that it provides an idea of whether the 
World Bank encourages a learning environment, i.e., whether past knowledge affects 
future planning within the Bank.  
However, a regression of net commitments on past overall project performance 
ratings or even past overall Bank and borrower performance may not be a correct 
specification because these ratings may not yet be available to the country manager at the 
time he/she is making a decision regarding the loan amount of a new project. A solution 
to this problem would be to use sub-ratings of past projects performance i.e., performance 
ratings at the design, preparation, and implementation stages of past projects. 
Unfortunately, the IEG sub-rating data are not disclosed to the public.  
To circumvent this problem, we use the performance ratings of past projects 
which, at the time of the approval of a new project, are at least halfway to the end or at 
least three- quarter to the end (figure 3). The idea is that if past projects are, for instance, 
at least halfway to the end at the time of approval of a new project, the country manager 
may already possess some relevant information about the overall future performance of 
                                                 
94 We could also argue that, in his/her decision-making process, the country manager should heavily weigh 
the performance of the most recently completed projects and the bank and borrower performance for those 
projects, rather than the projects that were completed a long time ago.  
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these projects. In effect, when a project is halfway completed, performance ratings at 
design, preparation, implementation and supervision stages of the project are already 
known (see appendix E). Furthermore, previous studies on the World Bank lending 
portfolio have shown that a project with a satisfactory quality at entry has a higher 
probability of performing well than a project with design problems from the start; the 
stock of prior economic and sector work (ESW) improves the quality of World Bank 
lending; and the timing and intensity of supervision have a positive impact on a project’s 
probability of success (Deininger et al. 1998; Kilby 2000; Wane 2004).  
As for past projects which at the time of the approval of a new project are 
completed, the country manager would already possess relevant information about the 
overall performance of these projects and thus, their performance ratings could easily be 
used when making a decision regarding the amount of resources to be allocated to the 
new project in the aid-receiving country.  
For illustration purposes, let us consider the example in figure 3. In order to 
maximize the effectiveness of a new  project in China, the China country manager at the 
World Bank should consider the following before determining the loan amount of the 
new project: (a) country-specific characteristics and (b) the relevance and performance of 
past projects P-2, P-3, P-4, P-5, and P-6.  
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Figure 3: Project Timeline 
Country: China 
Approval fiscal year of a new project: FY 199595   
     
 
 
An additional approach to test the existence of an “approval culture” or a 
“Money-Moving Syndrome” within an aid agency would be to examine how the promise 
of funds or the net commitments to a recipient country respond to macroeconomic 
conditions,  institutional framework and policy environment in that country. Similar to 
the aid allocation literature, we are interested in verifying whether the pattern of lending 
is dictated by recipients’ need and merit (factors making aid loans effective in alleviating 
poverty) or by aid agencies’ organizational imperatives to survive and grow (hypothesis 
                                                 
95 The World Bank’s fiscal year runs from July 1 to June 30.  For example, fiscal year 2003 covers the 
period from July 1, 2002 to June 30, 2003. 
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2). In particular, we would expect that, in an aid agency where poverty reduction 
initiatives outweigh money moving incentives, variables such as GDP per capita and its 
growth rate (measures of the level of poverty and indicators of need) would have a 
negative effect on the size of new projects ceteris paribus; meaning that the promise of 
funds of an education or health project would be larger the poorer the country. We would 
also expect that aid agencies would reward good economic policies; for instance the 
lower the inflation rate and the higher the degree of openness the larger the project loan, 
holding everything constant (indicators of merit). The quality of governance measured by 
the level of corruption and the bureaucracy quality in recipient countries should also enter 
in the decision-making process (other indicators of merit). A proven track record of 
lending to corrupt countries or countries with poor bureaucracies would seem to produce 
evidence that there is a “Money-Moving Syndrome” at work.  
Evidence supporting the existence of a “Money-Moving Syndrome” may also be 
provided by the impact of many other variables essential in capturing a donor agency’s 
preference for volume of lending over projects’ value or program accomplishments. One 
such variable is the total net commitment of past projects in a country at the time of 
approval of a new project. This variable would determine whether more budget resources 
tend to be allocated in recipient countries where past loan volumes are already substantial 
(hypothesis 3). If the emphasis is on the effectiveness of the development assistance 
provided rather than on the volume of lending, overall past loans alone should not affect 
decisions regarding project loan size; but rather their impact should be weighted in 
relation to intermediate or final performance of past projects. More precisely, we would 
expect the volume of past loans in a recipient country to have a positive effect on a new 
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project loan size if the proportion of successful past projects in that country is quite high 
(extension of hypothesis 3).  
Another interesting variable would be one that captures the degree of difficulty to 
evaluate and quantify project performance. More explicitly, this variable would reveal 
whether donor agencies systematically spend more money on large-scale development 
interventions which overall impact on poverty would be difficult to evaluate and quantify 
(hypothesis 4). As mentioned in chapter three, performance evaluation of development 
activities is an important aspect of the accountability of donor agencies. However, 
performance evaluation becomes more complex the more extensive the development 
effort. Basically, while the performance evaluation of a single project would be quite 
straightforward, the implementation of budget supports, development policy lending, or 
comprehensive development frameworks with their economic, political, institutional and 
social ramifications would render performance evaluations much more complex. We 
therefore assume that the more complex it is to evaluate development efforts of a donor 
agency in a recipient country, the greater the opportunities for organizational imperatives 
for survival, recognition, and growth to enter into play, and the greater the institutional 
incentives to “move the money.” We choose to divide economic sectors into three 
categories based on the degree of difficulty of project performance evaluation: difficult, 
moderately difficult and easy to evaluate.96 A project evaluation dummy is created to 
                                                 
96 These three categories are constructed on the basis of the type of project (or sectors), the lending 
instruments and the lending instrument types. The first category (“difficult to evaluate”) includes all 
projects in economic sectors financed by development policy lending. The second category includes all 
projects, except projects in the Infrastructure Network sector, financed by investment loans. The last 
category (“easy to evaluate”) includes all projects in the Infrastructure Network sector financed by 
investment loans. We assume that it is possible to determine in which category a new development project 
will fall even before its design or implementation as long as the type of project, the lending instrument and 
the lending instrument type are known. 
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capture each category. As aforementioned, this dummy variable also indirectly controls 
for the magnitude of projects.  
Additionally, we might be interested in testing the existence of end-of-fiscal-year 
pressures to spend within the World Bank (hypothesis 5); although it operates mostly on 
the basis of loans mobilized on international capital markets (not government 
appropriations) and, a priori, should be not subject to this type of pressure. To capture the 
end-of-fiscal-year effect, we use project’s approval date to create a dummy variable. The 
value of the dummy variable is one if a project’s loan size is approved in April, May, or 
June and zero if it is approved in the remainder of the fiscal year (from July to March).97  
Finally, we also argue that the quantitative and qualitative aspects of project loan 
size do not only depend on the above-mentioned variables but also on the interaction 
between these variables:  
First, let us consider what we call performance interactions. We have previously 
mentioned the interaction term between past project performance and past loans (see 
extension of hypothesis 3). In a money moving environment, we also argue that past 
project performance would matter less in decisions regarding loan sizes when a new 
project to be approved is considered difficult to evaluate than when it is easy to evaluate 
(this is an extension of hypothesis 4);98 the rationale being that the wider the economic, 
political, institutional and social ramifications of a new development project or program, 
                                                 
97 The World Bank’s fiscal year runs from July 1 to June 30.  For example, fiscal year 2003 covers the 
period from July 1, 2002 to June 30, 2003. 
 
98 As aforementioned, we assume that it is possible to determine in which category a new development 
project will fall even before its design or implementation as long as the type of project, the lending 
instrument and the lending instrument type are known.   
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the higher the probability of organizational imperatives and money moving incentives to 
enter into play, and thus the lower the chance to take into account the likelihood of 
project success in decisions regarding new project loan size. This is the interaction term 
between project evaluation dummies and past project performance criteria. 
  Second, we introduce an interaction term between past project performance 
criteria and corruption to examine to what extent the partial effect of past project 
performance on net commitments depends on the level of corruption in the recipient 
country. Basically, the level of corruption prevailing in a recipient country may also 
exacerbate preferences for volume of lending over its effective use by minimizing the 
impact of past project performance on decisions regarding new project loan sizes (this is 
an extension of hypothesis 2).99  
   Lastly, we are interested in estimating the effect of time interactions terms 
computed as a product of year dummies and past performance criteria on the one hand 
and project evaluation dummies on the other hand. Year dummies correspond to four 
time periods from 1984 to 2006. First, the 1980s, when development assistance took the 
form of structural adjustment programs aimed at reducing inflation, correcting 
government deficits, removing price distortions, and reducing trade barriers. Then, the 
first and the second half of the 1990s, when development assistance started to recognize 
the need for sound institutions like good governance, property rights, and democratic 
accountability. We divide the 1990s in two periods to somewhat capture the impact of the 
Wapenhans Report released in 1992 and commissioned by Lewis Preston during his 
                                                 
99 As a reminder, the corruption index takes on values between zero (most corrupt recipient countries) and 
six (least corrupt recipient countries). 
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presidency at the World Bank (1991-1995). The Wapenhans Report found that pressure 
to lend money surpassed any other considerations and therefore instigated the 
implementation of measures destined to shift the focus away from lending volumes 
towards effective implementation of lending projects. Finally, the 2000s which saw the 
rise of a new aid architecture characterized by a greater emphasis on selectivity in 
allocating aid; a growing recognition of the importance of governance, institutions, and 
local ownership of reforms; enhancement of aid coordination and donor alignment with 
country strategies; greater considerations for absorptive capacity constraints; measuring 
and monitoring of results.  
 
In summary, we are interested in empirically testing the following: the extent to 
which the “Money-Moving Syndrome” coexists with an aid agency’s true mission to 
reduce poverty and promote economic growth; the latter being achieved when aid loans 
are allocated on the basis of country need and country performance as measured by good 
governance, good policy environment, and good intermediate and final outcome 
indicators.  
Table 3 below summarizes the main set of testable hypotheses developed to 
estimate the level of “Money-Moving Syndrome” within aid agencies and in particular 
the World Bank. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, results in the second 
column of the table are expected to provide evidence in support of the “Money-Moving 
Syndrome.”  
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Table 3. Some Testable Hypotheses Assessing the “Money-Moving Syndrome”100 
 
Independent 
Variable 
 
Evidence of  Quality-Aid if 
Expected Impact on Dependent 
Variable (a) 
Evidence in Support of  “Money-Moving 
Syndrome” if 
Expected Impact on Dependent Variable (b) 
Overall Project 
Outcome  
Positive  Negative/Insignificant 
Project 
Sustainability 
Positive Negative/Insignificant 
Project Institutional 
Development Impact 
Positive Negative/Insignificant 
Bank Performance Positive Negative/Insignificant 
Borrower 
Performance 
Positive Negative/Insignificant 
Implementation 
Completion Report 
or ICR quality  
Positive Negative/Insignificant 
Total Net 
Commitment of Past 
Projects 
Insignificant Positive 
End of Fiscal Year 
Dummy 
Insignificant Positive 
GDP per capita Negative Positive/Insignificant 
GDP per capita 
Growth 
Negative Positive/Insignificant 
Inflation Negative Positive/Insignificant 
Openness Positive Negative/Insignificant 
Corruption101 Positive Negative/Insignificant 
Bureaucracy Quality Positive Negative/Insignificant 
Note: (a), (b): statistically significant and holding everything else constant.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
100 The table does not include important interactions terms that may be useful in capturing the “Money-
Moving Syndrome.” See section four for details.  
101 The ICRG corruption index takes on values between zero, for the most corrupt countries, and six, for the 
least corrupt countries.  
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Model Specifications 
To test our set of hypotheses, we estimate variants of the following general baseline 
equation:   
 
εβββββββα ++++++++= ZDbPGpnetcommit ZDbPGpg ''''g)log(                 (4.1)  
 
where g is a 2x1 vector of governance and institutional variables that affect 
project loan size, here corruption and bureaucracy quality; p is a 2x1 vector of 
macroeconomic policy variables, i.e., trade openness and inflation rate as a measure of 
monetary policy; G is a Gx1 vector of variables reflecting recipient need such as 
logarithm of GDP per capita, logarithm of GDP per capita squared, growth rate of GDP 
per capita, and logarithm of population. In the aid literature, it has often been found that 
small countries usually receive more aid than larger countries.102 In addition, the D vector 
reflects region, sector, and year dummies in the regression. The regional and sector 
dummy variables capture variations across regions and sectors which may affect project 
loan size.  
P is a Px1 vector of intermediate and final project performance indicators, notably 
overall project outcome, project’s sustainability, project’s contribution to institutional 
development in the borrowing country, and implementation completion report quality. 
Considering they constitute different measures of project outcome, we estimate variants 
                                                 
102 However, there is not a consensus in the aid literature regarding the role of population as an indicator of 
recipient need versus its role as an indicator of donor interest. If it is reasonable to assume that, at the same 
level of development, larger poor countries would require more aid than smaller ones; it is also the case that 
donors would wish to give more aid to larger and potentially powerful poor countries in order to increase 
their political influence (Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Burnside and Dollar 2000).  
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of equation (4.1) with one performance criterion at a time. We also include the vector b, 
which is a 2x1 vector of bank and borrower performance.  
All these performance ratings are transformed into dichotomous variables for the purpose 
of the econometric analysis. For example, the dummy variable “outcome50” is equal to 
one if, at the time of approval of a new project in a recipient country, at least 50% of past 
projects halfway completed or completed in that country were successful.103 When 
making a decision regarding the loan size of a new project, this measure not only gives a 
country manager an adequate idea about the success rate of ongoing and completed 
projects, but also the likelihood of success of new projects in the country. Hence, with a 
proportion of at least 50% of successful past projects in the country, a country manager 
might feel confident about allocating more funds to a new project for the reason that 
these funds are less likely to be wasted compare to a situation where the success rate of 
past projects is very small. The dummies are interpreted similarly for each of the other 
project performance rating criteria.104  
                                                 
103 The dummy variable “outcome50” is equal to zero if, at the time of approval of a new project in a 
recipient country, either there are no halfway completed or completed past projects, or strictly less than 
50% of halfway completed or completed past projects were successful.    
 
104 The other dummies reflecting project performance rating criteria are: sustain50, impact50, and icrq50.  
Sustain50 equal to one if, at the time of approval of a new project in a recipient country, at least 50% of 
past projects halfway completed or completed were likely sustainable. Impact50 equal to one if, at the time 
of approval of a new project in a recipient country, at least 50% of past projects halfway completed or 
completed had a substantial or modest institutional development impact. Icrq50 equal to one if, at the time 
of approval of a new project in a recipient country, at least 50% of past projects halfway completed or 
completed were judged successful by the World Bank’s operational staff.  The dummies reflecting Bank 
and Borrower performance rating criteria are bankperf50 and borrperf50. Bankperf50 equal to one if, at 
the time of approval of a new project in a recipient country, at least 50% of past projects halfway 
completed or completed had a successful bank performance. Borrperf50 equal to one if, at the time of 
approval of a new project in a recipient country, at least 50% of past projects halfway completed or 
completed had a successful borrower performance.  
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Finally, our baseline equation also includes a subset of Zx1 vector of variables Z, 
essential in capturing the tradeoff between volume of lending and project's quality within 
the World Bank. The vector of variables Z includes the lagged dependent variable,105 the 
total net commitments of past projects in a country at the time of approval of a new 
project, the end-of-fiscal-year dummy and a project evaluation dummy. The interaction 
terms between the above-mentioned variables are also included in this vector.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
105 The dependent variable is from period t + 1 and the lagged dependent variable is therefore from period t.   
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CHAPTER V  
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 This chapter reports the empirical results derived from our main testable 
hypotheses regarding the presence of the “Money-Moving Syndrome” using data from 
the World Bank. We proceed to estimate the following:  
• First, for each of the three project performance rating criteria developed by the 
World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), i.e., (a) overall project 
outcome,  (b) project’s sustainability, and (c) project’s contribution to 
institutional development in the borrowing country, we estimate the general 
baseline equation capturing our five main testable hypotheses and the corollary 
interaction terms;  
• Second, we estimate the general baseline equation using the project performance 
rating developed by the operational staff of the World Bank itself, i.e., the 
Implementation Completion Report or ICR quality.  
The rationale for these alternative specifications is simply to evaluate the robustness 
of our results to various measures of project performance.  
Four tables, Table 4 to Table 7 below, report the estimation results. For each of 
the four project performance criteria above-mentioned, we estimate the parameters in the 
baseline equation using simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). As for inference, we use 
the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for our estimates of the loan allocation 
model.  
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 The first section clarifies some issues regarding the data. The second section 
reports the determinants of project loan size using each project performance rating 
criterion one at the time in the baseline equation. To that effect, Table 4 presents the 
estimation results of our loan allocation model described in equation (4.1) using overall 
project outcome as the first project performance rating criterion. Table 7 presents similar 
results using the Implementation Completion Report or ICR quality as the fourth and last 
project performance rating criterion. The five main hypotheses and the corollary 
interactions are discussed in turn. The third section considers the results of the previous 
section and discusses the extent to which the “Money-Moving Syndrome” coexists with 
the World Bank’s true mission to reduce global poverty and promote economic growth in 
the developing world.  
 
Additional Data Issues 
Before presenting and interpreting the estimation results of our testable 
hypotheses, some clarifications might be useful. The corruption index takes on values 
between zero (most corrupt) and six (least corrupt). Therefore, a positive sign in the 
estimation results tables indicates that, holding other factors fixed, the least corrupt the 
recipient country, the higher the project loan size on average. The same is true for 
bureaucratic quality; a positive sign indicates that countries with a high quality 
bureaucracy receive on average larger project loan size, holding everything else fixed.  
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Determinants of Project Loan Size 
 In this section, we examine the existence of the “Money-Moving Syndrome” 
using the World Bank project database and using alternatively each project performance 
rating criterion in the loan allocation model. Table 4 to Table 7 present the empirical 
results.  
 
 
 
Table 4. Determinants of Project Loan Size (Overall Project Outcome) 
Dependent Variable: Log of Net Commitments a  
                                                     Specifications 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable No Interactions Performance Interactions Year Interactions 
Lnetcommit_1 0.059** 0.161*** 0.050* 
 (0.030) (0.046) (0.030) 
corrupt 0.046 -0.050 0.045 
 (0.036) (0.050) (0.036) 
bureau 0.010 0.023 0.006 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
openk 0.002* 0.001 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
infl 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Lgdp -1.048*** -1.046*** -0.985*** 
 (0.381) (0.382) (0.373) 
Lgdp2 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.079*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
ggdp_cap -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Lpop 0.385*** 0.382*** 0.379*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Lcumloan -0.048 -0.048 -0.042 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) 
outcome50 -0.309** -0.300 -0.203 
 (0.123) (0.317) (0.134) 
bankperf50 0.363*** 0.342*** 0.319** 
 (0.127) (0.126) (0.125) 
borrperf50 0.005 0.016 0.015 
 (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) 
reg2 0.102 0.092 0.096 
 (0.120) (0.118) (0.120) 
reg3 0.181 0.153 0.190 
 (0.122) (0.123) (0.123) 
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reg4 0.320** 0.279** 0.312** 
 (0.132) (0.132) (0.133) 
yr80s 0.004 -0.055 0.123 
 (0.093) (0.091) (0.132) 
yr95_99 -0.248*** -0.239*** -0.100 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.128) 
yr2000s -0.551*** -0.562*** -0.375 
 (0.136) (0.138) (0.371) 
proj_eval1 1.253*** 0.944*** 0.815*** 
 (0.102) (0.169) (0.170) 
proj_eval2 -0.524*** -0.521*** -0.455*** 
 (0.057) (0.077) (0.081) 
Apr_June -0.089* -0.085 -0.083 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.052) 
Lagcom_out50  -0.145***  
  (0.051)  
peval1_out50  0.427**  
  (0.198)  
peval2_out50  0.030  
  (0.111)  
out50_corr  0.160**  
  (0.063)  
yr80_out50   0.000 
   (0.000) 
yr9599_out50   -0.131 
   (0.127) 
yr2000_out50   -0.626** 
   (0.280) 
yr80_peval1   -0.752*** 
   (0.210) 
yr9599_peval1   0.257 
   (0.210) 
yr2000_peval1   1.010*** 
   (0.338) 
yr80_peval2   -0.149 
   (0.150) 
yr9599_peval2   -0.120 
   (0.122) 
yr2000_peval2   0.132 
   (0.363) 
Constant 0.247 0.229 0.078 
 (1.372) (1.397) (1.351) 
Observations 1383 1383 1383 
R-squared 0.43 0.44 0.44 
a Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5. Determinants of Project Loan Size (Project Sustainability) 
Dependent Variable: Log of Net Commitments a  
                                                         Specifications 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable No Interactions Performance Interactions Year Interactions 
Lnetcommit_1 0.060** 0.097** 0.050* 
 (0.030) (0.038) (0.030) 
corrupt 0.052 0.003 0.057 
 (0.036) (0.043) (0.037) 
bureau -0.000 -0.003 -0.009 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
openk 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
infl 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Lgdp -1.070*** -0.986** -1.058*** 
 (0.383) (0.384) (0.380) 
Lgdp2 0.085*** 0.080*** 0.084*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
ggdp_cap -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Lpop 0.391*** 0.391*** 0.384*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Lcumloan -0.053 -0.048 -0.041 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) 
sustain50 -0.116 -0.370 -0.151 
 (0.078) (0.302) (0.111) 
bankperf50 0.205* 0.184 0.191* 
 (0.112) (0.112) (0.114) 
borrperf50 -0.036 -0.034 -0.022 
 (0.114) (0.113) (0.115) 
reg2 0.064 0.015 0.072 
 (0.119) (0.118) (0.119) 
reg3 0.164 0.109 0.179 
 (0.122) (0.123) (0.123) 
reg4 0.282** 0.216* 0.290** 
 (0.131) (0.131) (0.132) 
yr80s 0.011 -0.015 0.098 
 (0.093) (0.092) (0.131) 
yr95_99 -0.258*** -0.239*** -0.228** 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.114) 
yr2000s -0.552*** -0.557*** -0.792** 
 (0.136) (0.138) (0.364) 
proj_eval1 1.251*** 0.962*** 0.791*** 
 (0.102) (0.118) (0.172) 
proj_eval2 -0.524*** -0.578*** -0.455*** 
 (0.057) (0.070) (0.081) 
Apr_June -0.088* -0.075 -0.088* 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.052) 
Lagcom_sust50  -0.073  
  (0.049)  
peval1_sust50  0.537***  
  (0.159)  
peval2_sust50  0.173  
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  (0.120)  
sust50_corr  0.122*  
  (0.065)  
yr80_sust50   0.000 
   (0.000) 
yr9599_sust50   0.086 
   (0.126) 
yr2000_sust50   -0.131 
   (0.237) 
yr80_peval1   -0.757*** 
   (0.213) 
yr9599_peval1   0.271 
   (0.212) 
yr2000_peval1   1.024*** 
   (0.350) 
yr80_peval2   -0.152 
   (0.150) 
yr9599_peval2   -0.123 
   (0.122) 
yr2000_peval2   0.129 
   (0.375) 
Constant 0.205 -0.044 0.240 
 (1.383) (1.396) (1.379) 
Observations 1383 1383 1383 
R-squared 0.43 0.44 0.44 
a Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6. Determinants of Project Loan Size (Project Institutional Development Impact) 
Dependent Variable: Log of Net Commitments a  
 Specifications 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable No Interactions Performance Interactions Year Interactions 
Lnetcommit_1 0.059** 0.190*** 0.049 
 (0.030) (0.050) (0.030) 
corrupt 0.050 -0.039 0.056 
 (0.036) (0.051) (0.036) 
bureau 0.012 0.018 0.004 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
openk 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
infl 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Lgdp -1.070*** -1.150*** -0.994** 
 (0.386) (0.387) (0.385) 
Lgdp2 0.084*** 0.090*** 0.079*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
ggdp_cap -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Lpop 0.380*** 0.376*** 0.366*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Lcumloan -0.042 -0.040 -0.025 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
impact50 -0.090 0.113 -0.099 
 (0.115) (0.337) (0.121) 
bankperf50 0.232* 0.250* 0.218 
 (0.136) (0.137) (0.137) 
borrperf50 -0.086 -0.101 -0.082 
 (0.106) (0.108) (0.107) 
reg2 0.079 0.076 0.077 
 (0.120) (0.118) (0.120) 
reg3 0.161 0.155 0.158 
 (0.123) (0.123) (0.125) 
reg4 0.295** 0.275** 0.280** 
 (0.132) (0.131) (0.133) 
yr80s 0.002 -0.064 0.097 
 (0.094) (0.092) (0.133) 
yr95_99 -0.247*** -0.239*** -0.233 
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.157) 
yr2000s -0.555*** -0.584*** 0.328 
 (0.138) (0.144) (0.363) 
proj_eval1 1.241*** 0.754*** 0.772*** 
 (0.102) (0.194) (0.174) 
proj_eval2 -0.527*** -0.487*** -0.463*** 
 (0.057) (0.084) (0.081) 
Apr_June -0.084 -0.081 -0.085 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.052) 
Lagcom_imp50  -0.172***  
  (0.053)  
peval1_imp50  0.585***  
  (0.225)  
peval2_imp50  -0.044  
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  (0.112)  
imp50_corr  0.136**  
  (0.064)  
yr80_imp50   0.000 
   (0.000) 
yr9599_imp50   0.056 
   (0.154) 
yr2000_imp50   -1.259*** 
   (0.208) 
yr80_peval1   -0.739*** 
   (0.214) 
yr9599_peval1   0.287 
   (0.213) 
yr2000_peval1   1.031*** 
   (0.348) 
yr80_peval2   -0.147 
   (0.150) 
yr9599_peval2   -0.115 
   (0.122) 
yr2000_peval2   0.147 
   (0.371) 
Constant 0.405 0.519 0.297 
 (1.390) (1.416) (1.391) 
Observations 1383 1383 1383 
R-squared 0.43 0.44 0.44 
a Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7. Determinants of Project Loan Size (Implementation Completion Report  
Quality) 
Dependent Variable: Log of Net Commitments a  
 Specifications 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable No Interactions Performance Interactions Year Interactions 
Lnetcommit_1 0.061** 0.180*** 0.051* 
 (0.030) (0.052) (0.030) 
corrupt 0.049 -0.047 0.056 
 (0.036) (0.055) (0.036) 
bureau 0.011 0.018 0.002 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
openk 0.002* 0.001 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
infl 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Lgdp -1.046*** -1.122*** -0.976** 
 (0.385) (0.389) (0.384) 
Lgdp2 0.082*** 0.088*** 0.077*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) 
ggdp_cap -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Lpop 0.385*** 0.381*** 0.371*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Lcumloan -0.053 -0.054 -0.036 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) 
icrq50 0.093 0.222 0.087 
 (0.114) (0.347) (0.117) 
bankperf50 0.119 0.149 0.083 
 (0.131) (0.132) (0.132) 
borrperf50 -0.096 -0.119 -0.096 
 (0.107) (0.109) (0.108) 
reg2 0.091 0.093 0.100 
 (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) 
reg3 0.182 0.172 0.193 
 (0.122) (0.123) (0.124) 
reg4 0.301** 0.285** 0.298** 
 (0.132) (0.131) (0.132) 
yr80s 0.027 -0.034 0.111 
 (0.095) (0.094) (0.134) 
yr95_99 -0.267*** -0.253*** -0.427** 
 (0.068) (0.069) (0.187) 
yr2000s -0.575*** -0.583*** 0.324 
 (0.137) (0.141) (0.363) 
proj_eval1 1.248*** 0.789*** 0.767*** 
 (0.102) (0.235) (0.173) 
proj_eval2 -0.525*** -0.478*** -0.460*** 
 (0.057) (0.088) (0.081) 
Apr_June -0.087 -0.082 -0.089* 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.052) 
Lagcom_icrq50  -0.152***  
  (0.055)  
peval1_icrq50  0.519**  
  (0.259)  
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peval2_icrq50  -0.058  
  (0.113)  
icrq50_corr  0.139**  
  (0.067)  
yr80_icrq50   0.000 
   (0.000) 
yr9599_icrq50   0.252 
   (0.184) 
yr2000_icrq50   -1.282*** 
   (0.208) 
yr80_peval1   -0.720*** 
   (0.213) 
yr9599_peval1   0.296 
   (0.213) 
yr2000_peval1   1.063*** 
   (0.349) 
yr80_peval2   -0.145 
   (0.150) 
yr9599_peval2   -0.120 
   (0.122) 
yr2000_peval2   0.169 
   (0.371) 
Constant 0.249 0.421 0.180 
 (1.391) (1.443) (1.391) 
Observations 1383 1383 1383 
R-squared 0.43 0.44 0.44 
     a Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 states that in a money moving environment, the relevance and 
efficiency of past projects, their sustainability, and their impact on institutions in a 
recipient country would not matter in decisions regarding the net commitments of new 
development projects in that country.  The results in the first specification (column one) 
of Table 4 through F4 finds evidence to support this hypothesis within the World 
Bank.106 The dummy variable “outcome50” is negative and statistically significant at the 
                                                 
106 The regression specifications with sector dummies rather than project evaluation dummies yield 
approximately the same results, at least when the performance criterion is the overall project outcome (see 
Table F1 in appendix F).  
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5 percent level, meaning that a country with a proportion of at least 50 percent of 
successful past projects receives on average 31 percent less in new project loan (or net 
commitments) than when it has a success rate of strictly less than 50 percent, holding 
other factors fixed. In other words, more resources are directed to countries where the 
success rate of past projects is small and are therefore more likely to be wasted. It would 
appear that despite a low performance of foreign aid in some developing countries, the 
World Bank continues to provide these countries with increasing levels of funding. This 
situation may reflect an “excessive optimism” about conditions in recipient countries that 
often plagues development organizations, an “excessive optimism” about the probable 
returns of new development assistance projects approved. Another possibility is the fact 
that recipient countries with low performance of foreign would attract more attention 
from the World Bank. 
The additional project performance dummy variables “sustain50,” “impact50,” 
and “icrq50” enter insignificantly, suggesting that the proportion of past projects that 
were sustainable, or past projects with a substantial institutional development impact, or 
even past projects that were judged successful by the Bank’s operational staff does not 
affect decisions regarding new project loan sizes.  
Related to the first hypothesis is the impact of Borrower and Bank performance 
ratings of past projects that are halfway completed or completed at the time of approval 
of a new project. The borrower performance rating (“borrperf50”) evaluates the level of 
the borrower’s ownership and responsibility necessary to ensure the quality of project’s 
preparation and implementation, which are important to achieve both development 
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objectives and sustainability. From Table 4 through Table 7 in all three specifications,107 
we find that the proportion of past projects for which the borrower performance was 
successful does not affect current project loan sizes.  
These results may suggest that the World Bank might have not created positive 
organizational incentives to learn about factors leading to successful project performance. 
Had it been the case, a primary emphasis would have been placed on factors identified as 
necessary (if not sufficient) conditions for project effectiveness; factors such as the 
success rate of past projects or the level of recipient ownership of a development 
assistance project or program.  
Strikingly, however, from the dummy variable “bankperf50” in the first column 
of Table 4, it seems the World Bank allocates 36 percent more funds to new projects 
when at least 50 percent of past projects had a successful bank performance compared to 
when strictly less than 50 percent of past projects had a successful bank performance. For 
all other project performance criteria, except the Implementation Completion Report 
quality, “bankperf50” enters positively and significantly at the 10 percent level. 
Therefore, it seems the bank performance during past project identification, preparation, 
and implementation outweigh past overall project performance or even borrower 
performance in decisions regarding new project loan amounts.  
Additionally, when the interaction term between outcome and corruption 
(“out50_corr”) is introduced in the regression specification (column 2 of Tables F1 to 
F4),  the estimated coefficient is positive and significant at the 5 percent level, implying 
that as the corruption index increases (i.e., for less corrupt countries), new projects will 
                                                 
107 Each result table includes three specifications: one specification with no interaction terms, another one 
with performance interaction terms and the last specification with year interaction terms.    
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receive on average 12 to 16 percent more loan amounts when the proportion of successful 
past projects is at least 50% compared to a success rate of strictly less than 50 percent 
ceteris paribus. The implication of this result is very important: with less corrupt recipient 
countries, the World Bank would be more likely to take into consideration the success 
rate of past projects in deciding new project loan sizes, thus suggesting the importance of 
good governance as a safeguard or counterbalance against “Money-Moving Syndrome” 
within a donor agency.108  
Finally, when we introduce the interaction term between past project performance 
criteria and time, we found that new projects receive on average 63 percent less when the 
proportion of successful past projects is at least 50 percent during the 2000s compared to 
the early 1990s (column 3 of Table 4); the average percentage becomes 126 percent and 
128 percent for the dummy variables “yr2000_imp50” and “yr2000_icrq50” respectively 
(column 3 of Table 6 and Table 7). These results suggest that perhaps many years after 
the Wapenhans Report, i.e., during the 2000s, the organizational imperatives to survive 
and grow may have once again entered into play within the World Bank’s loan approval 
process and driven institutional incentives to pursue “move the money” policies.    
Hypothesis 2 
Recall that hypothesis 2 states that in a money moving environment, the pattern of 
lending would be dictated by the aid agency’s organizational imperatives to survive and 
grow rather than by recipients’ need and merit (factors making aid loans effective in 
alleviating poverty).  
                                                 
108 “Successful projects” here encompass projects with good results in all four project performance rating 
criteria.  
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Concerning recipient need, the results suggest that the World Bank allocates aid 
funds according to recipient’s need only to some extent. Indeed, as evidenced by the 
coefficient for “Lgdp” (in all three specifications of Table 4 to Table 7), at low values of 
the logarithm of GPD per capita, a 1% increase in GDP per capita reduces loan sizes by 
around 1%, holding other factors fixed. But at some point, the elasticity of loan with 
respect to GDP per capita  increases as the logarithm of GPD per capita increases. The 
turning point occurs when the GPD per capita is equal to around $552 (constant 2000 
US$).109 It turns out that for 1,162 of the 1,977 projects the GPD per capita averages 
more than $552, which represents about 59 percent of the sample. Therefore, the 
quadratic to the right of $552 (or 6.31 for “Lgdp”) could not be ignored, meaning that 
there is an increasing marginal effect of the logarithm of GPD per capita on the logarithm 
of net commitments. In other words, the World Bank would give aid loans to the neediest 
countries, but at a certain level of GDP per capita, the Bank would lend more to richer 
countries.   
 Furthermore, as expected, the World Bank allocates more aid to larger countries. 
However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, there is not a consensus in the aid 
literature regarding the role of population as an indicator of recipient’s need versus its 
role as an indicator of donor interest. If it is indeed reasonable to assume that, at the same 
level of development, larger poor countries would require more aid than smaller ones, it 
is also the case that donors would wish to give more aid to larger and potentially 
                                                 
109 The turnaround value of “Lgdp” is calculated using the following equation: Lgdp*= |coefficient on 
“Lgdp” divided by twice the coefficient on “lgdp2”|. Lgdp* is therefore equal to 6.31 (|-1.048/(2*0.083|)  
and gdp* is equal to $552.  
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powerful poor countries in order to increase their influence (Maizels and Nissanke 1984; 
Burnside and Dollar 2000).110 
Finally, the growth rate of GDP per capita, which is used in the baseline equation 
to determine whether slow-growing countries are more likely, ceteris paribus, to attract 
more aid loans per capita than fast-growing ones, is negative but very small and 
insignificant. Thus, the growth rate of GDP per capita does not seem to affect project 
loan sizes.  
 In regard to recipient’s merit, the results in column 1 of Table 4 to Table 7 show 
that the quality of governance, institutional framework and policy environment necessary 
for poverty reduction and sustained economic growth are not the driving force behind 
decisions regarding loan sizes of development projects and programs. Specifically, the 
level of corruption, the quality of bureaucracy, and the inflation rate in recipient countries 
are not statistically significant. However, total trade as a percentage of GDP (“openk”) is 
positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent level, indicating that more open 
countries receive more net commitments per project. Nevertheless, the estimated 
coefficient for “openk” is very small and therefore not economically significant. 
   
Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 states that in a money moving environment, more budget resources 
would tend to be allocated in recipient countries where past loan volumes are already 
substantial. The estimated coefficient for “Lcumloan,” i.e., the logarithm of the 
                                                 
110 This result remains even after controlling for agreement type, i.e., the type of financing or credit 
according to the financing or credit instrument used: here either the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD), or the International Development Association (IDA).  
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cumulative loan amount of all past projects in a country at the time of approval of a new 
project, enters negatively but it is not significant. However, the loan size of the most 
recently approved past project does have a positive and significant effect, ceteris paribus, 
on the net commitments of a new development project as evidenced by the estimated 
coefficient for “Lnetcommit_1”(column 1 of Table 4 to Table 7).111 This indicates that 
only the most recently approved projects in a country influence decisions regarding the 
net commitments of new development assistance projects. However, this effect is not 
substantial.  
When the interaction term between the project performance rating criteria and the 
lag of net commitments is introduced in the baseline equation, the effect of the lag of the 
dependent variable is reinforced. For instance, the estimated coefficient of the interaction 
term “Lagcom_out50” enters negatively but significantly at the 1 percent level, implying 
that as the loan size of the most recently approved project increases, new projects will 
receive on average 14 percent less net commitments when the proportion of successful 
past projects is at least 50% compared to a success rate of strictly less than 50 percent, 
ceteris paribus (column 2 of Table 4). The same is true for the estimated coefficients of 
“Lagcom_imp50” and “Lagcom_icrq50”; they enter negatively but significantly at the 1 
percent level (column 2 of Table 6 and Table 7). In other words, aid loans are allocated 
where the most recent loan volumes are substantial and where the achievement rate of 
past projects is small i.e., where the likelihood of successful outcomes is lower.  
 
                                                 
111 As aforementioned, the dependent variable is from period t + 1 and the lagged dependent variable, 
denoted Lnetcommit_1, is therefore from period t. 
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Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 states that in a money moving environment, donor agencies would 
tend to spend more money on large-scale development interventions which overall 
impact on poverty would be difficult to evaluate and quantify; the rationale being that the 
more complex it is to evaluate development efforts of a donor agency in a recipient 
country, the greater the opportunities for organizational imperatives for survival and 
growth to enter into play, and the greater the institutional incentives to “move the 
money.” Here, we assume, for instance, that budget supports, structural reforms, or 
comprehensive development frameworks (with their numerous economic, political, 
institutional and social ramifications) that are financed by development policy lending 
would be more complex to evaluate and quantify than straightforward infrastructure 
projects financed by investment lending.112  
The results in the four tables (Table 4 to Table 7) confirm this hypothesis. The 
dummy variable for projects that are difficult to evaluate (“Proj_eval1”) enters positively 
and significantly in all three specifications and its effect is substantial. Holding other 
factors constant, development projects which overall impact on poverty is difficult to 
evaluate and quantify receive on average around 125 percent more net commitments than 
projects considered easy to evaluate. On the other hand, projects categorized as 
moderately difficult to evaluate, i.e., all types of projects (except infrastructure projects) 
financed by investment loans, receive on average around 52 percent less net 
commitments than projects in the infrastructure sector also financed by investment loans. 
This result may capture the fact that, confronted to a choice between many investment 
                                                 
112 As mentioned above, we assume that it is possible to determine in which category a new development 
project will fall even before its design or implementation as long as the type of project, the lending 
instrument and the lending instrument type are known.  
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loans, World Bank’s employees would tend to favor large and quick-disbursing 
infrastructure projects such as dams, roads, ports, irrigation canals, factories, and so on. 
As above mentioned, we argued that for projects with wide economic, political, 
institutional and social ramifications, it may be extremely complicated to tease out the 
influence of the development project itself from the influence of environmental factors 
and shocks. Under these murky conditions, a donor agency is provided with opportunities 
and incentives to “move the money.” Consequently, we would expect that with projects 
that may be considered difficult to evaluate, the performance of past projects would not 
be taken into account in decisions regarding net commitments per new project. The 
results in the second column of Table 4 to Table 7 do not corroborate our intuition, 
however. The positive and significant coefficient on the interaction terms between project 
performance rating criteria and project evaluation dummies, like “peval1_out50,” 
suggests that Bank’s employees tend to allocate larger loans to projects that may be 
considered difficult to evaluate when the likelihood of success is higher.   
Finally, the interaction terms between project evaluation dummies and time 
dummies reveal that, ceteris paribus, projects considered difficult to evaluate receive on 
average about 72 percent less net commitments during the 1980s than projects considered 
easy to evaluate during the early 1990s. The reverse is true for the years 2000s compared 
to the early 1990s (column 3 of Table 4 to Table 7). These outcomes potentially reflect 
the shift in the development discourse in the 1990s when the development assistance field 
began to recognize the need for sound institutional and policy environments as factors 
conducive to poverty reduction and sustained and equitable growth. 
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Hypothesis 5 
Hypothesis 5 states that in a money moving environment, an international donor 
agency might be subject to end-of-fiscal-year pressures to spend. The end-of-fiscal-year 
effect is captured by “Apr_June,” a dummy variable equal to one if a development 
project’s loan size is approved in April, May, or June and zero if it is approved in the 
remainder of the fiscal year (from July to March); since the World Bank’s fiscal year runs 
from July 1 to June 30. The negative and significant coefficient on “Apr_June” (column 
1, Table 4 and Table 5) implies that there is no end-of-fiscal-year pressures to spend 
within the World Bank; in fact projects approved in April, May, or June receive on 
average 9 percent less net commitments than projects approved throughout the remainder 
of the fiscal year, for the same level of other factors. This result seems to indicate that the 
World Bank operates mostly on the basis of loans mobilized on international capital 
markets (not government appropriations) and, is therefore not pressured to commit 
resources at the end of the fiscal year.113  
 
Other Control Variables 
 Among all the region dummies, only Latin America and the Caribbean region 
exhibits a positive and significant coefficient; meaning that Latin America and the 
Caribbean receive on average more net commitments per new project than Africa, 
holding other factors fixed. This effect is robust to all specifications in Table 4 to Table 7.  
                                                 
113 Alternatively, we use the dummy variable “June” to capture the end-of-fiscal-year effect. The dummy 
variable equals to one if a development project’s loan size is approved in June and zero if it is approved in 
any other month during the fiscal year. Table F2 in appendix F presents the results. The estimated 
coefficient of “June” is negative and insignificant in all three specifications, which seems to indicate that, 
holding everything constant, there is no difference between a World Bank project approved in June and a 
World Bank project approved in the remainder of the fiscal year in terms of loan size. In other words, the 
end of the fiscal year has no effect on decisions regarding project loan size.  
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When taking onto account year dummies, we notice that net commitments per 
new project during the second half on the 1990s were on average about 25 percent less 
than net commitments per new project during the early 1990s. The same is true for net 
commitments per new project during the 2000s which were on average about 55 percent 
lower than during the early 1990s (column1 in Table 4 to Table 7). These results may 
indicate that the Wapenhans Report and the subsequent implementation of measures 
destined to shift the focus away from lending volumes towards effective implementation 
of lending projects have been somewhat successful in dampening the “approval culture” 
for loans and the pressure to lend that had affected the World Bank’s project approval 
process prior to the report.  
As mentioned in the literature review in chapter two, one widespread explanation 
of the aid ineffectiveness emphasizes that donor country strategic interests have 
frequently dominated recipient countries’ needs and merits as aid allocation criteria 
within aid agencies, both bilateral and multilateral. Donor strategic interests generally 
include diplomatic interests (e.g., establishing military bases, securing UN votes, 
supporting a preferred regime); commercial interests (e.g., “tied” aid, providing exports 
subsidies to donor countries firms, focusing on projects with high foreign exchange 
components); and cultural interests usually provided to promote a donor’s religion, 
language, or values (Lancaster 1999). Although donor countries’ strategic interests 
behind aid giving are beyond the scope of this dissertation, it might nevertheless be 
important to control for this factor in the loan allocation regression.  
To analyze the role played by the largest shareholders, especially the U.S., in 
pressuring the World Bank to deviate from its objectives to eliminate poverty and 
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promote sustain development, we use U.S. trade statistics as a measure of U.S. 
commercial interests; specifically U.S. exports to a specific country in year t as a share of 
U.S. exports, in the same year, to all included countries and U.S. imports from a country 
as a share of U.S. imports from all included countries (Fleck and Kilby 2005a).114 In this 
framework, an allocation of World Bank funds reflecting U.S. commercial interests 
would confirm the emphasis of organizational imperatives to survive and grow over aid 
effectiveness, and therefore a focus on the volume of aid disbursements rather than on the 
impact of aid on development.  
From the results presented in Table F3 in appendix F, the estimated coefficients of 
U.S. export share and U.S. import share enter with the right sign (respectively positive 
and negative) as suggested by the U.S. trade policy which favors exports over imports 
(Fleck and Kilby 2005a), but they are statistically insignificant. These results seem to 
indicate that project loan size does not reflect U.S. commercial interests.  
 
Discussion 
 In general, the empirical results presented in the previous section support the 
hypothesis that there is a “Money-Moving Syndrome” at work within the World Bank’s 
current loan allocation criteria.  
The World Bank’s loan allocation criteria suggest that recipient’s need is a 
stronger selection criterion than recipient’s merit as measured by the quality of 
governance, institutional framework and policy environment. However, even recipient’ 
need appears not to be a consistent criterion within the Bank.  In particular, Bank’s 
                                                 
114 The U.S. trade statistics data come from the 2008 IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS).  
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employees would give aid loans to the neediest countries, but at a certain level of GDP 
per capita, Bank’s employees would lend more to richer countries; thus reducing aid 
resources available for the poor in the poorest countries. According to the Meltzer 
Commission Report (2000), when development assistance is limited to the poorest 
countries, “additionality of resource transfer is enhanced.” The report adds that aid 
resources available for the poor would increase drastically if the volume of lending to 
middle- or high-income countries was reduced and reallocated to the poorest countries. In 
other words, the positive incentives to “move the money” would be reduced and aid 
effectively targeted to the poor if aid volumes to richer countries that do not need it are 
limited.   
Furthermore, despite a new development discourse that emerged in the early 
1990s and which recognized the need for sound institutions like good governance, 
property rights, and democratic accountability; and despite findings by Burnside and 
Dollar (2000) suggesting that aid has been ineffective in promoting growth and 
stimulating policy reforms except in good policy and institutional environments, it would 
appear that the level of corruption alone, the quality of bureaucracy, and the inflation rate 
in recipient countries are not the driving forces behind decisions regarding project loan 
sizes within the World Bank; thus creating positive incentives to “move the money.”  
However, the evidence shows that with less corrupt recipient countries, World Bank’s aid 
officials would be more likely to take into consideration the success rate of past projects 
in deciding new project loan sizes. This result suggests the importance of good 
governance as a safeguard or counterbalance against the “Money-Moving Syndrome” 
within a donor agency.  
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Additionally, it appears that despite a low performance of foreign aid in some 
developing countries, World Bank’s aid officials would continue to provide these 
countries with increasing levels of funding. This situation may reflect an “excessive 
optimism” about conditions in recipient countries or about the probable returns of new 
development assistance projects approved. This result may also reflect the fact that 
recipient countries with low performance of foreign would attract more attention from the 
World Bank. In any case, the end results are a reinforcement of positive incentives to 
“move the money” and a potential inefficiency of aid caused by a misallocation of scare 
resources.  
Another important issue is the emphasis on recipient countries’ ownership of 
development activities and reforms. The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness115 
recognized that if development assistance was to be linked to an autonomous design and 
implementation of national development strategies, it would promote the reduction of 
poverty and inequality, increase growth and accelerate the achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goals. However, the evidence shows that World Bank’s 
officials do not seem to factor in the level of recipient ownership of national development 
strategies in decisions regarding new project loan sizes, which may provide further 
opportunities for organizational imperatives to grow and thus drive incentives to pursue 
“move the money” strategies.  
However, it would appear that World Bank’ officials take into account the bank 
performance during past project identification, preparation, and implementation. 
Unfortunately, if quality at entry and appropriate supervision provided by a donor agency 
                                                 
115 http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html, accessed 10 
February 2008. 
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are necessary for the achievement of development objectives, it is not sufficient; 
therefore, it may not be efficient to allocate money among development assistance 
projects solely on that basis. On the other hand, a positive and statistically significant 
estimated coefficient for the bank performance dummy variable across almost all project 
performance criteria would provide evidence that World Bank’s lending practices 
encourage an internal learning environment in the sense that past knowledge about the 
quality of the work done by Bank’s officials in various stages of past projects affects 
current decisions regarding loan sizes. 
Furthermore, it seems that loan sizes of new development projects in a recipient 
country are higher where loan volumes of the most recently approved development 
assistance projects are substantial. Although this result may reflect the fact that a group of 
loans may respond to a common policy decision, the effect appears to be reinforced when 
the achievement rate of past projects is small i.e., where the likelihood of successful 
outcomes is lower. Here again, the evidence of a “Money-Moving Syndrome” at work 
within the World Bank’s loan allocation criteria is reinforced.   
The World Bank’s aid officials also tend to allocate more aid loans to 
development projects which overall impact on poverty may be considered difficult to 
evaluate and quantify compared to projects considered easy to evaluate. We argue that 
this result may strengthen positive incentives to “move the money” on the basis that the 
more complex it is to evaluate development efforts of a donor agency in a recipient 
country, the more complicated it is to tease out the influence of the development project 
itself from the influence of environmental factors and shocks. Therefore, under these 
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murky conditions, a donor agency is provided with opportunities and incentives to pursue 
“move the money” strategies. 
On the other hand, projects categorized as moderately difficult to evaluate, i.e., all 
types of projects (except infrastructure projects) financed by investment loans, receive on 
average less net commitments than projects in the infrastructure sector also financed by 
investment loans. This result may suggest a preference for large and quick-disbursing 
infrastructure projects such as dams, roads, ports, irrigation canals, or factories over any 
other development projects financed by investment loans; and therefore, it may indicate a 
“lending culture” at work within the World Bank’s development practices.  
The regional dummy variables seem to indicate that Latin America and the 
Caribbean receive on average more net commitments per new project than Africa. This 
result confirms the finding that recipient countries’ needs appear not to be a consistent 
allocation criterion within the World Bank.  Aid would be “moved” in the sense that it is 
not predominantly focused on the poorest of developing countries that actually need it.  
 Finally, as expected, the World Bank appears not to be subject to end-of-fiscal-
year pressures to spend, simply because it operates mostly on the basis of loans mobilized 
on international capital markets rather than government appropriations like bilateral aid 
agencies.  
 Overall, the empirical results suggest that, within the World Bank, the 
quantity of foreign aid committed or disbursed in itself appears as important a mission as 
the effectiveness of aid, suggesting that there seems to be a degree of “Money-Moving 
Syndrome” in effect within the World Bank’s development activities. In general, World 
Bank’s lending practices do not appear to adequately fit the needs and merit of the 
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poorest countries; furthermore, World Bank’s lending resources tend to be directed to 
countries where the success rate of past projects is small and are therefore more likely to 
be wasted, while the proportion of sustainable past projects in a recipient country, or the 
proportion of past projects with a substantial institutional development impact, or even 
the proportion of past projects judged successful by the Bank’s operational staff do not 
seem to affect decisions regarding new project loan sizes in that country. These factors, 
among others discussed above, seem to lead to the conclusion that an “approval culture” 
undermines the World Bank’s lending portfolio.  
However, there is evidence that World Bank’s lending practices encourage an 
internal learning environment in the sense that past knowledge about the quality of the 
work done by Bank’s officials in various stages of past projects affects current decisions 
regarding loan sizes. Additionally, the World Bank appears not to be subject to end-of-
fiscal-year pressures to spend mainly because it operates mostly on the basis of loans 
mobilized on international capital markets. These pressures are in fact more likely to be 
present within bilateral aid agencies financed through government appropriations.   
As emphasized by the review of literature in chapter two, there is good reason to 
believe that a high degree of “Money-Moving Syndrome” will somewhat lead or 
contribute to aid ineffectiveness for the simple reason that, in this context, what matters 
the most is the volume of aid disbursed rather than its actual impact on poverty reduction 
or economic growth. In this dissertation, we posited that evidence in support of the 
“Money-Moving Syndrome” could perhaps be used to provide some evidence as to why 
foreign aid has not been more effective at reducing global poverty in developing 
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countries despite the large amount of resources involved in achieving this goal over the 
years.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
In this dissertation we explored the extent of the role played by international donor 
agencies’ incentive structures, especially incentives to “move the money” (or the “Money 
Moving Syndrome”), as a potential cause of the low performance of foreign aid in 
reducing poverty and promoting sustainable economic growth in developing countries.  
Theoretically, we developed a simple principal-agent model which examined how 
donor agencies’ institutional incentive systems affect the characteristics of an optimal and 
efficient incentive contract and thus give rise to the Money Moving Syndrome. Our 
model adapts the basic framework developed in Baker (1992) to fit the organizational 
settings of international development agencies by introducing the notion of 
“organizational imperatives” (such as survival, growth, achieve and/or maintain higher 
status or leadership position, promote interests of stakeholders, and so on) as an 
additional factor in an aid agency’s total value function (other than its true mission to 
maximize poverty reduction and economic growth).  
Our main conclusion from the model indicates that as long as concerns about aid 
effectiveness are predominant and a high level of accountability is attached to readily 
measurable development activities implemented in the least corrupt countries, the 
performance measure would elicit an “effective” effort from aid officials, i.e. a level of 
effort that would contribute as much as possible to an aid agency’s true mission to reduce 
poverty and promote economic growth. Therefore, the quantity of aid disbursed would 
factor in aid “quality” (“Quality-Aid Incentive Scheme”). 
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On the other hand, if organizational imperatives outweigh the goal of aid 
effectiveness and limited accountability is attached to development activities that do not 
discriminate against corrupt countries and are provided in the form of budget support or 
program aid more difficult to evaluate, the staff would be given the incentive to direct 
each unit of effort and money towards promoting organizational imperatives. Therefore, 
the focus would be on the amount of money disbursed (aid “quantity”) rather that the 
impact of that amount of aid on development (“Money-Moving Syndrome Incentive 
Scheme”). The empirical chapter and the results partially corroborate the model’s 
predictions.  
Empirically, we investigated the extent to which incentives to “move the money”,  
stemming from organizational imperatives, are present within donor agencies and coexist 
with genuine concerns about aid effectiveness to shape aid agencies’ decisions regarding 
project loan size to developing countries. In our context, we posited that evidence in 
support of the “Money-Moving Syndrome” can perhaps be used to provide evidence as to 
why foreign aid has not been more effective in reducing global poverty and promoting 
economic growth among developing countries. Due to the unavailability of the data on 
projects and programs funded by other bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, the 
empirical analysis focused exclusively on the World Bank-funded project database. In 
this context, the World Bank is therefore used as a proxy for the performance of all other 
donors in the development field.  
We implemented the empirical estimation using the independently pooled 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) methodology. On the one hand, the empirical results 
provide evidence that World Bank’s lending practices encourage an internal learning 
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environment in the sense that past knowledge about the quality of the work done by 
Bank’s officials in various stages of past projects affects current decisions regarding loan 
sizes. In addition, the World Bank appears not to be subject to end-of-fiscal-year 
pressures to spend mainly because it operates mostly on the basis of loans mobilized on 
international capital markets. These pressures are in fact more likely to be present within 
bilateral aid agencies financed through government appropriations.   
On the other hand, our empirical results revealed that, in general, World Bank’s 
lending practices do not appear to adequately fit the needs and merit of the poorest 
countries. More important, World Bank’s lending resources tend to be directed to 
countries where the success rate of past projects is small and are therefore more likely to 
be wasted; while the proportion of sustainable past projects in a recipient country, or the 
proportion of past projects with a substantial institutional development impact, or even 
the proportion of past projects judged successful by the Bank’s operational staff do not 
seem to affect decisions regarding new project loan sizes in that country. These factors 
seem to lead to the conclusion that there is a degree of “Money-Moving Syndrome” in 
effect within the World Bank’s development activities; in other words, the quantity of 
foreign aid committed or disbursed in itself appears as important a mission as the 
effectiveness of aid. 
These results could be translated into the following policy recommendations for 
reducing donor agencies’ institutional incentives to “move the money” and improving the 
overall performance of foreign aid.  
First, in order to get the institutional incentives right, first at the source i.e. at the 
stage where the funds originate with donors organizations, and then at the destination, it 
appears imperative to establish within aid organizations a system of checks and balances 
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that would allow individuals involved in aid to overcome diversionary incentives 
hindering their genuine intentions to help the poor. Instituting accountability for 
effectiveness seems to be a step in that direction. Several applications of accountability 
for effectiveness within bilateral and multilateral aid agencies exist in spite of the fact 
that they may be difficult to implement. In particular, one solution to enforce the 
accountability for effectiveness within bilateral and multilateral development agencies 
would be to allocate a portion of their budget to the creation of a supreme independent 
entity, even though this would mean fewer resources available for development activities 
(hierarchical accountability). Aid organizations would be accountable to the entity that 
would represent only the interests of taxpayers in rich nations providing aid resources and 
intended beneficiaries in aid-receiving countries. The entity would restore the “broken 
information feedback loop” that exists between the two parties by providing aid 
recipients with means to communicate their own needs, to communicate whether those 
needs have been met, to question the adequacy of what donor agencies provide them, or 
to have a voice in all decisions that affect development strategies, projects, and policies. 
The entity would therefore conduct independent evaluations of donor agencies’ 
performance or institute standard principles and guidelines that must be abided by in 
order to conduct project evaluations; for these independent evaluations constitute an 
important criterion by which the success of development activities is judged.  Overall, the 
existence of a supreme independent organization would recreate a political process in 
foreign aid similar to the one in modern democracies where taxpayers (voters) are the 
same as beneficiaries and could therefore exercise political pressure on public 
bureaucracies to improve performance and satisfy their needs. 116 
                                                 
116 It must be clear that the concept of accountability could only be raised in relation with intermediate aid 
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However, such an approach would be probably unfeasible in the current 
development paradigm. Another more practical approach to institute accountability for 
effectiveness within bilateral and multilateral development agencies would be to allocate 
a portion of aid resources directly to recipient countries (civil society or ultimate 
beneficiaries of aid) so that they could provide an independent feedback to donor 
agencies, thus creating a direct communication channel between recipients and aid 
agencies (Martinez-Vazquez et al. 2005). Providing recipients with financial means to 
easily communicate their own needs and whether those needs have been met, or to 
question the adequacy of what donor agencies provide them, appears to be one important 
and feasible avenue to reduce money moving incentives within aid agencies. 
Second, aid selectivity in donor agencies should be strengthened around criteria 
such as high levels of poverty, good governance (such as low levels of corruption, 
transparency, ownership, and high bureaucracy quality), and sound policies. Allocating 
aid based on such criteria would not only reduce positive incentives to “move the money” 
within aid agencies by targeting aid resources where they are needed the most and would 
likely be more effective, but also would help improve incentives in recipient countries. 
Undeniably, enforcing aid selectivity on such a basis would provide developing countries 
concerned about poverty reduction with strong incentives to establish a good governance 
environment with sound institutions and policies.  
                                                                                                                                                 
agencies that link the taxpayers in rich countries and the intended beneficiaries in poor countries. The 
reason being that aid agencies are expected to use aid resources entrusted to them effectively to promote 
economic growth and reduce global poverty. Undeniably, in a relationship solely between these ultimate 
protagonists of foreign aid (taxpayers and beneficiaries) there is no place for accountability. Taxpayers in 
rich countries willingly transfer part of their income to developing countries to alleviate poverty and simply 
cannot be held accountable when aid fails to achieve its purpose. Additionally, we should note that 
increasing accountability for effectiveness can increase efficiency but can also impose great costs. 
Consequently, accountability should only be increased when its benefits outweigh its costs.  
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Finally, providing official development assistance in the form of development 
interventions where the overall impact on poverty or economic growth is easy to evaluate 
and quantify may be another approach to discourage donor agencies’ institutional 
incentives to “move the money”. With such projects, it would be possible to tease out the 
influence of development projects from the influence of environmental factors and shocks, 
disentangle causes and effects, hold the implementing aid agency accountable, learn from 
mistakes, and improve the focus on high “quality” aid. However, considering this approach 
may lead to an overflow of “hard” infrastructure projects in developing countries, it would be 
more beneficial to invest resources in built-in evaluation systems where an evaluation 
procedure (e.g. quantifiable performance measurements and clear evaluation criteria) is built 
directly into the implementation of a development project or program rather than being 
conducted at the end of the development activity. 
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APPENDIX A 
BEYOND QUANTITATIVE AID: THE QUALITY OF AID 
According to the Commitment to Development Index 2006 developed by the 
Centre for Global Development (CGD), “quality” aid, among other things, excludes tied 
aid, subtracts debt payments by developing countries on aid loans, penalizes donors for 
overburdening poor countries with a large variety of small aid projects, and favors poor 
and uncorrupt countries. 
Figure A below compares donor countries in terms of the quality of aid they 
provide to developing countries. In 2006, while Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and 
Sweden scored highest in terms of the amount of quality aid as a share of GNI provided, 
the United States and Japan (the largest donors in absolute terms) ranked at or near the 
bottom.  
Figure A: Quality Aid in 2006 (% of GNI) 
 
Source: Commitment to Development Index 2006, Center for Global Development.  
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APPENDIX B 
LITERATURE REVIEW ON PREVIOUS AID ALLOCATION MODELS 
Collier and Dollar (2002) developed a poverty-efficient allocation of aid model 
based on some findings from the aid effectiveness literature.117 They deduced the 
following from their model: aid allocated to developing countries should be an increasing 
function of good policy and poverty level in those countries; and the poverty-efficient 
equilibrium is determined where the marginal impact of an additional dollar of aid, in 
terms of the number of people lifted out of the poverty line per million dollars, is 
equalized across aid-receiving countries.118 Their model depends on the important 
assumption that donors have no influence in the distribution of income within countries; 
in other words, they can reduce poverty only through an increase in aggregate income.  
In the Equal Opportunity Model of aid allocation developed by Cogneau and 
Naudet (2004), these authors introduced an effort indicator influenced by structural 
disadvantages to growth (such as climate, the health of the population, historical 
disruptions…) over which each country has little or no control; in that sense, they tried to 
control for aid effectiveness differential across countries; aid effectiveness beyond the 
control of aid agencies. Their optimal aid allocation gives more to the poorest countries 
by equalizing differences in poverty risk by a specific point in time between countries 
facing different disadvantages but making the same degree of effort. Their model 
                                                 
117 Some studies on aid effectiveness have shown the following results: 1) the impact of aid on growth 
depends on the quality of economic policies and institutional environments in developing countries 
(Burnside and Dollar 2000); and 2) aid does not systematically induce political or economic reforms 
(Alesina and Dollar 2000); for more studies, see (Collier and Dollar 2002). 
 
118 Collier and Dollar (2002) used the headcount Index as a measure of poverty.  
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complements the work done by Collier and Dollar (2002) by introducing a notion of 
fairness.  
A different aid allocation model is the model implicit in the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) which seeks to allocate aid so as to minimize differences 
between actual levels of MDG indicators in each country and their target levels. As such, 
the MDGs poverty efficient outcome implicitly assumes that the marginal effectiveness 
of aid is equal across all countries (McGillivray 2006).  
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APPENDIX C 
THEORETICAL MODEL-MAXIMIZATION PROBLEMS 
In this appendix, we provide the full development of some equations figuring in 
the theoretical model.  
• Equation (3.5) in the theoretical model is derived as follows:  
The principal’s objective is to maximize expected profits, i.e. the total value net of 
compensation payments:  
)],,(),([max **
,
εε ebPseVE
sb
−−  
s.t.  
_
)](),([ UeCebPsE ≥−+ ε                          (C.1) 
)(),( *'* eCebPe =ε                            (C.2) 
The principal sets the fixed payment, s, to bind the agent’s participation constraint. 
Substituting s from the participation constraint and equation (C.2) into the principal’s 
expected profit gives:  
)],,()(),(),([max *
_
* εεε ebPeCebPUeVE
b
−−+−   
where *e  is function of b and ε .  
Deriving this last equation with respect to b yields the following:  
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From equation (C.3),  
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Differentiating equation (C.2) with respect to b gives:  
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Replacing equation (C.5) into equation (C.4): 
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According to the definitions of variance, covariance and coefficient of correlation,  
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Assuming without loss of generality that 1][][ == ee PEVE , combining equations (C.6) 
and (C.7) yields the following optimal piece rate: 
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• Equation (3.11) in the theoretical model is derived as follows:  
The principal’s objective is to maximize expected profits, i.e. the total value net of 
compensation payments:  
)],,(),([max **
,
εε ebPseWE
sb
−−  
subject to the participation and the incentive compatibility constraints given respectively 
by equations (C.1) and (C.2).  
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As above, the principal sets the fixed payment (s) to bind the agent’s participation 
constraint. After substituting s from the participation constraint and equation (C.2) into 
the principal’s expected profit, it becomes:  
)],,()(),(),()1(),([max *
_
** εεεαεα ebPeCebPUeVeOE
b
−−+−−+  where *e  is 
function of b and .ε   
Deriving this last equation with respect to b yields the following:  
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From equation (C.8),  
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Replacing equation (C.5) into equation (C.9): 
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According to the definitions of variance, covariance and coefficient of correlation 
presented in line (C.7), equation (C.10) changes as follows:  
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where )],,([)1()],([)],([ εγεγε eOEeVEePE eee −+= mc +=
θγ , and 1ρ  is the coefficient 
of correlation between eO  and eP , and 2ρ  is the coefficient of correlation between eP  
and eV . 
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APPENDIX D 
DATA APPENDIX 
 
Table D1. Variable Names    
variable name variable label 
country Country 
year Approval Fiscal Year119 
netcommit Net Commitments (Millions of US Dollars) 
Lnetcommit Logarithm Net Commitments 
Lnetcommit_1 Logarithm Net Commitments Lagged  
approvdate Approval Date 
deactdate Deactivation Date 
exit_fy Exit Fiscal Year 
evaldate Evaluation Date 
p_id Project ID 
totproj Total # of Projects Approved per FY/Country 
tproj Total # of Projects Approved in each Country 
region Region 
sector Sector 
network Network 
instr Lending Instrument 
evaltype Evaluation Type 
instrtype Lending Instrument Type 
agreetype Agreement Type 
corrupt Corruption 
bureau Bureaucracy Quality 
openk Openness 
gdp GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 
Lgdp Logarithm  GDP per capita  
ggdp_cap GDP per capita growth (annual %) 
infl Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 
Lpop Total Population (logarithm) 
count Number of HC (a ) 
Lcumloan Cumulative Loan Amount of All Past Projects At the Approval Time (log) 
outcome50 (b) Dummy Variable equal 1 if at least 50 % of HC were successful 
sustain50 Dummy Variable equal 1 if at least 50 % of HC were likely sustainable 
impact50 
Dummy Variable equal 1 if at least 50 % of HC had a Substantial or Modest 
Impact 
bankperf50 
Dummy Variable equal 1 if at least 50 % of HC had a successful Bank 
Performance 
borrperf50 
Dummy Variable equal 1 if at least 50 % of HC had a successful Borrower 
Performance 
icrq50 Dummy Variable equal 1 if at least 50 % of HC were judged successful by the 
                                                 
119 The World Bank’s fiscal year runs from July 1 to June 30.  For example, fiscal year 2003 covers the 
period from July 1, 2002 to June 30, 2003. 
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BOS(c) 
half_date Time By which Projects are Halfway Completed 
projeval 
Measure Constructed to Reflect Degree of Difficulty to Evaluate Project 
Performance 
proj_eval1 Equal to 1 if Sector Projects Difficult to Evaluate 
proj_eval2 Equal to 1 if Sector Projects Moderately Difficult to Evaluate 
proj_eval3 Equal to 1 if Sector Projects Easy to Evaluate (base) 
Apr_June Equal to 1 if Approval Month is April, May or June 
reg1 region==Africa (base) 
reg2 region==E&S Asia 
reg3 region==Europe, Middle East and North Africa 
reg4 region==Latin America and the Caribbean 
sect1 sector==Eco. Mngt 
sect2 sector==Env&Soc 
sect3 sector==Finance 
sect4 sector==Human 
sect5 sector==Infrastructure (base) 
sect6 sector==Private 
yr80s Dummy equal to one if 1980s 
yr90_94 Dummy equal to one if 1990 to 1994 
yr95_99 Dummy equal to one if 1995 to 1999 
yr2000s Dummy equal to one if 2000s 
Note: (a) "HC" means "Past Projects Halfway completed or Completed by the Approval Time of a New 
Project". (b) More precisely, outcome50 equal 1 if at least 50 % of HC were successful. Equal to 0 
otherwise, meaning that either there are no HC (i.e. count=0) or strictly less than 50% of HC were 
successful. (c) BOS = World Bank Operational Staff.  
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Table D2. Descriptive Statistics: All Sample   
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
country 1977 63.94588 37.54392 1 134 
year 1977 1994.957 4.244748 1984 2006 
netcommit 1977 74.02852 126.3778 0.1332412 2525.25 
approvdate 1977 12817.04 1539.58 8931 16692 
deactdate 1977 36980.73 1107.845 34150 39156 
exit_fy 1977 2001.079 3.093327 1993 2007 
evaldate 1977 37315.47 1074.931 35468 39262 
region 1977 2.411735 1.110506 1 4 
sector 1977 3.514922 1.553012 1 6 
network 1977 3.24785 1.467349 1 6 
instr 1977 11.11482 2.916425 1 15 
instrtype 1977 1.866464 0.3402388 1 2 
agreetype 1977 1.488113 0.5030125 1 3 
evaltype 1977 1.114315 0.3182735 1 2 
outcome50 1977 0.5665149 0.4956814 0 1 
sustain50 1977 0.4066768 0.4913379 0 1 
impact50 1977 0.6302479 0.4828596 0 1 
bankperf50 1977 0.5943349 0.4911445 0 1 
borrperf50 1977 0.5432473 0.4982522 0 1 
icrq50 1977 0.6545271 0.4756425 0 1 
p_id 1977 16.19423 18.6411 1 109 
totproj 1977 3.143652 2.662835 1 16 
count 1977 7.925645 12.51287 0 90 
cum_loan_amt 1977 1316.079 2590.611 0 16104.58 
projeval 1977 2.167931 0.6379714 1 3 
Apr_June 1977 0.430956 0.4953353 0 1 
corrupt 1581 2.909604 0.9128316 0 5 
bureau 1581 1.88707 0.8857682 0 4 
openk 1906 62.04777 38.35935 7.974345 384.6969 
gdp_cap 1941 1526.918 1854.101 74.74135 15815.79 
ggdp_cap 1934 2.592812 6.837837 -46.99654 89.41008 
infl 1818 50.38546 257.8053 -12.86966 4734.915 
pop 1951 1.42E+08 3.18E+08 41800 1.26E+09 
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Table D3. Variable Definitions and Data Source 
 
Variable 
 
 
Definitions and Data Source 
Net Commitment 
Amount 
The Net Commitment Amount is calculated as total commitments net of 
cancellations for all projects in the Work Bank portfolio.  
Source: The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank 
 
 
Overall Project 
Outcome 
A measure of the extent to which the project’s major relevant objectives were 
achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. Six-point rating scale: 
highly satisfactory, satisfactory, moderately satisfactory, moderately 
unsatisfactory, unsatisfactory, and highly unsatisfactory. 
Source: The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank 
 
 
Project Sustainability 
A measure reflecting the resiliency to risks of a project as measured by the 
likelihood that its estimated net benefits will be maintained or exceeded over the 
project's intended useful life. Five-point rating scale: highly likely, likely, 
uncertain, unlikely, and highly unlikely. 
Source: The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank 
 
Project Institutional 
Development Impact 
A measure of  the extent to which a project improves the ability of a country to 
use its human, financial, and natural resources efficiently, equitably, and in a 
sustainable manner. Four-point rating scale: high, substantial, modest, and 
negligible.  
Source: The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank 
 
 
Bank Performance 
A measure of the extent to which services provided by the Bank ensured quality 
at entry and supported implementation through appropriate supervision. Six-point 
rating scale from highly satisfactory to highly unsatisfactory, where “highly 
satisfactory” means that the Bank performance was rated highly satisfactory on 
both dimensions.  
Source: The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank 
 
 
Borrower Performance 
A measure of the extent to which the borrower assumed ownership and 
responsibility to ensure quality of preparation and implementation, and complied 
with covenants and agreements, towards the achievement of development 
objectives and sustainability. Six-point rating scale from highly satisfactory to 
highly unsatisfactory. 
Source: The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank 
 
 
Implementation 
Completion Report or 
ICR quality 
Project performance rating attributed by the operational staff of the Bank itself 
but not by the IEG; in that regard, it is a self-evaluation. It assesses (a) the degree 
to which the project achieved its development objective and outputs as set out in 
the project documents; (b) other significant outcomes and impacts; (c) prospects 
for the project’s sustainability; and (d) Bank and borrower performance, 
including compliance with relevant Bank safeguard and business policies. Three-
point rating scale: exemplary, satisfactory, or unsatisfactory.  
Source: The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank 
 
Region 
The administrative regions correspond to the major operational divisions of the 
World Bank: Africa; Asia; Europe, Middle East and North Africa; and Latin 
America and Caribbean  
Source: The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank 
 
 
Sectors 
Sectors are economic, political or sociological subdivisions within society. They 
reflect the type of project. There are 17 sectors represented in the World Bank 
Project Portfolio. E.g. Agriculture, Health, Education, Transport, Water Supply 
and Sanitation, and Energy and Mining. 
Source: The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank 
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Variable 
 
 
Definitions and Data Source 
 
Network  
The World Bank’s portfolio is also distributed by networks. There are six 
networks ranging from Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development 
Network (ESSD) to Private Sector Development Network (PSDN). 
Source: The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank 
 
Type of Lending 
Instruments 
Investment Lending provides long-term financing for a variety of activities in 
various sectors aimed at building the physical and social infrastructure necessary 
for development. Adjustment Lending provides quick-disbursing financing to 
support policy and institutional reforms in developing countries.  
Source: The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank 
 
 
Agreement Type  
The type of financing or credit according to the financing or credit instrument 
used: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the 
International Development Association (IDA), and the Special Fund (SPF). 
Source: The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank  
 
Board Approval Date 
The date that the Board of Directors voted to approve the loan or credit. 
Source: The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank Website: Projects & 
Operations, Help/FAQs 
 
Deactivation Date or 
Closing Date 
The date all financial activities related to the project stopped. In many cases, 
financial activities (e.g. closing the books) will continue after actual field 
activities have ceased. 
Source: The Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank Website: Projects & 
Operations, Help/FAQs 
 
 
 
GDP per capita 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is 
the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any 
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. 
It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or 
for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant U.S. 
dollars. 
Source: World Development Indicators (2006), World Bank 
 
 
 
GDP per capita 
Growth  
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local 
currency. GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear 
population. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without 
making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and 
degradation of natural resources. 
Source: World Development Indicators (2006), World Bank 
 
 
Inflation 
Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage 
change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a fixed basket of goods 
and services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. 
The Laspeyres formula is generally used. 
Source: World Development Indicators (2006), World Bank 
 
 
Openness 
Exports plus Imports divided by the RGDPL or Real GDP per capita (Laspeyres). 
It is the total trade as a percentage of GDP. The RGDPL is obtained by adding up 
consumption, investment, government and exports, and subtracting imports in 
any given year. It is a fixed base index where the reference year is 1996, hence 
the designation "L" for Laspeyeres. 
Source: Penn World Tables 6.2 (Heston et al. 2006) 
 
Corruption Index 
It captures the likelihood that capture the likelihood that high government 
officials will demand special payments and bribes, and the extent to which illegal 
payments are expected throughout lower levels of government. The corruption 
index takes on values between zero (most corrupt) and six (least corrupt). 
Source: The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Political Risk Group 
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Bureaucracy Quality  
It is a measure of the quality of a country's bureaucracy on a 4 point scale. It is a 
shock absorber that tends to minimize policy variations when governments 
change. A high quality bureaucracy (high score) has the strength and expertise to 
govern without drastic changes in policies or interruptions in government 
services. Countries with poor bureaucracies receive low points because a change 
in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-
day administrative functions.  
Source: The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Political Risk Group 
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Table D4. Loan Size and Performance by Region 
                                                             IEG Outcome 
Region successful unsuccessful Total 
Outcome by 
Number (%suc) 
Africa 40.526971 30.142516 36.499177  
 49.727427 36.725063 45.37823  
 333 211 544 61.21 
E&S Asia 116.42653 83.088866 108.97458  
 164.60493 78.532262 150.29587  
 396 114 510 77.65 
Europe, Middle East 
and North Africa 56.051398 56.490136 56.138606  
 76.049865 86.279512 78.096591  
 391 97 488 80.12 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 101.15312 95.559546 100.06012  
 139.39979 295.78958 180.45831  
 350 85 435 80.46 
Total 79.537467 58.055831 74.028519  
 122.3375 136.29554 126.37781  
 1470 507 1977 74.36 
Means, Standard Deviations and Frequencies of Net Commitments (Millions of Dlrs) 
 
 
 
Table D5. Loan Size and Performance by Sector 
                                    IEG Outcome 
Sector successful unsuccessful Total 
Outcome by Number 
(%suc) 
Eco. Mngt 99.792263 98.016032 99.351494  
 186.08838 313.71103 223.94369  
 203 67 270 75.19 
Env&Soc 56.432809 41.036762 51.919547  
 67.280901 55.846596 64.458306  
 299 124 423 70.69 
Finance 157.53541 96.724817 143.89565  
 257.70171 205.06518 247.28083  
 83 24 107 77.57 
Human 66.197872 40.769037 60.433284  
 91.262458 53.771783 84.858937  
 365 107 472 77.33 
Infrastructure 84.044846 70.133236 80.670248  
 90.201838 80.396672 88.061733  
 459 147 606 75.74 
Private 65.157223 20.668555 48.080765  
 100.26779 22.069688 82.535187  
 61 38 99 61.62 
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Total 79.537467 58.055831 74.028519  
 122.3375 136.29554 126.37781  
 1470 507 1977 74.36 
Means, Standard Deviations and Frequencies of Net Commitments (Millions of Dlrs) 
 
Table D6. Loan Size and Performance by Approval Month 
                                          IEG Outcome
Approval  
Month successful unsuccessful Total 
Outcome by 
Number (%suc) 
0 79.671605 59.245672 74.769381  
 134.51098 164.83653 142.56868  
 855 270 1125 76 
1 79.350981 56.700315 73.050268  
 103.15939 94.102745 101.17831  
 615 237 852 72.1831 
Total 79.537467 58.055831 74.028519  
 122.3375 136.29554 126.37781  
 1470 507 1977 74.35508 
Means, Standard Deviations and Frequencies of Net Commitments (Millions of Dlrs) 
Note: Equal to 1 if Approval Month is April, May or June 
 
 
 
 
Table D7. Loan Size and Performance by Evaluation 
                                     IEG Outcome
projeval successful unsuccessful Total 
Outcome by 
Number (%suc) 
1 179.82335 154.60088 174.75974  
 238.66986 367.88969 268.97261  
 211 53 264 79.92 
2 51.576388 35.804017 47.227337  
 67.77332 49.483375 63.630732  
 809 308 1117 72.43 
3 82.782338 69.950838 79.639051  
 88.953374 80.642899 87.100141  
 450 146 596 75.50 
Total 79.537467 58.055831 74.028519  
 122.3375 136.29554 126.37781  
 1470 507 1977 74.36 
Means, Standard Deviations and Frequencies of Net Commitments (Millions of Dlrs) 
Note: projeval is the Measure constructed to reflect the degree of difficulty to evaluate project performance   
1=Sector Projects Difficult to Evaluate; 2= Sector Projects Moderately Difficult to Evaluate; 3= Sector 
Projects Easy to Evaluate 
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Table D8. Countries Included in the Dataset (by Regions)  
Region: Sub-Saharan Africa
Country Freq. Percent Cum. 
Angola 7 1.29 1.29 
Benin 14 2.57 3.86 
Botswana 1 0.18 4.04 
Burkina Faso 19 3.49 7.54 
Burundi 15 2.76 10.29 
Cameroon 12 2.21 12.5 
Cape Verde 9 1.65 14.15 
Central African Republic 11 2.02 16.18 
Chad 16 2.94 19.12 
Comoros 8 1.47 20.59 
Congo, Democratic Republic of 3 0.55 21.14 
Cote d'Ivoire 16 2.94 24.08 
Equatorial Guinea 2 0.37 24.45 
Eritrea 5 0.92 25.37 
Ethiopia 18 3.31 28.68 
Gabon 4 0.74 29.41 
Gambia, The 9 1.65 31.07 
Ghana 32 5.88 36.95 
Guinea 17 3.13 40.07 
Guinea-Bissau 8 1.47 41.54 
Kenya 21 3.86 45.4 
Lesotho 8 1.47 46.87 
Madagascar 23 4.23 51.1 
Malawi 17 3.13 54.23 
Mali 22 4.04 58.27 
Mauritania 19 3.49 61.76 
Mauritius 9 1.65 63.42 
Mozambique 14 2.57 65.99 
Niger 10 1.84 67.83 
Nigeria 24 4.41 72.24 
Rwanda 13 2.39 74.63 
Sao Tome and Principe 7 1.29 75.92 
Senegal 24 4.41 80.33 
Sierra Leone 12 2.21 82.54 
Sudan 1 0.18 82.72 
Swaziland 1 0.18 82.9 
Tanzania 30 5.51 88.42 
Togo 15 2.76 91.18 
Uganda 22 4.04 95.22 
Zambia 19 3.49 98.71 
Zimbabwe 7 1.29 100 
Total 544 100   
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Region: East and South Asia
Country Freq. Percent Cum. 
Afghanistan 1 0.2 0.2 
Bangladesh 24 4.71 4.9 
Bhutan 2 0.39 5.29 
Cambodia 6 1.18 6.47 
China 109 21.37 27.84 
Fiji 3 0.59 28.43 
India 91 17.84 46.27 
Indonesia 64 12.55 58.82 
Korea, Republic of 18 3.53 62.35 
Lao People's Democratic Republic 13 2.55 64.9 
Malaysia 9 1.76 66.67 
Maldives 1 0.2 66.86 
Mongolia 5 0.98 67.84 
Nepal 19 3.73 71.57 
Pakistan 48 9.41 80.98 
Papua New Guinea 7 1.37 82.35 
Philippines 30 5.88 88.24 
Samoa 3 0.59 88.82 
Solomon Islands 2 0.39 89.22 
Sri Lanka 22 4.31 93.53 
Thailand 19 3.73 97.25 
Tonga 1 0.2 97.45 
Vanuatu 2 0.39 97.84 
Vietnam 11 2.16 100 
Total 510 100   
 
Region: Europe, Middle East and North Africa
Country Freq. Percent Cum. 
Albania 31 6.35 6.35 
Algeria 24 4.92 11.27 
Armenia 13 2.66 13.93 
Azerbaijan 7 1.43 15.37 
Belarus 3 0.61 15.98 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 24 4.92 20.9 
Bulgaria 13 2.66 23.57 
Croatia 8 1.64 25.2 
Cyprus 5 1.02 26.23 
Czech Republic 2 0.41 26.64 
Djibouti 6 1.23 27.87 
Egypt, Arab Republic of 15 3.07 30.94 
Estonia 4 0.82 31.76 
Georgia 11 2.25 34.02 
Hungary 16 3.28 37.3 
Iran, Islamic Republic of 3 0.61 37.91 
Jordan 12 2.46 40.37 
Kazakhstan 10 2.05 42.42 
Kyrgyz Republic 15 3.07 45.49 
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Latvia 11 2.25 47.75 
Lebanon 7 1.43 49.18 
Lithuania 9 1.84 51.02 
Macedonia, former Yugoslav Republic of 15 3.07 54.1 
Moldova 9 1.84 55.94 
Morocco 41 8.4 64.34 
Poland 27 5.53 69.88 
Portugal 1 0.2 70.08 
Romania 16 3.28 73.36 
Russian Federation 19 3.89 77.25 
Serbia 6 1.23 78.48 
Slovak Republic 2 0.41 78.89 
Slovenia 4 0.82 79.71 
Tajikistan 12 2.46 82.17 
Tunisia 20 4.1 86.27 
Turkey 24 4.92 91.19 
Turkmenistan 3 0.61 91.8 
Ukraine 11 2.25 94.06 
Uzbekistan 6 1.23 95.29 
Yemen, Republic of 23 4.71 100 
Total 488 100  
 
Region: Latin America and the Caribbean
Country Freq. Percent Cum. 
Argentina 41 9.43 9.43
Bahamas, The 1 0.23 9.66
Barbados 2 0.46 10.11
Belize 6 1.38 11.49
Bolivia 27 6.21 17.7
Brazil 71 16.32 34.02
Chile 17 3.91 37.93
Colombia 33 7.59 45.52
Costa Rica 5 1.15 46.67
Dominica 5 1.15 47.82
Dominican Republic 11 2.53 50.34
Ecuador 22 5.06 55.4
El Salvador 9 2.07 57.47
Grenada 3 0.69 58.16
Guatemala 9 2.07 60.23
Guyana 9 2.07 62.3
Haiti 10 2.3 64.6
Honduras 8 1.84 66.44
Jamaica 15 3.45 69.89
Mexico 43 9.89 79.77
Nicaragua 15 3.45 83.22
Panama 7 1.61 84.83
Paraguay 8 1.84 86.67
Peru 18 4.14 90.8
St. Kitts and Nevis 3 0.69 91.49
St. Lucia 3 0.69 92.18
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St. Vincent and the Grenadines 3 0.69 92.87
Trinidad and Tobago 3 0.69 93.56
Uruguay 12 2.76 96.32
Venezuela, Republica Bolivariana de 16 3.68 100
Total 435 100  
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APPENDIX E 
THE WORLD BANK PROJECT CYCLE 
 
Source: the World Bank (http://go.worldbank.org/GI967K75D0), accessed 10 September 2007.  
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APPENDIX F 
LOAN ALLOCATION CRITERIA: OTHER EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Table F1. Determinants of Project Loan Size with Overall Project Outcome and Sector  
Dummy 
Dependent Variable: Log of Net Commitments a  
           Specifications 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable No Interactions Performance Interactions Year Interactions 
Lnetcommit_1 0.076** 0.162*** 0.067** 
 (0.032) (0.049) (0.032) 
corrupt -0.020 -0.083 -0.022 
 (0.039) (0.053) (0.038) 
bureau 0.017 0.028 0.013 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
openk 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
infl 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Lgdp -1.308*** -1.309*** -1.309*** 
 (0.431) (0.433) (0.420) 
Lgdp2 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.102*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) 
ggdp_cap -0.001 0.000 -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Lpop 0.385*** 0.382*** 0.384*** 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.043) 
Lcumloan -0.042 -0.039 -0.033 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.042) 
outcome50 -0.297** -0.291 -0.238 
 (0.144) (0.349) (0.154) 
bankperf50 0.314** 0.286** 0.261* 
 (0.141) (0.143) (0.141) 
borrperf50 0.081 0.098 0.100 
 (0.132) (0.132) (0.130) 
reg2 -0.023 -0.030 -0.024 
 (0.132) (0.131) (0.132) 
reg3 0.157 0.149 0.195 
 (0.141) (0.142) (0.143) 
reg4 0.306** 0.287* 0.322** 
 (0.150) (0.149) (0.151) 
yr80s 0.038 -0.060 0.111 
 (0.097) (0.095) (0.132) 
yr95_99 -0.207*** -0.203*** -0.187 
 (0.071) (0.072) (0.133) 
yr2000s 0.083 0.050 -0.366 
 (0.146) (0.148) (0.468) 
sect1 -0.201 -0.637*** -0.821*** 
 (0.128) (0.228) (0.201) 
sect2 -0.601*** -0.513*** -0.472*** 
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 (0.074) (0.098) (0.105) 
sect3 0.184 -0.207 0.017 
 (0.163) (0.241) (0.241) 
sect4 -0.229*** -0.318*** -0.259*** 
 (0.069) (0.087) (0.088) 
sect6 -0.544*** -0.548*** -0.506** 
 (0.169) (0.191) (0.219) 
Apr_June -0.037 -0.031 -0.031 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.057) 
Lagcom_out50  -0.121**  
  (0.055)  
sect1_out50  0.632**  
  (0.271)  
sect2_out50  -0.116  
  (0.142)  
sect3_out50  0.561*  
  (0.313)  
sect4_out50  0.169  
  (0.130)  
sect6_out50  0.045  
  (0.317)  
out50_corr  0.111  
  (0.070)  
yr80_out50   0.000 
   (0.000) 
yr9599_out50   -0.028 
   (0.134) 
yr2000_out50   -0.405 
   (0.425) 
yr80_sect1   -0.674 
   (0.715) 
yr9599_sect1   0.382 
   (0.274) 
yr2000_sect1   1.886*** 
   (0.366) 
yr80_sect2   -0.060 
   (0.175) 
yr9599_sect2   -0.258 
   (0.158) 
yr2000_sect2   0.071 
   (0.412) 
yr80_sect3   -0.046 
   (0.318) 
yr9599_sect3   0.022 
   (0.373) 
yr2000_sect3   1.245*** 
   (0.449) 
yr80_sect4   -0.370** 
   (0.169) 
yr9599_sect4   0.042 
   (0.141) 
yr2000_sect4   0.677* 
   (0.362) 
yr80_sect6   -0.413 
   (0.509) 
yr9599_sect6   0.128 
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   (0.292) 
yr2000_sect6   -0.466 
   (1.049) 
Constant 1.166 1.144 1.137 
 (1.555) (1.588) (1.545) 
Observations 1383 1383 1383 
R-squared 0.31 0.32 0.34 
a Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table F2. Determinants of Project Loan Size with Overall Project Outcome and June  
Dummy 
Dependent Variable: Log of Net Commitments a  
                                Specifications 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable No Interactions Performance Interactions Year Interactions 
Lnetcommit_1 0.059** 0.160*** 0.051* 
 (0.030) (0.046) (0.030) 
corrupt 0.046 -0.053 0.045 
 (0.036) (0.050) (0.036) 
bureau 0.009 0.023 0.005 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
openk 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
infl 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Lgdp -1.059*** -1.057*** -0.995*** 
 (0.382) (0.382) (0.374) 
Lgdp2 0.083*** 0.084*** 0.079*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
ggdp_cap -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Lpop 0.388*** 0.385*** 0.382*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Lcumloan -0.051 -0.051 -0.045 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) 
outcome50 -0.302** -0.315 -0.193 
 (0.124) (0.318) (0.135) 
bankperf50 0.358*** 0.337*** 0.312** 
 (0.128) (0.127) (0.126) 
borrperf50 0.001 0.012 0.012 
 (0.118) (0.119) (0.118) 
reg2 0.100 0.091 0.094 
 (0.120) (0.119) (0.120) 
reg3 0.178 0.150 0.187 
 (0.122) (0.123) (0.123) 
reg4 0.330** 0.288** 0.322** 
 (0.132) (0.131) (0.133) 
yr80s -0.012 -0.070 0.109 
 (0.092) (0.090) (0.132) 
yr95_99 -0.246*** -0.236*** -0.095 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.128) 
yr2000s -0.545*** -0.555*** -0.370 
 (0.136) (0.138) (0.371) 
proj_eval1 1.250*** 0.942*** 0.807*** 
 (0.101) (0.168) (0.168) 
 
proj_eval2 -0.521*** -0.518*** -0.451*** 
 (0.057) (0.077) (0.081) 
June -0.040 -0.035 -0.032 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.063) 
Lagcom_out50  -0.144***  
  (0.052)  
peval1_out50  0.427**  
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  (0.197)  
peval2_out50  0.031  
  (0.111)  
out50_corr  0.165***  
  (0.063)  
yr80_out50   0.000 
   (0.000) 
yr9599_out50   -0.135 
   (0.127) 
yr2000_out50   -0.638** 
   (0.278) 
yr80_peval1   -0.755*** 
   (0.209) 
yr9599_peval1   0.265 
   (0.207) 
yr2000_peval1   1.025*** 
   (0.338) 
yr80_peval2   -0.152 
   (0.150) 
yr9599_peval2   -0.122 
   (0.122) 
yr2000_peval2   0.148 
   (0.364) 
Constant 0.217 0.213 0.046 
 (1.375) (1.401) (1.354) 
Observations 1383 1383 1383 
R-squared 0.43 0.44 0.44 
     a Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table F3. Determinants of Project Loan Size with Overall Project Outcome and Share 
of U.S. Trade 
Dependent Variable: Log of Net Commitments a  
                      Specifications 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable No Interactions Performance Interactions Year Interactions 
Lnetcommit_1 0.055* 0.163*** 0.047 
 (0.029) (0.047) (0.030) 
corrupt 0.055 -0.051 0.054 
 (0.036) (0.050) (0.036) 
bureau 0.004 0.023 0.001 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) 
openk 0.002* 0.001 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
infl 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Lgdp -1.066*** -1.099*** -0.998*** 
 (0.392) (0.392) (0.385) 
Lgdp2 0.084*** 0.087*** 0.080*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
ggdp_cap -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Lpop 0.393*** 0.380*** 0.388*** 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
shareexp 2.845 1.221 3.089 
 (8.554) (8.490) (8.414) 
shareimp -2.871 -0.085 -3.246 
 (6.795) (6.879) (6.761) 
Lcumloan -0.051 -0.052 -0.046 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) 
outcome50 -0.304** -0.300 -0.201 
 (0.123) (0.319) (0.135) 
bankperf50 0.361*** 0.339*** 0.317** 
 (0.127) (0.126) (0.125) 
borrperf50 0.010 0.017 0.020 
 (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) 
reg2 0.096 0.095 0.089 
 (0.120) (0.118) (0.120) 
reg3 0.169 0.153 0.177 
 (0.122) (0.123) (0.124) 
reg4 0.299** 0.262** 0.292** 
 (0.132) (0.131) (0.132) 
yr80s 0.005 -0.053 0.122 
 (0.093) (0.091) (0.133) 
yr95_99 -0.242*** -0.232*** -0.096 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.128) 
yr2000s -0.511*** -0.517*** -0.410 
 (0.134) (0.135) (0.370) 
proj_eval1 1.232*** 0.938*** 0.820*** 
 (0.101) (0.168) (0.171) 
proj_eval2 -0.520*** -0.519*** -0.455*** 
 (0.058) (0.077) (0.081) 
Apr_June -0.095* -0.090* -0.088* 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.052) 
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Lagcom_out50  -0.155***  
  (0.051)  
peval1_out50  0.415**  
  (0.197)  
peval2_out50  0.039  
  (0.112)  
out50_corr  0.172***  
  (0.063)  
yr80_out50   0.000 
   (0.000) 
yr9599_out50   -0.128 
   (0.127) 
yr2000_out50   -0.586** 
   (0.277) 
yr80_peval1   -0.764*** 
   (0.211) 
yr9599_peval1   0.247 
   (0.211) 
yr2000_peval1   1.006*** 
   (0.339) 
yr80_peval2   -0.148 
   (0.151) 
yr9599_peval2   -0.120 
   (0.122) 
yr2000_peval2   0.203 
   (0.361) 
Constant 0.193 0.454 -0.013 
 (1.436) (1.453) (1.417) 
Observations 1380 1380 1380 
R-squared 0.43 0.44 0.44 
a Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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